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Abstract 
It is generally argued that units of the Late Roman Army were 
substantially smaller than those of the Early Empire. This concept may 
be largely accurate but a number of problems are involved and 
generalisations must be made with caution. 
Even for the Principate unit sizes are not easy to establish, although it 
seems likely that legions contained about 5,000 men each, and auxiliary 
units approximately their nominal quingenary or milliary strengths. 
Documentary evidence is limited but does tend to confirm the statements 
of ancient writers - about quingenary equitate cohorts, for example. 
The significant increase in the total of units during the fourth century 
provides powerful if inferential evidence for smaller units: this can be 
approximately quantified from the lists of the NoMa. Literary evidence 
for the Late Empire is contradictory: there are indications of small units 
but also references to larger ones. This may well reflect a reality of a 
majority of smaller units co-existing with some survivals of traditional 
ones 
The payments in cash and kind recorded in the Panopolis papyri have 
been used to extrapolate sizes for units in Diocletianic Egypt. Some 
units - especially cavalry - may have been quite under-strength relative to 
Principate norms but too many uncertainties surround the calculations 
involved to allow confidence in the estimates, even if they had a wider 
relevance. 
AB 1 
Archaeology provides evidence for small units, although these are not 
always easy to calculate precisely. The drastic reductions implied by 
some excavations need to be treated with caution: it is not clear, for 
example, that the north British "chalets" do actually represent married 
quarters for tiny garrisons. 
A number of other factors need to be considered, such as the extent of 
the internal re-organisation of units, and of the practice of official records 
including "ghost' soldiers. 
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Introduction 
The Roman Army is one of the best documented institutions of the Ancient 
world but there are nevertheless areas of its structure and operations where 
the modern scholar is tantalisingly under-informed. The sizes of the various 
types of units composing the Army of the fourth and early fifth centuries 
A. D. is such an area. The issue of individual unit sizes is of course also of 
interest for the earlier Empire, but that period has at least produced a small 
body of explicit evidence in the form of various sorts of unit and sub-unit 
registers - few of which appear to have been extraordinarily small. Such 
direct evidence however does not appear to have survived for periods 
beyond the early years of the third century. 
Until recent years rather more consideration has in fact been given to the 
overall size of the Imperial defence forces, with individual unit 
establishments having been treated as a side issue. Thus, Ramsay 
MacMullen in 19801 epitomised the estimates of some twenty scholars 
writing from 1914 onwards to present a range of army totals between a low 
of 200,000 and an absolute maximum of no fewer than 1,000,000 men. For 
the fourth and early fifth centuries, MacMullen cites calculations from 
200,000 to 737,000. 
In 1961 L. Vdrady2 had attempted some quite detailed computations for both 
overall numbers and unit sizes in the army of the fifth century. He 
suggested quite a complicated series of unit establishments considerably 
reduced in size from the assumed norms of the Principate but in effect 
these amounted to little more than educated guesses. Although certain 
evidence had long existed in terms of, for instance, literary references to 
unit sizes, it is arguable that the breakthrough for this subject came with the 
publication in Dublin in 1964 of fragmentary papyri from the files of the 
strategus at Panopolis in Upper Egypt dating from AD 298-300. Although 
not explicitly providing information about unit sizes, these documents record 
details of the transfer of quantities of cash and supplies to various units of 
the Egyptian garrison. A. H. M. Jones in 19643 and Richard Duncan-Jones 
in 19784 extrapolated from the Panopolis papyri unit sizes for the 
Diocletianic army. These estimates, and especially the greatly reduced 
estimates of Duncan-Jones, have become central to the debate and widely 
accepted. A major element of this thesis will be a critique of these 
assessments and of the generalisations that have been based on them. 
The other central element of the case for significantly reduced unit sizes is 
the evidence of archaeology and especially the apparently diminutive 
garrisons of certain British forts housed in newly contructed "chalets" or 
family units. The chalet argument was first presented in detail by John 
Wilkes in 19665 and has since gained very wide currency. That argument 
will also be analysed. 
Roger Tomlin is an eminent example of a proponent for the case that the 
Roman Army contained units of very small size by the early 4th century. 6 
This case will be presented and examined in this thesis. The approach will 
be based essentially on a study of the primary written sources, both 
documentary and literary, and interpretations of these sources but some 
attention will also be paid to archaeological evidence. 
The issue of unit sizes is of more than marginal interest and its implications 
have generally been somewhat neglected. Small units might, for instance, 
imply a different attitude towards fort defence and the need to withstand 
sieges. It might also support a case that units must have changed their 
internal structures, and would have found the outposting of sub-units - 
which increasingly appears to have been characteristic of the first century - 
more difficult. The scale of military engagements in the Late Empire might 
also have been of a different nature had army units been smaller. Smaller 
units do not of course necessarily mean a smaller army, but where fort or 
provincial garrisons were reduced there would have been economic 
consequences of at least a local nature. Most significant perhaps is a 
possible connection between units smaller as a result of decay rather than 
deliberate planning and the military setbacks of the fourth and fifth centuries. 
Was the decline of Rome and the fall of the Western Empire partly the 
consequence of invading forces being opposed by army units with declining 
troop numbers? 
Such a re-examination of the evidence for unit sizes in the Late Empire 
should throw light on the sort of questions raised above. Many secondary 
works incorporate bold and sweeping assertions about unit sizes in the Later 
Roman Army and, based on such generalisations, proceed to further broad 
statements about the Late Army in general and even about Late Antiquity as 
a whole. This enquiry will also involve an evaluation of the interpretations of 
the evidence, and thus an examination of the validity of the generalisations 
most commonly put forward in secondary works. 
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Although the army of the Late Empire contained a number of new types of 
units and of units based on earlier types but much altered, it will be useful 
briefly to glance at those earlier formations and to attempt to establish some 
sort of base-lines from which to look at later developments. 
The army of the Early Empire was a much simpler organisation than that of 
the Late Empire and contained a fairly limited number of types of units. 
Leaving aside elements of ihe Fleet and the Praetorian Guard (as well as 
what we might consider para-military units such as the Wgiles and coholtes 
, vnbanae), the army of the Early Empire was composed of the Legions and 
the Auxiliaries. 
The Legions 
It is generally agreed that, from a peak of some sixty legions at the time of 
the Battle of Actium (31 Bq, Augustus created an Imperial Army that 
included some 28 legions. During the next two centuries or so, this figure 
remained remarkably constant: the low point was apparently the 25 legions 
reached following the Varian disaster in AD 9 (a figure not increased for 
some 30-33 years), with the total peaking at thirty legions in perhaps AD 
68RO, c. AD 10 1 and c. AD 165.1 
It is indicative of the problems involved in assessing Roman Army unit sizes 
that, as Keppie remarked, ". .. surprisingly the precise total [sc. of men in a 
legion] is nowhere reliably aftested., '2 
Writing during the reign of Augustus, Livy put the strength of a legion in 340 
BC at 5,000 infantry and 300 cavalry. 3 The Greek historian Polybius, writing 
in the second century BC and referring to his own times, said that a legion 
included 300 cavalry and 4,200 infantry, which could be increased "in times 
of exceptional danger"to a total of 5,000.4 
This seems to provide a basis for estimating legionary strengths during the 
mid/late Republic of perhaps 4,500-5,300, This is not a greatly different 
range from estimates that can be produced for the Early Empire, and it is 
interesting to note that the Byzantine antiquarian, John Lydus, writing in the 
mid-sixth century AD but purporting to refer to 388 BC. gave legions a 
strength of 6,000 infantry. 5 
The Early Imperial legions were organised rather differently from Republican 
ones and our basis for calculating their size is the explicit statement in the 
anonymous treatise on laying out fortifications attributed to "Hyginus": 
plena centuria habet milites LXXX. -6 Excavation of fortress plans also 
makes it clear that, whatever may once or theoretically have been true, 
accommodation was invariably provided for eighty rather than a hundred 
men per cm7tulia. 
Six centuries of eighty men each would have made a cohort 480 strong and 
given a legion an establishment of 4.800 men but there is the additional 
complication that by the late first century AD the First Cohort had developed 
a structure quite different from the other nine: it had not six centuries but 
five and those of double strength (160 men). The First Cohort of a legion 
contained therefore not the standard 480 men but 800. This should have 
produced a legionary total of 5,120 men (9 X 480 = 4,320 + 800) but there 
needs also to be considered the fact that the legion also included, in addition 
to its infantry, a small force of 120 mounted troops - used apparently as 
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scouts and messengers. It seems most probable that these troopers were 
carried on the books of the cohorts rather than additionally and that 
therefore the actual establishment of a legion was 5,120. If this view is 
mistaken and the mounted element was supernumerary, then the legionary 
establishment would have been 5,240 men. 
These considerations allow for no final certa7inty but it will be a reasonably 
safe generalisation to state that by the late first century AD a legion's 
theoretical strength was just in excess of 5,000. 
The need for non-legionary forces raised outside the citizen body and 
performing functions not well served by the legions - such as cavalry and 
light infantry - had arisen intermittently under the Republic, and such forces 
had been raised on an adhoc basis. Even by the beginning of the Empire 
many of these auxiliary units may not have had a permanent existence but 
have been disbanded when no longer needed. Very large numbers of such 
formations were however gathered during the Civil Wars and the reign of 
Augustus: the Balkan expeditionary force of AD 7, for example, included not 
only ten legions but no fewer than 86 auxiliary units. 7 
By the Early Empire, and possibly under Augustus. auxiliary units became 
regular elements of the Army and acquired their standardised organisations 
and sizes. The majority of auxiliary formations were nominally 500 strong 
but a large minority were theoretically double this size. During the second 
half of the first century AD "mixed" units - of both infantry and cavalry - 
emerged, and by then six different types of units can be distinguished: - 
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1. The most common type was the quingenary peditate cohort, an infantry 
"battalion" of 500 men. "Hyginus7state& that these comprised six 
centuries. Although the reference in "Hyginus"g to the strength of centuries 
is legionary and there is no explicit evidence on this point elsewhere, it 
seems reasonable to assign these centuries also strengths of eighty men 
each, giving these units total establishments of 480 which obviously 
matches quite closely with the nominal quingenary size. One calculation is 
that there were 127 such units in existence by c. AD 150.10 
2. Milliary peditate cohorts were double-sized infantry units developed 
under the Early Empire: one of the first records of such a unit dates from 
AD 88.11 According to "Hyginus", they consisted not of 12 centuries (as 
might have been expected) but of ten: 1 2 legionary-sized centuries would 
have put these units at 800 men. It has been suggested aftematively that, in 
this case, centuries of 100 men should be assumed bringing the cohorts to 
their nominal milliary strength. There are however obvious difficulties in 
arguing that the Roman Army operated centuries of different sizes. It has 
been calculated that-there were no more than perhaps 18 of these large 
formations in the mid-first century. 1 3 
3. The most common cavalry units were quingenary alae. There are two 
ancient references for calculating their size: "Hyginus! ' wrote that they 
comprised 16 fulmae (or "squadrons'l 14 and Arrian that they totalled 512 
men. 1 5 The turma size which these two figures produce (32) coincides 
neatly with the figure Vegetius gave for a legionary cavalry turma. 1 6 The 
squadron commanders, the decurions, seem not to have been included in 
Arrian's figures: their inclusion would take the unit size to 528 (512 + 16). It 
remains unclear however whether the two junior officers in each turma, the 
duplicadus and the sesquiplicadus, should or should not be included in the 
totals and therefore whether there were thirty or 32 actual troopers. The 
mid-second century total of quingenary alae has been calculated at some 
82-90 units (with perhaps up to about 15 stationed in Britain)) 
4. The rare milliary alae consisted of 24 turmae, according to "Hyginus", 
although 32 might have been anticipated. 1 8 24 turmae of 32 men each 
produce a unit size of 768, which some feel falls rather short of the nominal 
thousand. It has been argued by von Domaszewskil 9 on the basis of an 
inscription from Coptos that the turmae of milliary alae were not 32 but 42 
strong: this would put the establishment of such a unit at 1.008. It is far 
from cAear however that the Coptos, inscription does in fact record, as von 
Domaszewski claimed, a veAllation from three alae with 424 troopers under 
ten officers: it can also be interpreted as referring to five squadron 
commanders (the five decril7bnes) and their five subordinate officers. This 
would then have no relevance to establishing the turma size in these units. 
Breeze and Dobson have argued20 that these milliary alae should be seen 
not so much as "double! ' sized units but rather as "one-and-a-halfers7, which 
a strength of 768 would make them. 21 Inclusion of 24 decurions would 
produce a grand total of 792. 
Another way of producing a total closer to the nominal 1.000 would be to 
allow each of 24 turmae not 32 men but forty: forty men could represent five 
contuberniae. There is no evidential basis for assuming forty-strong turmae 
but this suggestion would give an ala of 960 men. 
In any case it is these rare units, rather than the legions, which should 
perhaps be seen as the Mite shock troops of the Early Empire: a strike force 
of at least 750 horsemen would hardly fail to impress. They would be 
expensive to maintain and this might help to explain why the normal total for 
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these units across the Empire was no more than between eight and ten: 
only one was stationed in Britain. 22 
5. Real problems arise when we begin to look at possible sizes for the part- 
mounted equitate cohorts, units which R. W. Davies has described as one of 
the few major military innovations of the Principate. 23 An inscription from 
late in the reign of AugustUS24 is perhaps the earliest record of such a unit, 
or at least a prototype. Quingenary equitate cohorts had six centuries and 
120 cavalry, according to "Hyginus', 25. but of course 120 does not divide by 
32. We might however assume four turmae of only thirty each (4 X 30 = 
120) or argue that the 120 of "Hyginus7was an approximation for 128, which 
would allow turmae of 32 (4 X 32 = 128). Alternatively, it has been 
suggested that quingenary equitate cohorts might have included five rather 
than four turmae: five turmae each of three standard eight-strong 
contubernia and five turmae each of four smaller contubernia of only six 
men each both produce exactly 120 troopers. Although most documentary 
evidence points to four turmae as a norm, the well documented Twentieth 
Palmyrenes from Dura had five and fort plans can be found to support both 
possibilities. 
What infantry strength are we then to allow such a cohort?. The norm for 
centuries of eighty men, as in the case of legions and quite probably 
auxiliary cohorts too, would give an equitate cohort an infantry component of 
480 (6 X 80 = 480). We could then calculate a unit size of 600 or 608 (480 
+ 120 or 480 + 128). which seems a reasonable approximation for the 
nominal size of 500. If it is felt however, as some have argued, that the 
important consideration in making these calculations is to produce a unit as 
close as possible to the the nominal size, then centuries of 72 (nine 
contubernia of eight each), 64 (eight contubernia of eight each) or sixty (ten 
smaller contubernia of only six each) have all been proposed as possibilities. 
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Table 2 lists some of the complicated permutations which result from these 
alternative suggestions: as well as the 600 or 608 already considered, unit 
sizes of 480,488,504,512,552 and 560 also then become possibilities. 
The Empire in the mid-second century contained some 130 equitate cohorts: 
the bulk of the cohorts in Britain (perhaps 25 or slightly more) were of this 
type. 26 
6. Finally, there were the milliary equitate cohorts: part-mounted units 
nominally 1,000-strong. Although "Hyginus" stated a precise structure for 
these regiments (ten centuries with 760 infantry and ten turmae of 240 
cavalry)27, a wide range of alternatives have nevertheless been proposed. 
The figures given by "Hyginus! 'would produce centuries of 76 men but the 
legionary norm of eighty would raJse the infantry component to 800 men. 
This could be further varied to 600,640 or 720 to accommodate century 
sizes of sbcty, 64 or 72 men respectively. If the cavalry figure given by 
"Hyginue' is accepted, there would already then be unit size possibilities of 
840,880,960,1,000 and 1,040. 
Further complications are produced by the suggestions that turma numbers 
must have been eight rather than ten and that turma sizes must have been 
thirty or 32 rather than 24. The basis for assuming eight turmae is that the 
text of "Hyginus! ' is corrupt at this point and that eight would neatly double 
the four that may have applied to quingenary equitate cohorts. Thirty or 32 
troopers have already been argued, and it is worth noting that eight turmae 
of thirty men each exactly matches the 240 troopers of "Hyginus", while eight 
turmae of 32 each comes close at 256. 
Table 2 lays out the complex permutations produced by the various 
suggestions for these units: there are 21 possible structures and 16 
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possible sizes. The total number of such units in the Empire in the mid- 
second century was perhaps no higher than about 22.28 
It is very difficult to conclude then that our base-lines for unit size 
assumptions for the situation by the end of the first century are very solidly 
drawn, although some seem firmer than others and in any case the range of 
possibilifies suggested for any particular unit type is not ridiculously wide: at 
the largest [milliary equitate cohorts] the top end of the scale is no more than 
36% higher than the bottom. Even with these official, theoretical 
establishments however, it is perhaps necessary to consider that - in some 
cases at least - our primary literary sources are mistaken or corrupt or partly 
so. Secondly, terminology (especially distributive numbers) is not being 
employed with any great precision. Thirdly, the Roman Army may have 
used the same unit or sub-unit term to describe formations of quite different 
sizes. 
Theory is of course one thing: practice, all too frequently. quite another. 
Many examples of modern institutions - military or otherwise - could be cited 
where official structures or sizes have little to do with reality. A small 
number of Roman Army documents survive from the second and early third 
centuries, against which we can attempt to collate the unit sizes suggested 
above. 
1. Chronologically, the first document to be considered is the recently 
discovered strength report from Vindolanda. of cohors I Tungrorum. 29 This 
is the only major document yet found from the earliest [1.42-hectare/3.5- 
acrel fort on the site (occupied a AD 85/90): it probably dates however from 
slightly later, 18th May of a year unknown but probably AD 92-7 and is 
a 
possibly an interim monthly return. It puts the net strength (num, -1z1spz11us) 
of the unit at 752 men including six centurions. A striking proportion of the 
unit was absent from base: 46 were serving as guards of the governor "at 
the office of Fero)e'; 30 no fewer than 337 (45% of the cohort's strength) 
including two centurions were at "Coria! ' (probably Corbridge): a centurion 
was in London: and 72 other soldiers, including two centurions, were 
distributed among five posts which cannot be identified. In other words 456 
men (61 % of the total) including five out of six centurions were away from 
base. Of the remaining 296,31 were ill (including six from wounds and 
apparently ten with eye problems) leaving only 265 men with just a single 
centurion (35%) present at the cohort's base and fit for action. 
The editors assume3l that the cohort was of the milliary peditate type. It is 
known from other evidence that the unit was milliary by AD 103, reduced to 
quingenary by AD 122 but milliary again by AD 146.32 If milliary, the unit 
was evidently under-strength (although a respectable 94% of a nominal 800) 
and included only six centurions. As well as the outside possibility that the 
unit was actually an over-strength quingenary one, it has also been 
suggested that it may have been a cohort in the process of re-organising 
from quingenary to milliary strength. 33 If the tablet is correctly assigned to 
the earliest Vindolanda fort, then there is the further oddity that that site 
could never have held the whole strength recorded in the document, 
although it could have accommodated more than the 250-odd it actually did. 
There may of course have been other units at Vindolanda at thiis time but we 
must also note the strong possibility that Roman Army forts were - at least at 
this period - not intended ever to house the whole of their garrison units. 34 
There is an important implication here for the lessons that can be drawn 
from archaeological evidence. 
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2. Another early document is the one known as "Hunt's pridianum", an 
annual return for cohors I Hispanorum veterana stationed at Stobi in 
Macedonia probably in the period AD 105/108.35 The papyrus puts the 
unit's strength at 546, including 119 cavalry, under six centurions and four 
decurions. This is evidently a quingenary equitate cohort with probably four 
slightly under-strength 32-strong turmae or perhaps four turmae very close 
to an establishment of thirty. 36 Mark Hassall has suggested alternatively 
that one decurion was absent and that there were in fact five turmae each 
with a theoretical establishment of 24 and therefore at 99.2% of strength. 37 
The infantry element of the cohort can be assumed by a process of 
deduction (546 - 119) to have totalled 427 men. Divided by six, this 
produces a century average of just over 71.38 As it is difficult to argue for 
the cohort having had turmae under-strength but centuries not, the simplest 
interpretation is to accept the obvious: that the cohort had sbc centuries 
each at average strength of about 90%39 of an establishment of eighty. 
This pridianurn demonstrates incidentally the Roman Army's predilection for 
detaching small forces from a parent unit. Apart from small numbers (or 
perhaps individual soldiers) detached, the cohort had a garrison based at 
Piroboridava in the Sereth (Hierasus) Valley over 650 Wilometres [400 miles] 
from HQ; a scouting patrol across the Danube, and an expedition with 23 
troopers, at least one decurion, and a centurion (with presumably some 
infantry too) also across the Danube. Mthough only the last element can be 
even provisionally quantified, the cohort had a substantial minority of its 
troops away from its base - in some cases, surprising distances away. 
3. A pridianum of the cohors I Augusta PraetoHa Lusitanorum equitata has 
been found dating from 31 August 156.40 Total strength is put at 505, 
including sbc centurions with 363 infantry (an average of 60.5 men per 
10 
century). A nominal century establishment of eighty would make these 
centuries rather weak (75.65% of maximum) but this would not be 
unreasonable in conditions of relative peace: the unit had been at the same 
station opposite Apollonopolis Maior in the Thebaid for 25 years. It might 
otherwise be calculated that the centuries of this cohort were at full strength 
meant to comprise not eighty but either sixty or 64 men each, in which case 
they would actually have averaged in AD 156 100.8% or 94.5% of 
establishment. 
The pridianurn gives the cohort 114 troopers but only three decurions. 
Assuming that there were in fact four turmae, this would mean each 
contained an average 28.5 men, which might represent 89% of a nominal 
32. This is a plausible calculation but it might otherwise be suggested that 
the turmae were at full strength thirty strong and therefore in this case at 
95% of establishment, or perhaps that there were in fact five 24-strong 
turmae in this cohort each actually averaging 22.8 men (or again 95% of 
nominal strength). As usual however the simplest assumption remains the 
most attractive. 
It can be noted that this unit appears in the Noffa Digl7&&m still stationed 
in Egypt, although 155 kilometres [250 miles] down the Nile at Hieracon (Der 
el GebraYA). 41 Aftough the disposition of the forces under the dux 
Thebaidos recorded in the Notitia are apparently Diocletianic, it nevertheless 
implies that the cohors I Lusitanorum had been based in Egypt for well over 
a century and a half, and perhaps even longer. 
4. First published in 1977 is the pridianurn of an unidentified quingenary 
equitate cohort stationed in Egypt, possibly in the Thebaid. The editors 
suggest that the unit is identical to the one in the previous example - cohors I 
Lusitanorum - but this identification is far from certain. 42 
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The pridianum dates from 213/216, and probably from 215.43 The cohort it 
records contained four decurions with 100 troopers plus 13 camel-riders. 
Total strength is given as 457 and the six centurions recorded presumably 
therefore commanded 334 infantrymen - an average of 55.7 men each. 44 
Assuming four decurions represent four turmae, each turma would have 
contained 25 troopers an average. 45 
The papyrus does apparently record permanent losses of thirty men 
C'decesserunt") from the cohort, including an unknown number posted to the 
Fleet, 46 seven killed (in action? ) and one invalided out. These permanent 
losses imply an original unit strength of 487. Only about three-quarters of 
the cohort was actually present at its base: the pridianum records 126 men 
Oust over 27% of total) "absunt in choram". 47 These soldiers posted to the 
countryside may have been, the editors suggest, stationed in the Delta to 
help deal with the disturbances following Caracalla! s visit in 215. 
5. The only substantial files of a Roman Army unit ever to have been 
discovered are those of cohors XX Palmyrenorum from Dura-Europos in 
Syria Coele. Originally a Seleucid fortress built in 300 BC, the city of Dura 
had been briefly under Roman control during the reign of Trajan (AD 115- 
117) and was recaptured by Lucius Verus during his Parthian expedition of 
AD 165 and thereafter retained until its destruction by Persian forces under 
Shapur I in 256. Dura was in an important position, lying at the centre of the 
district along the Euphrates known as the Parapotamia and also directly on 
the principal route from lower Mesopotamia into northern Syria: the whole 
Euphrates line formed a major element of the frontier between Rome and its 
Iranian neighbours (the Parthians and later the Sassanids), and Dura was 
one of a string of strong outposts along it. 
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For the first thirty or forty years of the main Roman occupation very little is 
known about Dura. It seems to have had a small garrison, at least partly 
composed of Palmyrene archers - as had been the case during the late 
Parthian period. The unit that is of particular concern here, the cohors XX 
Palmyrenorum. is first attested at Dura on 16th March AD 208 (P. Dura 56) 
but may well have been in existence considerably longer - possibly from the 
190s or even 170s. 48 The cohort is known only from the papyri from its own 
archive and from inscriptions from the city. It was presumably lost or 
formally disbanded when the Persians captured Dura. 
The records of the cohort are an extremely rich source but, for the present 
purpose, they arguably create more problems than they solve. The archive 
includes two extremely rare complete working rosters (of the type called 
"Morning Reports! ' by Fink): they are probably about three or four years 
apart in date. The earlier roster was dated by its editors to AD 21949 and 
lists all the men of the unit grouped by centuries and turmae. Strangely 
enough there are six of the former and five of the latter, which of course 
corresponds to none of the equitate cohort structures already suggested, 
either quingenary or milliary. The century sizes vary considerably from a 
minimum of about 69 to well over 140: all but one century have strengths in 
three figures. 50 It can be seen therefore that, on one of the rare occasions 
when reality is recorded in detail, it bears only a slight resemblance to 
theory. Average century size for XX Palmyrenorum in 219 works out in the 
range 121/123 - i. e. over 50% larger than the usual assumed norm of eighty. 
One complication to be borne is mind is that actual totals survive only for 
three of the cohort's centuries and these in only one case match tidily with 
what a damaged papyrus seems to record in terms of names. Thus, for 
example, the century of Marcus is given as containing a total of 140 soldiers 
but the papyrus only includes some 105 actual names with lacvl7ae implying 
another 24 or so - for a total of about 129.51 Similarly, the papyrus's editors 
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put the total of names for the century of Aurelius Julius Marianus at 114 with 
about 25 retmes lost for a total of some 139 men (compared with the 
recorded total of 146). 52 What might therefore have appeared to be a fairly 
standard quingenary equitate cohort in fact had five of its six centuries 
greatly over-strength, in some cases nearly double the probable norm of 
eighty men each. 
The turmae of XX Palmyrenorum are equally far removed in practice from 
the theories discussed above - to a positively bizarre degree. Bearing in 
mind the usual turma size assumption of 32, the Dura cohort in contrast 
contained turmae with claimed total sizes of 140/149,130/139,122-1131, 
120/139 and 134. In other words, theory would have given these five turmae 
no more than 160 men while the roster actually records squadron totals 
giving the cohort no fewer than 646 cavalry and perhaps as many as 692 - 
four times more than might have been expected! On the other hand, as with 
the infantry element of the unit, the roster details do not support the claimed 
squadron totals given above. They are respectively 60,66,68,71 and 61/67 
men: although much lower than the claimed totals, these figures are of 
course very large - in the region of double the assumed norm of 32 - and still 
push the cavalry element of the unit well beyond the theoretical maximum of 
160 to something in the region of 326/332. With the first four turmae 
incidentally, the papyrus has no lacunae and the totals provided by the 
names listed can be taken as indisputably accurate totals. 
We are left then, on the evidence of P. Dura 100. with a very strange unit 
both in terms of structure and size. It also appears to be a unit with a 
theoretical or paper strength considerably higher than its actucal numbers. 
Counting the names that can actually be read a total of 945 is reached; this 
is surely an incontrovertible minimum but gaps in the papyrus can be 
assumed to push this up to some 1,054. An additional 16 dromadadithen 
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create a grand total of 1,070 men. The unit sub-total figures however claim 
an enormous strength for the cohort of something between 1,390 and 1,451 
men. It may be that what is recorded here is a normal quingenary equitate 
cohort heavily reinforced because of the critical situation on the Eastern 
frontier (it was after all only 37 years after this document was compiled that 
Dura was lost to the Persians), or that it was a milliary unit from which a 
vexillation (of four out of ten centuries and three out of eight turmae) had 
been permanently detached and then this reduced structure was doubled to 
serve as a guard "unit"for a Governor or Dux. There rema7ins the problem 
however of the gross inflation of the paper strength of the turmae: the 
cohort was apparently carrying some 316-362 "ghost'troopers. This 
practice is certainly known from other periods of history and may well have 
been a semi-official custom to allow for the drawing of extra rations and/or 
pay. Why however should the unit only create "ghost" cavalrymen? The 
answer might relate to the fact that the cavalry was better paid than the 
infantry but it is still hard not to wonder if the Imperial Treasury would not 
have been likely to notice fraud on quite such a scale. 
The Dura archive also included a series of "morning reports" dating from a 
March in an unknown year between AD 223 and 235 (possibly 233). On 27 
March, for instance, the cohort totalled 92353 including 223 cavalry; there 
were nine centurions (although only six centuries), five decurions, twenty 
junior officers and 34 camel-riders. The figures for the next two days are not 
complete (92- and 9-) but on 30 March the cohort strength was down to 9 14 
men. The fluid nature of unit establishments is illustrated by this 11% loss of 
strength in four days. 
Further Dura records give strengths of 781 at its base C'in hibernis! '), 
including perhaps 185 (or 233) cavalry. on 27 and 28 May 239: 54 766 milites 
and 226 (? ) absentees at a date in c. 2251235; 55 and apparently 389 equites 
is 
at a date unknown. 56 All things considered. the Dura materials present a 
very odd and confusing picture. 
6. Robert Marichal published in 1979 an article on the discovery at Bu 
Njem in Libya of some 146 ostraca, of which 117 relate to matters military. 57 
Although Bu Njem's garrison between AD 201 and 238 included a vexillation 
of legio AlAugusta, the nine ostraca that are dated are from the 250s and 
apparently refer to a numelus based in the fort under a decurion. Although 
Marichal printed only one ostracon in full, the others apparently included a 
number of century daily reports. The number of effectives varied from 42 to 
63 men, averaging 57. These are fairly weak sub-unit strengths if we 
assume nominal century sizes of 80 (71 % on average) but not unreasonably 
low. 
Table 1 has been constructed to show the possible tables of organisation for 
quingenary equitate cohorts, the units for which the largest number of 
primary sources survive (although it needs to be stressed that these 
nevertheless represent a tiny and random sample). What does seem to 
emerge is that the two basic points of evidence provided by "Hyginus" are 
well supported and therefore credible: namely, the units contained sLx 
centuries and 120 cavalrymen. 
Cohors XX Palmyrenorum has been exduded from the list and, with this 
exception, it would be hard to argue for any other conclusion than that six 
centuries were standard, although the documentary evidence remains 
implicit rather than explicit. The cavalry component, as recorded by the 
documents, is strikingly homogenous: they come within 99.1%, 95% and 
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83.3% of the "Hyginus" norm: it would be perverse not to acccept this norm 
as reality. 
The infantry element however shows much more variety and this needs 
explanation. It may simply reflect the practicality that a smaller element is 
easier to keep up to strength than a larger one, or it may be more to do with 
the greater significance of the cavalry: they might have been regarded as 
the equivalent of a modem rapid reaction force. A number of suggestions 
have already been considered for the possible sizes of the infantry 
component of a quingenary equitate cohort: 360,384,432 or 480. There is 
no real room for ultimate certainty here but the general difficulty armies of 
any period have had in keeping forces abow establishment might tend to 
create a preference for a figure larger than the largest actually recorded - 
that is, above 427, The fact that the existence of legionary centuries of 
eighty men is well attested might further incline us towards the calculation 
based on this assumption: that is, 480 infantrymen (six centuries of eighty 
each). 
Although it must again be stressed that these figures (120 cavalry and 480 
infantry = 600 men in a quingenary equitate cohort) can be claimed as no 
more than one strong possibility, it is interesting to note that on this basis 
the largest of the recorded such units would have had an impressive 99% of 
its troopers and a healthy 89% of its infantry. 
It is always useful however to try to place our evidence in some sort of 
probability context and, if for the period covered by the examples in Table I 
(from the first decade of the second century to the second decade of the 
third), we accept Dobson's estimate of 130 such units and if we allow for no 
more than one strength report per annum (an unlikely minimum), then the 
three records we have represent survival of an absolute maximum of 0.02% 
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of the originals. This is clearly very much random survival and should make 
us wary of concluding that any particular document demonstrates the 
typical. 
Table 2 has been devised to show the literary evidence for unit structures 
and sizes together with the various interpretations of this evidence. It can be 
seen that the literary evidence is far from conclusive and remains open to a 
bewildering variety of interpretations, especially with the more complex unit 
types. 
The documentary evidence, in conclusion, represents extremely limited 
random survival and the records of cohors XX Palmyrenorum, for example, 
create more problems than they solve. Until more evidence is discovered, 
we remain confined to probabilities, although in some cases the range of 
options is at least fairly limited. 
Table Im Possffile Structure & Soze Models for Quengeolmy Equotate 
Cohorts (Literaly & DocumenjMy EvideoW 
Source/Unit Centudes InfantEy Turmae Caval ai= 
(Date) 
"Hyginus! ' 
(2nd Century) 6 120 
Coh I Hisp vet 6 (prob. ) 427 4 (prob. ) 119 546/ 
(AD 105/108) 596(? ) 
Coh I Lusitanorum 6 (prob. ) 363 4 (? ) 114 505 
(AD 156) 
? Coh 6 (prob. ) 334 4 (prob. ) 100 457/ 
(a AD 215) 487 
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Table 2- Possible Establishments for Auxileary Units 
Centudes Infant[y Turmae Caval[y sj= 
"Hyginus! ' 6 
6x8O 480 
Be * o 
480 
"Hyginus! ' 
M Ilialy Ped t 
10 
ate Cohort 
800 
10 x 80 800 800 
10 x 100 1000 
e e 
1000 
"Hyginus! ' 
C Qu ngen a[y Ala 
16 
Arrian 512 512 
Vegetius -x 32? 
16 x 32 512 512/ 
o * 
528 
"Hyginus" 
D M Iliac y Ala 
24 
24 x 32 768 768/ 
792 
24 x 42 1008 1008 
24 x 40 960 960 
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"Hyginus! ' 6 120 
6x 60 360 4x3O 120 480 
6x 64 384 4x3O 120 504 
6x72 432 4x3O 120 552 
6x8O 480 4x3O 120 600 
6x 60 360 4x32 128 488 
6x 64 384 4x32 128 512 
6x72 432 4x32 128 560 
6x8O 480 4x32 128 608 
6x 60 360 5x 24 120 480 
6x 64 384 5x 24 120 504 
6x72 432 5x24 120 552 
6x8O 480 5x24 120 600 
"Hyginus" lOx76 760 10 x 24 240 1000 
10 x 60 600 10 x 24 240 840 
10 x 64 640 10 x 24 240 880 
10 x 72 720 10 x 24 240 960 
10 x 80 800 10 x 24 240 1040 
10 x 60 600 8x32 256 856 
10 x 64 640 8x 32 256 896 
10 x 72 720 8x32 256 976 
10 x 80 800 8x32 256 1056 
10 x 60 600 lOx32 320 820 
10 x 64 640 10 x 32 320 860 
10 x 72 720 10 x 32 320 1040 
10 x 80 800 10 x 32 320 1120 
10 x 60 600 8x3O 240 840 
10 x 64 640 8x30 240 880 
10 x 72 720 8x3O 240 960 
10 x 80 800 8x30 240 1040 
10 x 60 600 10 x 30 300 900 
10 x 64 640 10 x 30 300 940 
10x72 720 10 x 30 300 1020 
10 x80 800 10x30 300 1100 
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55: P. Dura 91 = Fink, RMR No. 61. Does this mean a unit total of 992 or 
had the absentees already been discounted? Or does 766 "milites" 
specifically refer only to the cohort's infantry". ) 
56: P. Dura 92 = Fink, RMR No. 62. In addition P. Dura 83 (= Fink, RMR 
No. 48), dating from about 4 September 233, mentions 120 cavalry 
with XX Palmyrenorum: P. Dura 49 (-- Fink, RAM No. 49), dating 
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The structure of the army in the Early Empire was then, as we have seen, 
relatively simple. Excluding naval formations, the Praetorians, para-military 
forces and the numeri [a vague term meaning something like "units], we 
can describe the bulk of the army as comprising the legions and the 
auxiliaries - the latter being made up of six different types. 
There seem to have been some 28 legions by the mid-second century, rising 
to 33 by the beginning of the next. Allowing each legion the establishment 
of 5,000 which we have seen as being the best estimate, there would 
therefore have been some 140,000 legionaries in r- AD 150 and perhaps 
165,000 in a AD 200. Estimating a total of auxiliary units is less 
straightforward but a variety of attempts have been made. Brian Dobson, 
for example, has calculated some 387 cohorts and alae by r- AD 150.1 Eric 
Birley put the total for the same period at 409-419,2 while Ramsay 
MacMullen would bring the total down half a century or so later to 
approximately 350.3 Dobson uses his own estimates to put the total of 
auxiliaries at 227,000 for the mid-second century, while MacMullen reckons 
the total for the Severan period to have been 175,000.4 
We might then turn to the question posed by MacMullen in 1980: "How Big 
was the Roman Imperial Army'? "5 He demonstrated how many and varied 
had been the answers, quoting estimates of 500,000 for the second century, 
420,000 under Marcus Aurelius, and 400,000 or 300,000 under Severus. 
His own preference for the latter period was 345,000. One of the more 
recent forays into this field was by Anthony Birley: he rejected lower 
estimates in favour of a figure for the mid-I 60s of 415-445,000.6 Even 
accepting the lower end of the scale of possibilities, it is worth remembering 
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that few other examples of standing armies of anything approaching a third 
of a million men would be known until the 19th century. 
Before turning to consider how this army of the first and second centuries 
developed and changed, it is worth noting that it always included remarkable 
examples of stability and longevity. David Kennedy has recently shown how 
the proportion of survival from the early to the later army vary widely from 
region to region: very few pre-Severan auxiliary units, for example, survive 
on the Rhine and Danube (fewer than 9%). whereas the proportion in Britain 
is 30% and rises to nearly 36% in the East. 7 Jones lists a whole series of 
examples of continuity into the early Byzantine period, 6 among which the 
stories of two legions are particularly striking. V Macedonica, probably 
raised in 43 BC, was still serving under Justinian (the unit thus surviving for 
some 600 years), while the last clear reference to a legion in battle occurs in 
the account by Theophylact Simocatta, of the death of a soldier from the 
legion IV Parthica, then stationed at Beroe in Syria, on the field at 
Solachon. 9 That battle took place in the spring of 586 in the reign of 
Maurice - IV Parthica was then nearly 290 years old. 
The Develogament of a Field Armyn Early Precedents 
One of the significant ways in which the army of the Later Empire was a 
different creature from that of the Early Empire was its division into frontier 
garrison forces and strategic reserve or field army units. The army of the 
Principate had no true reserve capacity. and much of the military history of 
the first and early second centuries involves the shuffling of forces between 
threatened fronts or areas of planned conquest. 
In the early days of the Empire, the only real reserve forces under central 
command were the nine quingenary cohorts of the Praetorian Guard. 
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However at first only three of these units (a mere 1,500 men) were stationed 
in Rome itself; the other six (4,500 troops) normally being scattered through 
various Italian cities, until Tiberius concentrated the Guard in Rome. It is 
difficult to support the view, put forward for example by Eric Birley, 1 0 that the 
four Urban cohorts and seven cohorts of Wgiles should also be included as 
"GHO forces. " In practice they equate rather more comfortably to modern 
emergency rather than armed services: the Wgiles, for example, carried no 
weapons. 11 
With such limited central reserve capacity available, it was therefore possible 
to deal with strategic crises only by either the use of detachments or by the 
transfer of entire units, even legions. Thus, for example, when the revolt of 
Tacfarinas in Numidia proved difficult to suppress in the early 20s, the legion 
IX Hispana was temporarily transferred 1,600 kilometres [a thousand miles] 
from Pannonia. Similarly, when the Syrian legions proved unable to cope 
with the First Jewish Revolt in Nero's reign, the legion XV Apollinaris was 
transferred to the East from Pannonia, where it in turn was replaced by X 
Gemina from Spain. A British instance occurred in AD 83, when Agricola's 
British command was depleted of vexillations from the legions 11 Adiutrix, IX 
Hispana and XX Valeria Victrix for Domitian's Chattan War. Such 
vexillations were in effect aoll; oc field armies, and the prototype for later 
developments. 
Transfers of whole legions appear to have occurred for the last time under 
Marcus Aurelius, when 11 Adiutrix from Lower Pannonia and I Minervia from 
Lower Germany (together probably with V Macedonica from Lower Moesia) 
were transferred east for the Parthian War of the early 160s. Thereafter the 
only permanent transfers seem to have been when V Macedonica moved to 
Dacia in 166. and finally when Dacia was abandoned in 270 and V 
Macedonica and XIII Gemina were withdrawn. 
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Although the emergence of a field army was a process rather than an event, 
one turning-point which has been considered to mark the development of a 
quasi-permanent de la'cto field army is the reign of Marcus Aurelius. The 
Danubian Wars of the late 160s and 170s exposed the weakness of the 
Imperial defences: Marcus's response to the crisis included the improvising 
of field armies and the raising of two new legions (11 and III Italicae) for the 
protection of northern Italy. 
The reign of Septimius Severus (AD 193-211) seems however to have been 
even more crucial in the history of the development of the army of the Later 
Empire. Severus inherited thirty legions, which he increased to 33 with the 
raising of 1-111 Parthicae. Although I and III Parthicae were stationed in the 
new province of Mesopotamia, 11 Parthica formed part of what can be seen 
as the greatly increased garrison of Rome - the Imperial bodyguard. This 
now comprised ten milliary cohorts of the reformed Praetorian Guard 
(10,000). 1,000 equites sh7gulares and the new legion 11 Parthica 
(presumably about 5,000): a total of 16,000 men - or about three times the 
previous garrison. There also seem to have been available as central 
reserve elements Moorish javelin-men and Osrhoenian archers, stationed in 
the castrazwleglina near the city. These latter forces are recorded being 
used as field army units under Alexander and Maximinus, and even as early 
as in AD 213 under Caracalla in Germany. It would seem reasonable 
therefore to see the reign of Severus as a vital stage: Eric Birley quoted with 
approval the description of these developments by Platnauer as 
representing the formation of "the nucleus of a centralized field army. "l 2 
Birley further draws attention to the raising at this time of a number of new 
auxiliary units, many based in Eastern provinces) 3 and to the creation of 
large, mobile forces of at least a semi-permanent nature. Examples of the 
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latter are the exen&tus 114ýricus commanded by Ti. Claudius Candidus in the 
., Pslaaýwhich 
L. Asian, Parthian and Gallic expeditions; 1 4 the exelo-W [sic] At 
Marius Maximus led at Byzantium against Niger and at Lugdunurn against 
Albinus; 15 and the task force from four German legions which served firstly 
under Claudius Gallus in the Second Parthian Warl 6 and later under C. 
, Iles, % 
17 Julius Septimius Castinus against " dele&bnes etle&, 
Gallienus (sole emperor AD 260-268) faced a critical situation. His father, 
Valerian, had been captured by the Persian King, Shapur. who threatened 
the Eastern frontier; Postumus had formed a breakaway Gallic Empire that 
embraced also Germany, Britain and Spain, and the Alamanni were posing 
a serious threat to and even Italy. 
As long ago as 1903, Ritterling (in his paper "On the Roman Military 
Organisation of the Latter Part of the Third Century') drew attention to the 
importance of the poorly recorded reign of Gallienus to the development of a 
field army. This included a significant strengthening of the reserve cavalry 
forces: new elements were recruited from Dalmatian, Moorish and 
Osrhoenian auxiliaries: detached legionary cavalry (eqzlitesplolnofl: 18 
scutadi (presumably "shield bearers! '); equites sagitadi (horse archers); 
and equltes stablesianl (perhaps mounted legionaries or former provincial 
governors' cavalry guards). 1 9 
A similar growth of mobile infantry units can be detected at this time. This 
was the result of detaching vexillations from the frontier legions on an 
essentially permanent basis. Such a task force of British and German 
legions is recorded near Belgrade, and pia Melis coin issues struck in 259- 
60 honour Rhine and Danube legionary vexillations based in north Italy. 20 
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Epigraphic evidence similarly attests the presence of elements of 11 Parthica 
and III Augusta in north-west Macedonia: German and British vexillations at 
Sirmium in Pannonia; and detachments of two Dacian and probably four 
Pannonian legions at Poetovio. 
By the 260s therefore a substantial de lacto field army was in existence, 
comprising infantry formations based on vexillations from frontier legions 
and cavalry units, many of which were newly raised. 
Although precedents for a field army can be traced back into the early first 
century and particularly to the developments under Severus and Gallienus, 
the traditional interpretation remains valid in the sense that the ultimate form 
of the Imperial Army with a oellwL- field army was principally the work of 
Diocletian and Constantine in the late third and early fourth centuries. 
The Christian critic, Lactantius, writing quite soon after the event, is often 
said to have accused Diocletian of having quadrupled the army. In fact it is 
far from clear that this is what Lactantius meant and it should be noted that 
his use of the verb "contenderent' itself implies striving for larger forces 
rather than implying success in such an endeavour. 21 A quadrupling in any 
case is inherently implausible: John Casey, for example, has suggested a 
more convincing increase at this period of about a third - to something like 
the oddly precise 435,266 claimed by John Lydus in the mid-sixth century. 22 
It is generally agreed that Diocletian inherited 33 legions (including the three 
relatively new ones raised by Severus) and then substantially increased this 
total. Although Parker23 thought the number of Diocletianic: creations may 
have been no more than about 17, a higher figure is usually proposed: 
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Nischer24 suggested 34 and Casey 36 or 37.25 Tomlin's "doubled"26 seems 
an acceptable compromise: from 33 to approximately 66 legions. 
Most legions appear to have been posted in pairs to the frontiers. There is 
no indisputable evidence on the size of the new legions, or indeed of legions 
in general at this point but documentary and archaeological indications of 
new, smaller legions will be examined later. It is worth noting that the raising 
of 33 new legions of traditional (5,000) strength would have required the 
recruitment in a short period of some 165,000 extra legionaries: 1,000- 
strong legions -a widely accepted concept now for new formations at least - 
would have needed only 33,000 recruits. 27 The sheer implausibility of the 
former figure is perhaps one of the strongest reasons for needing to assume 
legions of a substantially reduced establishment by the early fourth century. 
By contrast, the previous largest number of legions raised at the same time 
would have been the three legions Parthicae formed by Severus probably in 
r- AD 197.28 
The legions, in any case, should perhaps by this time no longer be regarded 
as the 61ite frontier troops of the army: this r6le was now taken by field 
army cavalry detachments or mvOlMones, which served alongside some 
traditional alae and coholiles. 
Diocletian significantly strengthened the field army. This now included two 
new legions (IbWav? i and Herallianl), which had originally been Danubian 
units equipped with the 1nar§Ob&-bjI1us; 29 new 61ite legions. like 
the Solenses and Afanlnnses; the Lano&W (originating in lance-equipped 
Praetorians and legionaries30); and crack cavalry units, such as the 
szz6olae, equites com#es and equitespromo& (these latter being formed 
from detachments of provincial bodyguards and Praetorian cavalry). 
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This mobile reserve remained relatively small with only a small proportion 
retained centrally and, to meet particular emergencies, had to be reinforced 
by adlwc detachments from the frontier legionary garrisons: Tomlin, 31 for 
example, quotes an Egyptian papyrus of 295 which records some ten pairs 
of legionary vexillations. 
It has been stated that ". .. (the) Emperor Constantine was the innovator 
who created the army of the later Empire. "32 and, although debate will no 
doubt continue as to how significant were the foundations laid by his 
predecessors, it is probably true that this reign (306-337) saw the apogee of 
the Imperial army. 
Following his victory at the Milvian Midge in 312 (and apparently developing 
a concept originating under Constantius or Mc-wimian), Constantine 
established new infantry dlite units called azcv1&a: these included the CbmzO 
('homed men"), Araczhia& C'armlet wearers'), loWl and Vxfoles. These 
units seem to have been raised largely among Rhineland and Gallic settler 
Germans (1ae&). They have been described as the "shock troops of the 
late-Roman army. ', 33 
Following the example of Diocletian, Constantine did raise some new 
legions34 but a more important development was the establishment of new 
mobile infantry units (also called "legiones') formed from permanently 
detached elements of the frontier legions and other strategic garrisons: 
these could retain an old-style legionary title (like V Macedonica), or a 
numerical title (such asPlilnani or Sswndanl), or a geographical title (like 
the rzqgnecanl). 
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Mainly due to their support of Maxentius, Constantine disbanded the 
Praetorians and equites singulales Augusti: partly to replace them as 
Imperial "Guard" units, new mobile cavalry formations were added to the 
field army. These included new units called scholae; w. ýdlla&bnes of 
cavalry; the mounted equivalent of auxilla such as the equites Comilff: and 
units, like the Dallnatae and stablesiani, which seem to have been former 
field army units from the time of Gallienus posted to frontier garrisons and 
then re-mustered to the mobile reserves. 
It has been argued that Constantine's reign saw the division of the field army 
into "palatine" and "comitatensian" unit types but the former expression is in 
fact first used only from the 360s, and it is far from clear in any case that 
these two appellations represented a clear demarcation between "guard" 
and "line" units. There also appear in the fourth century army units 
described as pseuoolcomdatenses: the NoMa, for example, records 
ten legiol 7es ps eudocomita tenses underthe magis tel - militum pet - 0/ iel 7 tem, 
nine under the magistermilitumAel-114ikum and 18 in the command of 
the magistertnilitum Rhaesel7talis. 35 One suggestion has been that these 
were not true mobile units but more probably frontier command 
detachments temporarily or permanently assigned to the field army but not 
accorded field army status or privileges. 
Constantine's field army first seems to have been used in 312 agaýinst 
Maxentius in Italy, when units originally stationed in Britain, Germany and 
Gaul were deployed. Unlike the static, frontier garrisons, the field army units 
are listed without details of their bases in the NoMa. This is a reasonable 
reflection of reality: such forces had no fixed stations but were either on 
campaign or billeted in towns. Constantine created two new commanding 
generals for the cavalry and infantry field army formations: respectively, the 
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magisterequitilm and the magisterpeditum. A later development, and 
presumably a reaction to events, was the creation of regional field armies - 
in Gaul, Illyricum, the East (with headquarters at Antioch), Africa, Britain, 
Spain and Thrace. Some of these regional mobile armies (at least) did not 
emerge until very late in the 4th century: the small command of the comes 
&Malmialzlln, for instance. It has been calculated36 that by c. AD 395 there 
were in existence about 325 field army units, divided very nearly equally 
between Western and Eastern Empires. It is perhaps surprising to note that 
these "mobile" forces were predominantly infantry: only 85 units (26%) were 
mounted, giving a total reserve cavalry capacity for the whole Empire of 
perhaps only 17-34,000 men. 37 
Constantine must therefore have left a substantial proportion of the Imperial 
forces in the static units on the frontiers. These forces are represented in 
the NoMa by the "below the line" elements in the Eastern commands and - 
exceptionally in the West - in the command of the dimBl#anniarum (0c. 40). 
Those troops actually serving in effect as frontier police (such as the 
Hadrian's Wall fort garrisons) are described as knitav? ei these comprised 
the traditional alae and col7ol-tes, as well asnilmeli. The frontier legions 
and new-style formations (cumi, equites, milites and azzv§a) are classed as 
A, benses: it is not clear whether there was any real difference between 
Apenses and knitanel, or whether the former were in fact a type of the 
latter. 
There remains considerable argument about the quality of these non-mobile 
elements of the Late Roman Empire. There are clear indications that they 
were less favourably treated than the mobile troops in terms of pay and 
equipment, and physical requirements also indicate that the frontier forces 
had a lower status. 38 Contrary to one line of argument however, there 
seems no evidence on the other hand that the frontier forces had declined to 
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a type of peasant militia: the now well known account in Eugippius's Wta 
Sekeriniof the decline of Roman power in late fifth century Noricum 
includes the story of soldiers from =17olz; MBatawlilm unsuccessfully 
attempting to track down their arrears of pay. Although this incident 
occurred only a few years before the Batavians' fort at Passau fell to 
Hunumundus, the troops dearly still regarded themselves as regulars 
entitled to regular pay. 
There are moreover a number of instances showing that the Amitanei could 
serve perfectly satisfactorily as fighting troops. Tomlin39 cites their 
contribution to the defence of Amida in 359 and to Julian's Persian 
expedition four years later. There also seem to have been occasions - 
Tomlin quotes one from 363 and another from the early fifth century4O - 
when substantial numbers of knitaneiwere transformed into field army units 
(as pseuoblcinmitatel7ses ). Isaac has drawn attention to the use of limitanei 
by Belisarius in Mesopotamia and also that the term itself is not attested 
before AD 363.41 
Irregular Forces 
Some attention should perhaps now be given to an area that allows of even 
less precision than does consideration of the standing forces of the Empire, 
namely the matter of irregular troops. The origins of Rome's auxiliary troops 
is largely explained by a need to recruit non-citizens to cover contingencies 
not well provided for by Rome's own levies, such as light infantry and 
cavalry. Similarly, non-imperial or allied forces are recorded as playing 
significant r6les in many campaigns throughout the Empire's history. 
There are a number of literary references to Late Roman armies including 
large numbers of temporarily recruited non-Romans. 42 For example, 
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Themistius mentions Armenians and Iberians serving in the 380s and under 
Stilicho but the NoRia has no record of such troops. In the same way, 
large numbers of Goths fought with Theodosius against Eugenius in AD 394 
(10,000 were reported to have been killed) but the NoMa records only a 
handful of Gothic units. 43 The bulk of the Goths would therefore have been 
allied tribal formations44 recruited for the duration and then demobilised; 
there would have been obvious financial advantages in such an 
arrangement. 
An equally unclear picture is all we have of the local militias, whose r6le in 
the defence of the Later Empire must at times have been crucial. Eric 
Birley45 has shown that such local militias were well established by the first 
century and figure, for example, on a number of occasions in the account of 
the events of AD 69 by Tacitus in 777e Histolies. 46 In the 170s, Didius 
Julianus is reported as having raised militia forces in Belgica to cope with an 
invasion by the Chauci47 and a little over half a century later Gallienus took 
similar measures in north Africa. 48 Birley even suggests that =17ols / 
Ob, -17oWbram, attested at Newcastle in the NoMW9 may have originated as 
a tribal militia organised in the first century perhaps to watch the Ordovices. 
The existence of these shadowy and often unquantifiable additional military 
resources may well help to explain certain oddities of the Late Roman Army 
- such as the relatively small size of some recorded expeditionary forces 
Oust 13,000 with Julian in Gaul in 357; 50 only four regiments sent to Britain 
with Theodosius in 367; 51 and Stilicho's African expeditionary force of 398 
recorded by Claudian as comprising just six field army units, 52) and perhaps 
some apparent gaps in frontier defences. such as that in western Britain. 
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Britain 
The direct evidence relating to the changed Roman Army of the later Empire 
and the provinces of Britain is limited. It seems however safe to assert 
initially that there seems little dispute that the British garrison was reduced, 
perhaps sharply from an earlier peak. 
At the higher end of the range of possibilities for the mid-second century, 
one estimate would put the Roman forces in Brtain just in excess of 50,000 
men. 53 Although this might be somewhat high, it is unlikely to be 
excessively so and the hard evidence of the O-Szbny diploma of AD 12254 
can be read without undue speculation as implying a garrison at that point 
of rather more than 45,000 (on paper, at least). 55 This would incidentally 
suggest that some 13% of the total Imperial forces were then stationed in 
Britain: not merely the largest provincial army but also about 40% larger 
than the next largest (those of Dacia and Syria). 56 
It seems likely that a major factor (if not Me major factor) in explaining the 
reduction of the British garrison from perhaps 45-50,000 men in AD 120-150 
down to a size in c. AD 400 variously estimated at 33,500,57 28,000,58 
20,000.59 14,00060 or even just 12.00061 was the relatively quiescent nature 
of the previously troublesome northern frontier during the third century. 
While the Rhine, Danube, Eastern and North African frontiers all provided 
crises of a greater or lesser importance, in contrast northern Britain for the 
85 years at least from 211 to 296 was largely peaceful. 
A hard-pressed central government would have been short-sighted not to 
have begun to look upon the British garrison as a wasting asset and ready 
source of reinforcements for more critical sectors: ". .. Britain's large army 
39 
was one which could safely be siphoned of troops, whilst leaving sufficient to 
safeguard the island. "62 
Temporary detachments had of course a long history and may even have 
been the norm, at least on a localised scale in the first and second 
centuries: a well-known instance is the despatch of a veAllation of legio IX 
Hispana to serve with Domitian against the Chatti in AD 83.63 This pattern 
continued into the third century with a veAllation of legio XX recorded at 
Mainz in AD 255, at which point a detachment of 11 Augusta (possibly 
including its 7th Cohort) was also absent from headquarters. 64 The 
delightful roundel or badge of Aurelius Cervianus apparently 
commemorating an officer serving with a task force of the lind and Xxth 
legions, which was presumably in Gaul en route to the Rhine or Danube, is 
usually dated to the mid-third century also. 65 Shortly afterwards, however 
(apparently in AD 260), a joint force of presumably IInd and XXth 
legionaries66 appeared on the Danube in Pannonia. It seems more likely 
than not that these cohorts were cut off from their parent units by the 
rebellion of Postumus and the creation of his breakaway Gallic Empire and 
never returned: it seems inconceivable that Gallienus's "legitimate" central 
government would allow a revolt to be reinforced from areas under its own 
control. 67 
Although this is generally assumed to mark the early stages of a 
development which saw significant withdrawals of elements of the British 
garrison perhaps even as late as the early fifth century, there is in fact very 
little explicit evidence to support this not implausible scenario. Under 
Carausius and Allectus, for example, some movement of troops to the 
Continent might well seem more than likely but no positive proof for such 
movement is available. 
40 
The assumption that units of the British garrison were withdrawn to support 
Magnentius and either destroyed at the battle of Mursa in AD 351 or 
disbanded after that defeat (or kept on the Continent) is similarly quite likely 
but not susceptible to proof. 
Although some have suggested otherwise, there is no reason to suppose 
troop withdrawals in or after the "barbarian conspiracy'of 367 occurred, 
although the reinforcements recorded were no doubt of an emergency 
nature. Units may well have been destroyed in battle that year or have 
disintegrated in the apparent chaos that followed but it is equally possible 
that the small size of the expeditionary force sent to recover Britain Oust four 
field army regiments) may partly reflect the fact that the British garrison 
remained largely in being, if less than intact. It is also worth recalling that 
"There is no archaeological evidence from any Wall fort for destruction by 
enemy action.,, 68 It has been argued on the other hand that the old third 
century garrison of Britain was deliberately run down from r- AD 275-300 
and that, for example, some elements in the earlier part of the NoMa list for 
the Duke of Britain represented field army drafts posted to this country 
probably in c. AD 367/373.69 
It has become a relatively common assumption, too, that when Magnus 
Maximus made his bid for the Imperial throne in the 380s this must also 
have involved withdrawals from the army of Britain and this is frequently 
quantified to include specifically, for example, legio XX Valelia Lllc&& from 
Chester and perhaps the &-gzInAenses from Caernarvon and the limitanei 
units from the north-west and Wales, together possibly with some Wall fort 
garrisons and perhaps even legio V1 Vlctlz3r from York. 70 There is a great 
need for caution here however because ". .. like alleged withdrawals by 
earlier usurpers, the evidence is extremely thin.,, 71 Not only is it difficult to 
link archaeological evidence of the apparent abandonment of a particular 
41 
fort to a narrowly defined historical event but such abandonment could 
represent transfer of a unit within the province rather than outside. It is also 
worth remembering that Maximus has in the past been held responsible for 
the final evacuation of the Wall but numismatic and pottery evidence have 
since clearly revealed continued occupation well after the 380s. 
Although we have some literary sources for the period relating to the 
activities of Stilicho in the late 390s and early 400s, the picture that emerges 
is far from clear. The court poet, Claudian, appears to refer to military 
success agaýinst Scots, Picts and Saxons72 but it is by no means evident 
whether this involved more than naval victories or whether reinforcements 
were sent or whether Stilicho himself was personally committed. On the 
other hand, Claudian provides us with perhaps the sole unambiguous 
reference to troop withdrawals: 
venit et amýemis legio plaetenta Blitannis, 
quae Scoto clat kena &ucy lefroque notatas. 
fflg, ves picto inoliey7tj §g, v , r, gs. 
-173 
The mention of a legion and apparent description of northern Britain make a 
link with VI Victrbc at York difficult to avoid but there is reason for caution in 
jumping too readily to conclusions not necessarily supported by C3audian's 
words, where convention or lack of interest in military technicalities or even 
the needs of metre may have to be considered. 
Ingenious attempts have been made to connect Claudian's references to the 
events of c. AD 395-402 to the even more obscure and confused story 
recount--d in chapters 14-19 of Gildas's oef atdobf Bllfol7uln. 74 Gildas does 
indeed describe two Roman expeditions sent to Britain some time between 
the death of Maximus (383) and the famous appeal to Ahtius (446/454? ) 
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and two barbarian wars, one specifically involving Scots and Picts, the other 
perhaps implicitly so. Gildas was no historian and his purposes were not 
histodcal but the basic outline of his account is not inherently implausible 
(even if it does include the famous reference to the building of a turf wall 
&al7s insillam! )75 and may indeed be a muddled account of Stilicho's British 
policies, including troop withdrawals. Little further certainty is available from 
what is after all a work of religious denunciation not historical scholarship 
and which contains no dates and only about a dozen non-Biblical personal 
names. 
Ironically, it seems more than likely that, even if he were responsible for 
troop withdrawals, Stilicho also had the garrison of Britain reinforced. 
The Noffa records a small field army of nine units (six cavalry and three 
infantry) under a comes BnyannialzIn776 which may represent part of a 
reorganisation under Stilicho in c: AD 395. The fact that one of the 
regiments is named after the western emperor Honorius makes it difficult to 
date the establishment of the Count's command earlier than 395.77 
Moving towards the end of Roman control in Britain, the reign of 
Constantine 111 (407-411) has traditionally been seen as marking the final, 
catastrophic withdrawal of Imperial forces from the island. This has been 
argued not just in terms of the need for the usurpation to be made secure 
with drafts of the British garrison being shipped to Gaul in 407 but also from 
the appearance in the field army of the Gallic 1nqgistereqz1&m of units 
apparently taken from the Saxon Shore - the &-cvnoa1niB1#bn&s, Abillor, 
and, Dp/o , ratores. 
78 Even if these identifications are correct, there are many 
anomalies in the Noffa of this sort, and even if temporary withdrawals did 
occur we ". .. have no evidence that. .. (they) were not made up after the 
initial successes of Constantine's r6gime., 79 
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Logic then suggests that the very large British garrison of the mid-second 
century must have been greatly reduced in size during the third and fourth 
centuries and, as we have seen, some quite precise attempts have been 
made to quantify that assumption. Direct evidence is however lacking 
beyond the 250s and 260s, and it would be appropriate therefore to 
establish whether indirect evidence can provide a clearer picture. 
Michael Fulford, in his 1989 paper, 80 attempted to examine whether coin or 
pottery evidence demonstrated any trends. Arguing that the import of 
Gaulish sigillata shows a marked decline from perhaps c. AD 22-5 onwards, 
Fulford links this to military expenditure and claims that the decline of 
spending on high quality imported goods must show either that "expensive 
overseas contracts (sc. were] terminated but that the size of the army ... 
remained the same or that the volume of goods required had fallen because 
of reductions in the military establishment. "81 Fulford favours the latter 
explanation and supports this with the claim that internal trade involving the 
military - especially pottery for the northern frontier - also shows a decline. 
On the other hand Fulford points out that the decline of bronze supplies pre- 
dates the Severan campaigns, when military forces might be expected to 
have been at peak strength. Coin evidence is equally inconclusive both due 
to the debasement of the early third century and to the increasing 
significance of remuneration to the troops in kind through the annona 
n7ililaliS. 
Reductions in accommodation in barracks with the building of some barrack 
blocks in the fourth century as individual "chalets" for family units has been 
seen at various forts, especially on Hadrian's Wall, and this has led to 
calculations of reduced garrisons, in some cases greatly reduced. This 
issue will be further examined in chapter 5, where it will be seen that the 
44 
whole "chalet' concept has come under attack and may not provide the 
evidence for very small Late Empire units that was once thought. 
Another example of the difficult nature of archaeological evidence in this 
area comes with the thesis that in the late third and early fourth centuries 
(from perhaps r. AD 270) a number of forts on Hadrian's Wall or in its 
hinterland were greatly run down or even abandoned, to be re-occupied with 
new units perhaps under Constantius. This situation has been claimed, for 
example, to have existed at Haltonchesters, Rudchester, South Shields, 
Bowness-on-Solway and Birdoswald. 62 A contrary case83 has argued that 
the lack of epigraphic and numismatic evidence is a general rather than a 
local phenomenon, and that an apparent layer of humus in some third 
century buildings at Rudchester, Haltonchesters and Birdoswald may not be 
evidence of abandonment but of occupation with a certain decline of military 
order. This in turn may result from a sort of semi-autonomy forced on many 
forts by (a) the lack of coinage reaching the frontiers and (b) the cessation 
of the old practice of sending eqz&&-s from other provinces to serve as 
auxiliary commanders: the latter custom must evidently have been at least 
interrupted with the establishment of the Gallic Empire. 
None of the above amounts to proof that the overall size of the British 
garrison did not decline nor that individual units did not become smaller but 
does indicate some of the problems involved in proving or at least 
quantifying the case. 
As far as the legions are concerned, the epigraphic evidence will not take us 
beyond the middle of the third century. There is a possible tile-stamp 
recording 11 Augusta in 269/71; otherwise it disappears from the epigraphic 
records in 255/60.64 VI Victrix is last recorded a little earlier, in 238144 or 
perhaps slightly later. 85 XX Valeria VictrLx is just possibly recorded on a tile- 
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stamp of 249/5186 and milifes from the legion dedicated an altar at 
Milecastle 52 at Bankshead in 26216.87 
Carausius's coin series record both 11 Augusta and XX Valeria Victrix in the 
period 287/93 but not the Vlth Legion. On the other hand, the NoMa - 
perhaps a record of the situation as late as the late fourth century or even 
slightly later - includes 11 Augusta and VI Victrix but not XX Valeria Victrix. 
The Twentieth's fortress at Chester shows little sign of military occupation 
much beyond c. AD 300 in any case. Although the bases of the other two 
legions is less than clear in the NoMa, there is no good reason not still to 
place VI Victrix in York in the fourth century while 11 Augusta may have 
moved from Caerleon to Richborough as early as the 270s, although it has 
been recently argued that its NoMa HO was in fact in London. 88 
Two areas in which a relatively clear picture emerges are Wales and the 
forts beyond Hadrian's Wall. With regard to the former, Jeffrey Davies puts 
the peak occupation in c. AD 80 at three legions and probably 35 or 36 (but 
perhaps as many as 38-40) auxiliary units: a total of approximately 20,000 
auxiliaries. 89 This was however very short-lived and by c. AD 138 had been 
greatly reduced, comprising no more than seven sites by a AD 300.90 A 
gradual decline continued until by c. AD 394 the only sites likely still to have 
been occupied were Caerwent (possibly a field army base? ) and 
Carmarthen (where the evidence consists of just a single coin). Traditional 
dates for the abandonment of the northern outpost forts have been in the 
360s or preferably c. 342/3 (in connection with the visit of Constans and 
based on the complete absence of the common Period 23 coins of 
Constantine 11) but many would now argue for an even earlier date of c. AD 
312/14, following Constantine's visit. 91 
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The British sections of the Notitia record only five alae, 18 cohorts and five 
numeri which are clearly survivals from the third century. Although this 
represents well over half the non-legionary garrison units recorded in the 
NoIll1a, there had evidently been an influx of "new" units to Britain probably 
from the last quarter of the third century. 
The defeat of the Gallic Empire in 274 probably saw a substantial influx of 
new units, such as the eqLlAes Dallnatae (one of many such regiments 
raised by Gallienus92) and the 17umerus D1re&o1z1m, which were stationed 
behind Hadrian's Wall as a mobile reserve or on the Saxon Shore. Other 
reinforcements probably arrived with Constantius in c. AD 297+: the ala 
Hnrcrzlea (a creation of the period 295/305), stationed at Elslack according 
to the NoUla, may have been one such unit. The process presumably 
continued in some piecemeal form during the early fourth century, as 
evidenced by the presence atOal7uln (Doncaster? ) in the NoMa of another 
mobile reserve unit, the equites CWspianiwhich presumably could not have 
been created before AD 317.93 
A number of new style, Late Army units probably arrived in Britain in the 
aftermath of the crisis of AD 367. Holder94 cites seven possible permanent 
reinforcement regiments from that period: the milites TL117gl6vaniand the 
17UMe1iZI6.1enSO1VM, FOMMS&M, Ne1IIO'IVM DUMS&M, PaCVMiUln, 
Sole,? slum and TzlmacL-17slum. These units were also distributed as 
garrisons for northern and Saxon Shore forts. It is perhaps in this contcxt 
that Ammianus relates the appointment in 372 of a German prince, 
Fraomar, to the command of "a large and powerful contingent"of Alarnanni 
in Britain. 95 
Attempts have been made to create an impression of the state of the Roman 
Army in Britain in the last twenty-thirty years of the fourth century by 
47 
assuming the British sections of the Noffa to date from then and combining 
its evidence with that of archaeology for other sites occupied then. Stephen 
Johnson, for example, tried such an exercise for northern Britain. 96 The 
Noffa lists 35 forts under the command of the dzxR1Ma17171a1vn7,17 along 
Hadrian's Wall and 18 behind it. To these Johnson adds: 12 forts probably 
occupied in the 370s but not in the NoMa, four newly built fourth century 
forts, two legionary fortresses, four forts possibly occupied, three fortlets and 
six signal stations. 97 In addition to this large northern border command, the 
maritime defence command of the Saxon Shore included some nine units 
(with possibly ten stations), and there was also the regional field army of 
the con7es, 61#an17&w1n. To these can perhaps also be added urban militia 
forces and whatever defences there must surely have been - albeit 
unrecorded - for the west of Britain. 
It may be therefore that, even allowing for intermittent withdrawal of troops, 
a much smaller size for most units and possible inaccuracies and obsolete 
elements in the Noffa, the shadow at least of an impressive force remained 
in Britain at the close of the fourth century. As with other aspects of Roman 
rule - the Villa economy, urban life, the upkeep of roads and the Imperial 
post - the garrison, with its dependence on the eAstence of Imperial rule for 
its recruitment, training, officering and payment, can hardly have long 
survived the break with the Continent in a AD 409-11. This need imply 
nothing about the behaviour of individual soldiers or even units (as the story 
of IX Batavorum at Passau shows) but the structureperse must have 
collapsed quite suddenly in the second decade of the fifth century AD. 
The coinage record allows us to glimpse something of what must have 
happened. Bronze coins down to the numerous SAWS REIPVBLICAE 
issues from Rome and Aquileia struck in 395+ did reach BrirWin in quantity 
but the later VRBS ROMA FELIX type of c. AD 403/4 and subsequent 
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GLORIA ROMANORVIVI issue of Honorius from Arles and Lyons are not 
found. This implies quite clearly that the central government ceased 
sending official salary payments (and presumably replacement military and 
Civilian officials) in approximately AD 402. Silver coins later than c. 400 are 
unusual and gold coins are not found from beyond 403. 
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As the British examples cited in Chapter 2 exemplify. 1 the epigraphic record 
is generally poorer in quantity and quality by the mid-third century. Similarly. 
it would be a reasonable generalisation that the army of the Late Empire is 
relatively poorly served by the literary evidence when contrasted for example 
with the detailed account Tacitus provides for the period AD 14-70. The 
opening part of the Annals. which deals with the Rhine-Danube mutinies and 
Germanicus's German campaigns in the opening year of Tiberius's reign. 
alone includes references to ten legions2 and specified quantities of 
auxiliaries. 3 
With some exceptions. the literary record for the fourth and fifth centuries 
does not provide this level of detail, which in the case of the surviving works 
of Tacitus would allow reasonably full unit histories to be compiled for the 
legions at least. There are however a number of writers for the later period 
who make direct or implicit reference to military matters from which 
information an organisation and unit sizes may be gleaned. 
Reference has already been made to the accusation by Lactantius4 in his 
Christian polemic LL- Afoltbus Pelseallolvm that Diocletian multiplied the 
existing army. 5 Although Lactantius was a contemporary of Diocletian and 
wrote his work only twenty years or so after the establishment of the 
Tctrarchy to which it refers, he had no personal military experience and it 
seems inherently more than improbable that this increase could actually 
have amounted to a quadrupling (if, in any case. that was what Lactantius 
was actually trying to WriteS). A doubling of the existing 33 legions seems to 
have taken place under Diocletian (although many would argue - as 
sa 
mentioned earlier - that these new legions at least were much smaller than 
the 5,000-strong ones of the Early Empire). and it has been suggested7 that 
the impedal forces increased at the end of the third century by about a third 
from some 345,000 to perhaps 440,000 or so. 
Writing towards the latter end of the fourth century was the distinguished 
academic Ljbanius. Ubanius. a native of the Syrian Antioch. was an orator 
and professor of rhetoric in various cities of the Greek East. He referred 
incidentally to Diocletian as'7hat emperor who set a wall of armed soldiery 
to defend the Roman empire. .. . "8 Writing of the same reign, Ubanius 
recounted a story concerning a mufinous unit of 500 soldiers. The context 
of the anecdote makes the strength of the unit a marginal issue: he can 
possibly be assumed to be referring to a quingenary cohort but there is no 
real basis for confirming that assumption and the unit might equally well be 
a legionary vexillation or some sort of one-off working party. 9 Ubanius 
himself had never seen military service) 0 
Roughly contemporary with Libanius, it is now generally agreed, were the 
so-called SCEiptores Historiae Augustae (or "Augustan Histor/j. Although 
the work itself claims to have been written by six named authors in the reign 
of Diocletian. this appears to be entirely spurious: it seems to be the case 
that the work was actually written by a single, unknown author writing 
considerably later. probably in the 360s or 370s. The History's Ufe of 
Sevcrus Alexander refers to that emperor's preparations for his Persian War 
in a AD 230/231.11 These preparations supposedly included the formation 
of a Greck-styie phalanx of phalangvW30,000-strong: the emperor is 
described as being obsessed with modelling himself on his namesake. 
Alexander the Great. 
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The alleged phalanx is interestingly described as ". .. formed from six 
Icgions., -1 2 If this passage can be taken to imply that six comolele legions 
were re-mustered as a phalanx. then the author appears to be calculafing 
the individual legion strengths at 5,000 men. It is not necessary to see this 
little episode as other than probably entirely fictional nevertheless to allow 
the assertion that the author be&-wd legions to be about 5,000 strong - at 
least in the 230s, if not in his own time. 
Perhaps the most significant historian of the Late Empire and main source 
for the third century was Ammianus Marcellinus (a AD 330- C. 395). 
Ammianus was a soldier of substantial experience, serving probably until in 
his mid 30s or early 40s. Initially acting as a staff officer to the Master of the 
Horse. Ursicinus. Ammianus later saw active service in Gaul. Mesopotamia 
and on Julian's Persian expedition. He is generally well regarded as a 
source. being both fair and accurate, and was himself an eyewitness of 
some of the events he describes. 
An impressively long list of regiments referred to by Ammianus can be 
compiled: Roger Tomlin has catalogued references to some four field army 
units and nearly thirty frontier regiments) 3 If we turn to army and unit sizes, 
Ammianus notes that Julian won his crowning victory over the Alamanni at 
Strasbourg in 357 when commanding only 13,000 men: in fact, he stresses 
that it was the smallness of Julian's army (of which news was carried by a 
deserter from the. -Scvtan)) which helped to convince his enemies of his 
certain defeat. 14 It needs to be remembered however that this relatively 
small force under Julian was originally planned as half of a pincer movement 
against the Alamanni. the other part being a force of 25,000 under Barbatio, 
the Mastcr of tim Foot. 1 5 Although the junction of the two armies was not 
effected. a commitment of 36,000 troops was by no means insignificant: the 
army that invaded Britain in AD 43 was of that order. 1 6 
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Ammianus was himself present at the siege of the cliff-top fortress city of 
Amidal 7 when Shapur 11 invaded Mesopotamia in 359 and has left a detailed 
account of the battle. 1 8 Ammianus estimated the military and civilian 
population of Amida at 20,00019 and also gives details of the garrison. 
Although he was writing from memory some thirty years later and although 
his description of the city is confused (or at least disoriented), 20 there is no 
reason to doubt the details of the units he lists. These, he wrote, included 
seven "legions7: the city's regular garrison unit, legio VPadNba; two 
legions raised under Magnentius and transferred from Gaul (LLxL-nffa& 
and Magnen&aq); legiones XXX and XFbl-lenses; and the relatively 
new2l Stipelwntoles and Plaeventoles. 22 There were evidently other units 
in the city too. Although the specified units all appear to have been 
Diocletianic or newer and there would therefore be no reason to assume 
"old-styld'5,000-strong establishments, Ammianus's figures - if correct - 
would certainly imply much smaller legions. Jones suggested that 
Ammianus was therefore implying legions no more than about 1,000 men 
each23 and this has become a widely accepted figure, although it amounts 
to little more than a reasonable probability. Jones himself added the 
qualification that some at least of the Amida garrison units may have been 
under-strength from campaign losses. 
Ammianus includes a detailed account of a sally by the Gallic troops in 
Amida in which they suffered casualties of 40024 but it is difficult to 
extrapolate much from that other than the reasonable assumption that the 
Gallic elements must therefore have numbered significantly in excess of 400. 
If Ammianus is to be accepted as an accurate source for details of the siege 
of Amida, it might also be noted that he put the losses of the attacking 
Persians at 30,000.25 This would make it difficult to envisage Shapur's 
besieging army as having an original strength of any less than 40,000 men; 
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60,000 or 70,000 or even more would not seem unreasonable to have 
sustained such losses. If the Roman army in Amida is to be reckoned at a 
strength of no more than some 10,000, then it is most impressive that it 
inflicted such casualties on the Persians and withstood a siege of over ten 
weeks, especially as it can be argued that the fall of the city was caused only 
by an unfortunate combination of treachery and bad luck. The Persian 
casualties and the long delay at Amida were in any case sufficient to 
persuade Shapur to abandon the campaign and return to Ctesiphon. The 
strength of the city's defences may have played a r6le in the 74-day siege 
but Amida's renowned black basalt walls date essentially from a later 
period. 26 
It might be possible to hesitate before accepting easily Ammianus's figure 
for the Persian dead: enemy casualties are a notoriously difficult area for 
estimation, arguably even in modem circumstances. 27 Ammianus does 
however go out of his way to cite his sources, even naming the officer who 
seems to have been assigned to count the dead. 28 Ammianus is in any 
case impressively well informed about Shapur's army, for which he is even 
able to provide an outline order of battle. 29 
Although Ammianus himself took part in Julian's great Persian campaign of 
363 and describes the war at length, he provides little of the detail of 
numbers and units that would be of use to the current purpose. Julian's 
army is elsewhere put at 65,000 men30 and this would not be inconsistent 
with the statement by Ammianus that 30,000 troops under Count Procopius 
were detached to Armenia to guard the rear of Julian's advance. 31 The only 
other statistic in Ammianus's account is the reference to the 20,000 troops 
that had been needed to tow and manoeuvre the thousand ships that had 
accompanied the advance down the Euphrates. 32 Of the scores of units 
that must have formed Julian's expedition, Ammianus names barely half a 
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dozen. The field army Kctores regiment is mentioned at the siege of 
Maozamalcha: a soldier from the unit called Exsuperius led the assault from 
a mine the engineers had dug. 33 A cavalry formation identified only 
as reltiaoý are described as disgracing themselves during a Persian attack 
and then apparently being disbanded. 34 The comitatensian legion ZaI71717i 
is mentioned because its commander, Vetranio, was killed driving off a 
Persian attack. 35 Then, following Julian's death on 26th June and the 
accession of Jovian, four other field army units are mentioned as 
distinguishing themselves during a Persian attack with elephants on the 
rearg u ard: th e loviani an d th e HerculialW ( legibl7es pala&7ae), and th e loWi 
and the VICto , res (ayXiliapala&l7a). 
36 The Antioch-based lawyer, loannes 
(John) Malalas included some further details of this campaign in his Greek 
world chronicle, composed probably in the 560s or 570s. He notes a unit of 
1,500 lancialii and Inaffarii, and the legion I Armenaica as forming part of 
Julian's army. 37 
Two of Ammianus's references to events in Britain detail the composition of 
field army expeditions sent to the island under Lupicinus in AD 360 and 
Theodosius in 367-8.38 Only four units were involved on each occasion: in 
360 the Herull and Ba&W (described as "lightly armed"39) together with two 
17umari of Moesians: and in 367 HeIzIll and BataW again, this time 
accompanied by loviiand VIctotes. It might reasonably be asked how such 
limited military intervention could have been expected to be of any 
significance. However these expeditionary forces may have been up to 
about 3,000 strong40 and this is perhaps not such a small figure in the 
context of estimates for the strength of the fourth century British garrison, 
which have ranged down to as few as 12,000 men. In any case both 
expeditions in the 360s seem to have had fairly limited "spearhead" r6les: it 
has been said that ". .. their main purpose could have only been to raise 
local morale. "41 We have in fact no clear indication from Ammianus of any 
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campaigning involving Lupicinus's force, and Theodosius's four regiments 
seem only to have been used on their own against bands of looterS. 42 The 
major counter-attacks against the barbarian invaders were undertaken by a 
force apparently formed largely from returning deserters and troops on leave 
from the original garrison. It should also be noted that, in the case of the 
first of these expeditions at least, whatever measures were undertaken by 
the field army detachments, they were no more than short-term in effect 
(and perhaps even in intention): Ammianus himself recorded just four years 
after Lupicinus's visit to Britain attacks by Picts, Scots, Saxons and Attacotti 
"aerumnis ... continuis.,, 
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The disastrous battle at Adrianople (9 August 378) forms the climax of 
Ammianus's history but his account is disappointingly lacking in 
organisational details. He himself had earlier referred to the difficulties of 
estimating the numbers of Goths, as he had when declining to catalogue 
Shapur's Persian army. 44 He does conclude his account of the battle with a 
reference to casualties but this does no more than list the distinguished 
dead and claim that about two-thirds of Valens's army were lost in the 
disaster. 
Modern accounts have put the Roman army at Adrianople as low as c. 15- 
18,000 or as high as 30-40,000 while Hoffmann has used the Noffa to 
identify some of the mobile army units lost there. Ammianus himself 
however refers to a mere handful of regiments. He mentions the SaglYalii 
and SL-%Wa6iwho seem to have launched the opening assault of the battle: 
the Lal=ýaeii and Maffaeii, who protected Valens after his own bodyguard 
had fled; the BataW, who failed to act in their assigned reserve r6le; and 
the Slablesial7l, Dbmes&dandP1omo&- units whose commanders fell in 
the battle. 
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Elsewhere in his history, however. are a scatter of other references by 
Ammianus to unit sizes and organisation. In his account of his own arrival 
at Amida in the spring of 359. Ammianus tells the story of two units (the 
word he uses unfortunately is "turmae") of cavalry sent from Illyricum ("a 
feeble and cowardly lot") who, while in "drunken sleepP, allowed a force of 
20,000 Persians to slip by at night unseen. Ammianus specifically mentions 
that these two units of Danubian cavalry had a total strength of 700.45 The 
implicit individual unit strength of about 350 might reasonably be seen as 
representing a theoretical establishment of around 500 in campaigning 
circumstances. 
In his account of Julian being hailed Augustus in 360, Ammianus mentions 
a rather odd incident when Constantius, allegedly jealous of Julian's 
successes in the West, ordered to be detached from his army for 
campaigning against the Persians four of his best auxiliary regiments 
(Heluli, BataW, Celts andPelulantes) together with 300 picked men from 
each of the other units under his command ("ex numeris aliis trecentos! 1.46 
This can be seen as a remarkable snub, especially bearing in mind the 
relatively small size of Julian's army, but the important point is that 
Constantius's order would only have made sense if the units in question had 
been substantially larger than, say. 500 strong each. It may be in fact that 
what is being witnessed here is the standard process for creating 
detachments or sub-dividing units - although here used to weaken Julian's 
position. 
When recording the restoration to the throne of Hiberia (the kingdom east of 
Armenia in the area of Georgia) in AD 370 of King Sauromaces, Ammianus 
states that he was accompanied by " 12 legions! ' under the general 
Terentius. 47 This would certainly be an impressive force, even if the 
reference were to relatively small Late Army legions but, for a military man, 
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Ammianus is remarkably imprecise in his use of terminology and he may 
well have meant 12 auxilia or simply something vaguer along the lines of " 12 
units. " 
Finally, in his narrative of events leading up to Adrianople in 378, Ammianus 
includes a couple of interesting asides about field army unit sizes. Gratian is 
said to have picked 500 veterans from each of his legions to scale the 
heights held by the Alamannic Lentienses. 48 Shortly afterwards, we hear of 
the Master of Infantry. Count Sebastian, being assigned a force made up of 
300 soldiers detached from each of his units ("numeri") to use in counter- 
guerrilla warfare against the Goths in Thrace. It needs only be stressed that 
these references need to assume actual unit strengths substantially larger 
than the detachments detailed: say, 500-1,000 strong. 49 
A near contemporary of Ammianus was the court poet Claudian (Claudius 
Claudianus), an Egyptian who lived between c. AD 370 and c. 404. In 397 
the Mauretanian chieftain and former Count of Africa, Gildo, rose in revolt 
against Stilicho and the government in Milan. Fearing especially the threat 
to the supply of grain from Africa to Italy, Stilicho despatched an expedition 
against Gildo the next spring commanded by his own estranged brother, 
Mascezel. Claudian later composed the poem In G11donem in praise of 
Stilicho's r6le in the war. Included in this panegyric is what amounts to an 
order of battle for Mascezel's army: it apparently comprised the Helcztllani 
and IbWanissenlbles (both described as "cohorts"); the Neiiii, the Felices 
iunibres: the "legion" Augusti (Vill Augusta? ): and the Leonesiunibres. 50 
This seems too circumstantial a detaH to be fictional and, apart from the 
vague Augustl, the other five units are all recorded in the NoRia as field 
army infantry regiments - four of them stationed in Italy. 51 By a useful 
coincidence, the early fifth century Christian historian Orosius (Paulus 
Orosius) also referred to the expedition against Gildo in his defence of 
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y, Histolia A&v1sus Paganos, written some 19 years after the Christianit, 
event. Orosius put the strength of Mascezel's task force at about 5,000 men 
and this has been used, for example, by Vdrady, 52 as a means of attempting 
to calculate the size of the field army units in the campaign of 398. A simple 
calculation (assuming the 6 regiments were of roughly the same size) would 
produce an average figure of rather more than 800 men. 53 This would fit in 
quite well with the range of 500-1,000 suggested by some scholars as being 
likely for fourth century mobile army units. 54 Vdrady however suggests a 
more complicated solution: he puts the three palatine legions (the first three 
units detailed above) at 1,200 each (a total of 3,600), while calculating the 
three "auxiliary" formations at only 500 each. 55 
Living at very much the same time as Claudian was the philosopher and 
writer, Synesius of Cyrene (c. AD 370- c. 412/415), bishop of Ptolemais in 
Egypt from c. AD 410/411. As well as 156 letters, Synesius wrote hymns, a 
political allegory and a treatise On)U? gs171p. As a prominent landowner, 
Synesius had also played a r6le in leading armed resistance to raids by the 
desert barbarians. Cyrenaýica was under threat from the nomadic or semi- 
nomadic Macetae and Ausurians from southern Numidia and Tripolitania, 
made more dangerous by their use of camels. Between AD 404 and 411 the 
Cyrenaican countryside was regularly overrun by these tribes, and a more 
serious invasion occurred in 412. Regular Roman troops seem to have 
been dispersed in forts and particularly the cities, and to have put up a poor 
defence. Synesius's writings however make several references to Imperial 
forces called UnnIgaroale: these appear to have been Hunnish federate 
cavalrymen. 
At one point, for example, Synesius states that in 411 forty Unnigardae were 
"with us7and another 200 with his associate, Anysius. 56 In a letter to the 
same Anysius, 57 Synesius recounts the apparently dramatic defeat of a 
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force of rather more than 1,000 Ausurian barbarians, who were ambushed 
in a narrow defile by his small force of forty Unnigardae. It may be that this 
account can be accepted at face value and that the factors of topography 
referred to by Synesius do help to explain a victory which, although 
remarkable, was far from unprecedented when Imperial forces were pitted 
against poorly equipped and untrained barbarians. 58 It is in any case not 
easy to extrapolate from this anecdote an assumption that Late Roman 
mobile cavalry formations typically numbered fewer than fifty troopers. 
Synesius himself goes on to suggest that another 160 Unnigardae would be 
sufficient to finish this campaign and it seems considerably easier to take 
this as a reference to additional federate troops rather than as any sort of 
precise reference to, for example, an extra four cavalry regiments. 59 It is 
perhaps a reflection of the scale of the fighting involved in Cyrenaica that 
Synesius felt that the more critical invasion the next year (412) could be 
defeated by four centuries of infantry. 60 
Veget*us (Flavius Vegetius Renatus) lived perhaps between c. AD 383 and 
a 450: possibly a Spaniard, it has been suggested that he may have been 
a finance minister or comes sacyistabu# of Theodosius 1. At some date 
probably between 383 and 392 Vegetius wrote his Ebitbma Rel 
Militalis or De Re Milltali, in which he described the weakness of Roman 
infantry and suggested strategies for improvement. Vegetius has not been 
held in high esteem in modern times, being criticised as an amateur on 
military matters with a nostalgic longing for a return of the classic legions. 
He was however held in remarkably high regard in mediaeval and early 
modern Europe: 150 mediaeval manuscripts of his work, for example, 
survive. 
Vegetius has already been referred to6l as one of the autho(ities for placing 
the size of a turma at 32 men and this still seems on balance the most likely 
68 
figure, although it is usually argued that he was referring back to a period 
not later than the end of the third century rather than to his own days. It is 
interesting to note that Vegetius - who did after all live through the supposed 
triumph of cavalry over heavy infantry at Adrianople - has little concern with 
the qualities of Roman cavalry forces: cum praesens doctrina 
sufficiat. -, 62 
Vegetius's work included an intriguing reference to two legions 6,000 men 
strong which had "formerly" defended the Illyrian frontier over a long period 
with their Inafflobalbali or lead-weighted darts; they were later honoured 
with the titles Jovian and Herculean by Diocletian and Maximian. 63 It is not 
entirely clear what Vegetius was trying to write here and it has been argued 
that the period at which the legions had the classical strength of 6,000 could 
have been substantially pre-Diocletianic. 64 It is also quite possible to 
consider these two legions to have been entirely fictional but, if Vegetius's 
statement is taken at something like face value, there would appear to have 
been legionary units in Illyricum at the accession of Diocletian and Maximian 
(AD 286) with the traditional 6,000-strong establishment. Even if this figure 
is accepted as accurate, it does not of course have any implications either 
for legions outside Illyricum or for those of periods later than the late third 
century. On the other hand, there is at least the possibility of legions at 
traditional strength in one area of the Empire only some 14 years before 
documentary evidence from another area has been interpreted as recording 
legions nearly six times smaller. It may well be that, as well as accepting the 
possibility that there may have been two different legionary establishments 
(for those raised before and after the 280s), there may also have been 
different actual strengths due to factors such as battle casualties or slack 
recruiting during periods of inactivity. 
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Finally Vegetius includes an interesting comment on fort sizes: ". .. the size 
of the camp shculd be proportional to the number cf. troops. A camp which 
is too confined will not permit the troops to perform their movements with 
freedom, and one which is too extensive divides them too much. " ("Nam 
propugnatores angusta constipant et ultra quam convenit latiora 
diffundunt. ")65 Even from a military amateur, this seems unexceptionable 
common sense and should perhaps be borne in mind when considering 
suggestions for drastically reduced garrison numbers - resulting, for 
example, in a two-hectare (five-acre] fort held by just over eighty soldiers. 66 
Zosimus was a Greek-speaking pagan from the East, possibly a native of 
Constantinople -a city he knew well. At some time between c. AD 450 and 
c. 503 - probably later rather than earlier - he compiled his NewHistoly, a 
sort of digest of the work of earlier historians, especially Eunapius and 
Olympiodorus of Thebes. The work contains a number of incidental 
references to unit and army sizes. He calculates, for example, a Western 
army of some 286,000 in 312: 98,000 under Constantine and 188,000 
under Maxentius. 67 There is nothing particularly incredible in this figure, 
nor is there in Zosimus's estimate that Julian's Persian expedition of 363 
numbered 65,000 men. 68 The latter has become widely accepted and is 
perfectly acceptable: it is a reasonably modest size compared with some 
ancient army estimates, although it may have been the largest Imperial 
expedition ever put into the field. 
Early in the next century, the invasion of Italy by the Ostrogoth leader 
Radagaisus (AD 405) was halted, Zosimus claimed, by a surprise attack 
from an army led by Stilicho: this force apparently comprised some Alan 
and Hunnish irregulars together with thirty regular mobile army units. 69 it 
seems difficult to envisage this force at anything much larger than 30,000 
men, which makes the total rout of 400,000 "Celts and Germans" less than 
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easy to credit. It is worth noting therefore that Orosius estimated the 
barbarian force at only 200,000 or slightly more, 70 while Augustine reckoned 
it at more than 100,000 but including many non-combatants, 71 In other 
ways too, Zosimus's account of the events of 405 seems unsatisfactory. 
The army of Radagaisus may perhaps have included Vandals and Silings 
as well as Goths but reference to Celts make little sense. Furthermore, 
there seems not to have been a bloody battle as described by Zosimus but 
rather the blockade of. a hill ("de Resole" or "Faesulae") followed by a 
capitulation. There were apparently very few deaths: in fact, Orosius wrote 
that so many prisoners were taken that the price of a slave fell to one gold 
piece. Olympiodorus also contradicts Zosimus's claim that a "few" of the 
defeated barbarians were enrolled as auxiliaries: he refers to no fewer than 
12,000 high-born conscripts. 
An implicit reference to unit sizes occurs when Zosimus records that 
Honorius, concerned that Rome was "in no better position than before, " 
ordered to the city from their Dalmatian bases five legions comprising "6,000 
men in all,, 72 in January or February 409. Although the phrase used by 
Zosimus means "formations [ tagmatal of troops", this does seem to be a 
reference to field army legions well over 1,000 strong. 73 Zosimus 
incidentally goes on to recount that the five "legions7were ambushed en 
, ro, yte to Rome by Alaric and all but 100 were taken prisoner. 
The next year, according to Zosimus, six long expected units arrived in 
Ravenna from the East: ". .. they numbered 4,000. "74 This could be 
interpreted as a reference to cohorts some 600-700 strong: the Greek word 
used is taglnata. 75 It should be noted, although there are exceptions, many 
Greek-speaking writers clearly found transliterating Latin technical terms 
aesthetically undesirable and preferred to seek classical analogies: these 
were often quite inappropriate, such as "phalan)e'. 76 
71 
EugWqim (c. AD 460-533+) was the abbot of a monastery near Naples, 
who was possibly a native of Noricum. He is well known for his Vita 
Seve, rinl, a life of Saint Severinus, an Easterner who lived between c. AD 
455 and 8 January 482, and visited Noricum probably in the 460s. This 
biography has become a popular source in recent times for the state of the 
Late Army and also as providing an analogy for the less well recorded 
decline of the military establishment in early fifth century Britain. 77 What 
Eugippius recorded in the Vita was presumably the remnant of the very large 
garrisons of the same region recorded in the NoMa (0c. 34 and 35): these 
totalled two cvnei, 17 units of equiles, eight legionary detachments (from 
four different legions), a group of Marcomanni, three alae, II cohorts, a 
detachment of Raetians and four river patrol forces. Even allowing the 
smallest possible establishments for these units, it has to be concluded that 
the NoRla was recording (probably in the late fourth century - perhaps only 
eighty years or so before the visit of Severinus) several thousand troops at 
least defending this crucial section of the upper Danube. Sevennus however 
appeared to have encountered just a couple of surviving units in the 460s. 
At Favianis (the modern Mautern in Austria) Eugippius recorded that 
Severinus found a small contingent (militespauoý; siml) under a tribune; 
this base had earlier (according to the NbMa) housed a riverine detachment 
of the legion I Noricorum. 78 At the modern Passau in Bavaria Severinus 
apparently found a small garrison, which is usually taken to be the final 
remnant of =17ols lRatawrum (a unit which had been at Passau so long 
that it had given its name to the fort79). It is not unreasonable to assume 
that Eugippius's silence in regards to the other garrisons implies that most, if 
not all, of them had been abandoned. Eugippius records the fall of one of 
these, loviacum (modern Schl6gen in Austria, base of a "naval" detachment 
of legio 111talica according to the Alb&ia8Q), to the Herulii in a single night at 
some point in or after 472. 
72 
Eugippius also describes the fall of Favianis to the Rugi under their king 
Feletheus or Feva and (in c. AD 476) of Passau/Batavis. He had earlier 
recorded the famous incident when the Passau troops, finding their pay had 
not arrived, sent a delegation to Italy seeking redress: 81 the bodies of these 
soldiers were later found floating in the Inn. When the barbarians under 
Hunumundus finally captured Passau, the forty survivors were all kilied: 82 it 
is obviously open to question as to what this should be taken to imply about 
the final strength of the Ninth Bata: vians other than it must presumably have 
been rather larger than forty, although not necessarily very much more. 
It should finally be noted that, although Eugippius does record that the 
Norican towns continued to hold out beyond the fall of the remaining military 
posts, he nowhere makes reference to the Danube fleet which must once 
have been a substantial force. 
loannes Ly-dus (or John the Lydian) was born at Philadelphia in Lydia in 
a AD 490 and lived until towards the end of Justinian's reign (that is, before 
565). After a career in the civil administration in Constantinople, Lydus 
became an academic and was perhaps the most distinguished antiquarian 
of his period: he was noted for his knowledge of Latin - by then a rarity in 
the East. His writings included works of panegyric, history and poetry. In 
the current context. it is worth noting that, although he had experience of 
matters of government, scholarship and the law, he had none of military 
affairs. 
Towards the end of his life (between AD 554 and 565), Lydus wrote a work 
usually known as Lle Afagis&a&bas or On Ponels, a sort of study of Roman 
institutions. In this book Lydus describes, purporting to refer to the war 
against the Veii in 388 BC, the establishment of units of particular sizes. 83 
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These units included cohorts of 500 "shield-bearers, " alae of 600, 
vexillations of 500 horsemen, tul7nae [slq] of 50n horse archers, and legions 
of 6,000 infantry. It is not easy to make much sense of this passage. It 
does not seem to refer with much accuracy to real Republican units of this 
very early period but nor does it scem that Lydus is anachronistically 
describing Imperial forces of his own period. As well as his terminology. 
Lydus's chronology seems suspect. 84 
Before dimissing Lydus's figures as a complete nonsense however, it should 
be noted that some individual elements - such as the 6,000-strong legion - 
are perfectly feasible ones for the early Empire or even the Republic. 
Furthermore, Lydus elsewhere85 cites figures for Diocletian's army which do 
not seem ridiculous. He put the army at 389,704 men (plus 45,562 in the 
fleet, for a grand total of 435,266), which would fit quite well with other 
estimates for the situation at Diocletian's accession at least86 and should 
cause some hesitation before judging his statements to be entirely without 
value. 
A near contemporary of Lydus was the poet and lawyer, Agatheas (a AD 
532- a 579/582), who wrote in the late 560s an Histolia, of which the first 
five books survive covering the years 552-559. Describing a serious 
invasion of the Hunnish Cottigurs under Zabergan in 559, Agathias records 
that they reached the walls of Constantinople unmolested. In a bitter 
passage, he attributes the barbarians' success to the "drastic reductions in 
the armed forces incurred through the negligence of the authorities! ' who 
had allowed the Rc, -nan army to dwindle from an establishment of 645,000 
men to "barely 150,000" including units stationed in Italy, Spain, Lazica in 
the Caucasus, Egypt and on the Persian border. 87 These figures - 
especially the latter - are not intrinsically unbelievable, even if they are taken 
only to reflect the strength of the mobile armies excluding the Alnitanei 
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Another sixth century Byzantine writer, Procol2ius, gives no figures for unit 
sizes but does include some interesting references to the total numbers in 
certain expeditionary forces. The army that Anastasius led against the 
Persians in 503, for example, Procopius estimated at 52,000 men; 88 he 
said that Belisarius commanded 25,000 troops on the Eastern front in 530 
and 20,000 the next year. 89 Referring to such sixth century armies, ranging 
in size from some 8,000 to over 50,000 men, Jones wisely reminded us that: 
"These small figures need not, however, throw doubts on the gross totals. 
With all large armies it is difficult to put into the field for a given campaign 
more than a very small proportion of their total numbers; the great majority 
of the troops are tied down by local commitments. This was markedly the 
case with the later Roman empire. The lilnitanel in the first place were 
committed to local defence and internal security duties: ... they were not 
available for a major campaign. They accounted ... for about two-thirds of 
the total at the end of the fourth century. "90 
It could indeed be argued that, even by modern standards, the figures cited 
by ancient authorities are high rather than otherwise: the 65,000 men that 
Julian is usually agreed to have led into Persia in 363 must have 
represented at least 10% or 15% of the entire Imperial army, mobile or not. 
This compares, for example, with the 12.75% of total armed forces 
comprising the peak US deployment to Vietnam in 1969 or the UK's 
deployment of 8.5% of its forces to the Falklands in 1982; neither of these 
powers of course also had a frontier defence task of quite the nature that 
faced Julian. 
Procopius, incidentally, refers to the presence of a "legion" at Melitene [V 
Macedonica] in a manner which implies his unfamiliarity with the term - or at 
least his assumption that his readers would be unfamiliar with the word. At 
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the time he was writing legions evidently continued to form part of the 
Imperial forces, as the reference by Theophylact Simocatta. to IV Parthica 
indicates. 91 
Table 3 below is a schematic method of representing the unit size 
references contained in this chapter. The picture it summarises is far from 
consistent or clear. It seems to provide evidence both for units much 
smaller than the assumed establishments of the Principate (Ammianus and 
Synesius, for example) and for apparent survivals of traditionally sized 
formations (recorded, for instance, by Libanius and Vegetius). There are 
therefore no simple conclusions. It may be that an image of inconsistency is 
best explained as representing a reality of inconsistency. It may be however 
that our evidence is too limited and too random to allow any lessons to be 
learnt. And it may be of course that writers of literature, often with little or no 
military experience, should always be considered with caution. 
Author Data Date Referred to 
Libanius Late 4th C Diocletianic 
SHA 360sf7Os+ a 230/1 
Vegetius 383/392 Pre-Diodetianic (? ) 
Ammianus Early 390s 354 
Claudian Early 5th C 398 
Synesius Early 5th C 411 
Cohorts (? ) of 500 
Legions of 5,000 
Legions of 6,000 
7 legions totalling 
well under 20,000 
2 cavalry "turmae" 
totalling 700 
Field army units of 
about 800 
Cavalry unit (? ) of 40 
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Zosimus Late 5th C 409 
Eugippius Early 6th M. c. 476 
John Lyclus 554/565 380s BC-7 
John 574+ 363 
Malalas 
Legions (? ) of about 
1,200 
Cohorts (? ) of about 666 
Cohort of 40+? 
Cohorts of 300 
Alae of 600 
Cavalry vexillations of 
500 
Turmae of 500 
Legions of 6,000 
Unit of 1,500 lanciarii and 
mattiarii 
1: See Chapter 2 pages 45-46. 
2: Namely Legions 1, V, VIII, IX, XIII, XIV, XV, XVI, XX and XXI (Tacitus, 
AnMIS. 1). 
3: Ibid., 1,49 (26 cohorts and eight alae). 
4: See Chapter 2 page 32. 
5: Lactantius, 7,2. The chapter contains other exaggerated jibes. 
6: C f. JohnCasey, 77 ýe L egions in the La tel - Roman El npire. - T17e Foul ffi 
Annual Caelleon Le&ure, Caerleon, 199 1, page 12. Note the 
implication of Lactantius's use of the word "contenderent. " 
7: By Casey, ibid., for example. 
8: Libanius, Crabones, 20,17. 
9: Libanius, Orationes, 20,18. The word used is "Pentakosion" = "the 
500". 
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10: This is perhaps however too often assumed to equate with complete 
ignorance nf matters military. It could be remarked that - with some 
notable exceptions - most of the younger modern students of the 
Roman army have no first hand military experience either. 
11: SHA, Severus Alexander, 50,5. 
12: Ibid.. 
13: Roger Tomlin, 'Senibles-lunbres in the Late-Roman Field Army. 
Alnerir. al7, lozII77alolPhilolog, y Vol. 93,2,1972, Appendix 1, pages 
266-69. 
14: AmmianusMarcellinus, Histo/ies, 16,12,2. 
15: Ibid., 16,11,2. 
16: Cf. Peter Salway, RomaI7 Blitain, The Oxford History of England I A, 
Oxford, 1981, page 75. 
17: Modern Diyarbakir in south-east Turkey. 
18: Ammianus was only in his late 20s at the time of the siege, although 
his account of it was written probably in his late 50s or early 60s. 
19: It has been suggested (Roger Tomlin, pe/s. w1nm. ) that a copying 
error might have resulted in a missing digit and that Ammianus 
actually wrote 120,000. 
20: He places Amida on the wrong bank of the Tigris, with Mesopotamia 
and the river Nymphaeus in the wrong direction. 
21: The Sklpelwnlbres and Praemwlbres had been raised a decade or so 
before. 
22: Ammianus, 18,9,3. 
23: A. H. M. Jones, Me Later Roman EmpireA94-602-- A Sicial, Economic 
a17dAd1n1nis&a&L- Sulwy, Oxford, 1964, Volume 2, page 682. 
24: Ammianus, 19,6,11. 
25: Ammianus, 19,9,9. 
26: Although they may already have been anticipated in a more basic 
form (Roger Tomlin, pem colnm. ). 
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27: Cf. for example the wide variations in estimates of casualties suffered 
by the Iraqi forces in the 1991 Gulf War. 
28: Diascenes (Ammianus, 19,9,9). 
29: Ibid., 18,6,22. Ammianus lists the Chionitae (under their king 
Grumbates). the Cuseni (Kushans), the Albani and the Segestani (the 
latter accompanied by a force of elephants, about which he seems 
particularly anxious). 
30: Zosimus, Nea Histolia, 3,13,1. This can be read as referring only to 
the strength of the main force less the Tigris detachment (implying a 
full strength of 83,000 men). 
31: Ammianus. 23.3.5. (16,000 according to Malalas 13,21, and 18,000 
according to Zosimus [op. cit., 3,12,4]). 
32: Ammianus, 24.7.4. 
33: Ibid., 24,4,23. 
34: Ibid., 25A 7. 
35: Ibid., 25,1,19. 
36: Ibid., 25,6,2-3. 
37: John Malalas, 13,21 and 13,23. 
38: Ammianus, 20,1,3and27.8.7. 
39: Ibid., 20,1,3. The expression "velitari" might mean something like 
"light infantry" but might equally suggest that in this emergency the 
troops were deployed unencumbered, for example by baggage. 
40: Personal comment from Roger Tomlin, referring for example to 
Hoffmann's estimates. 
41: N. J. E. Austin, Ammlanus on Walfare. - A17 117wsAga&b17 il7to 
Alnlnial7zls'AfilitalyKl7owledge, Collection Latomus Volume 165, 
Brussels, 1979, page 109. 
42: Ammianus, 27,8,7: ". .. roving parties of 
freebooters! ' in the 
Penguin translation (Walter Hamilton and Andrew Wallace-Hadrill, 
Harmondsworth, 1986, page 343). 
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43: Ibid., 26,4.5. 
44: Ibid., 31,5.10 and 18,6,23. 
45: Ibid., 18,8.2. 
46: Ibid., 20,4,2. Zosimus (3,8,4) describes how, after already 
having demanded two "Celtic legions [ tagmata]", Constantius ordered 
more legions to be detached from Julian's army, followed by four 
cavalry "regiments [ tagmata]". Libanius ( Ora&bnes 18,94) refers to 
the incident without giving details, while Julian himself (Le&el- to the 
Affienlans 280D) says he sent four, then another three, alMmol of 
infantry and two tagmata of cavalry. 
47: Ibid., 27.12,16. 
48: Ibid., 31,10,13. 
49: Cf., for example, Roger Tomlin, 'The Late-Roman Empire' in 
General Sir John Hackett (ed. ), W"are in the Ahoiel7tWblld, 
London. 1989. page 238. Is the relative frequency of references to 
detachments of 300 troops coincidence or is it evidence of some Wind 
of norm? 
50: Claudian, In G17doneln, 418-423. 
51: Namely, Hercullal7isenlores (N. D. Oc. 5,146 and 7.4. Italy), IoWani 
seniores (N. D. Oc. 5,145 and 7,3, Italy), NerWi(N. D. Or. 5,46, the 
East), FellceshlMores (N. D. Oc. 5,180 and 7.23, Italy) and Leol7es 
iuniores (N. D. Oc. 5,172 and 7,19, Italy). 
52: L. Vdrady, 'New Evidences on Some Problems of the Late Roman 
Military Organisation', ActaAnIiquaAcademiae&ien&adum 
Hangalicae Tomus 9, Budapest, 1961, pages 333-96, quoting 
rosius, His tol ia con tra paganos, 7,3 6.6. 
53: 5,000 -: - 6= 833. 
54: Cf. note 49 above. 
55: Vdrady, op. cit. (note 52). k/drady's calculations give the force an 
exact size of 5,100: 3X1,200 +3X 500 = 5,100. 
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56: Synesius, Constitil&b. 1576. 
57: Synesius, Letter 78. In Letter 125 Synesius is clearly referring to 
irregulars enrolled at his own expense, and it seems at least possible 
that none of his exploits involved regular troops and that any statistics 
cited are irrelevant when considering anit sizes. 
58: At Strasbourg in 357, for example, Julian defeated 32,000 Germans 
with an army of just 13,000. Ammianus (16.12,63) puts Roman 
casualties at 247 dead while the enemy lost at least 6,000. 
59: The Loeb translator of Synesius (Augustine Fitzgerald, 1926) 
suspects exaggeration in this letter and makes an interesting 
comparison with the account by Sidonius Apollinaris (LeAels 3,3,3- 
4) of his brother-in-law Ecdidius defeating a force of several thousand 
Goths with only 18 men! Gregory of Tours later reduced even this 
minuscule force to just ten (Hist Frana 2,24). This incident took 
place in AD 474, just fifty years after Synesius's death. It has recently 
been suggested however [Whittaker 1993 page 295] that "we are here 
victims of terminology" and that the small figures cited are references 
to Ecdidius's satellites and not his whole army. 
60: Synesius, Cbns&u&o 1576 and 1563. 
61: See Chapter I page 4. 
62: Vegetius, 3,26. 
63: Ibid., 1,17. Vegetius states that each soldier carried five "darts" in his 
shield. 
64: John Casey, op. cit. (note 6), page 13. 
65: Vegetius, 3,8. 
66: Namely, Housesteads: see Chapter 5 pages 137-139. 
67: Zosimus, 2.15,1-2. The Panegwic of Constantine puts Maxentius's 
troops at 100,000 (9,3,3) and Constantine's at under 40,000 
(9.5.1-2). 
68: Ibid., 3,12-13. But see note 30 above. 
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69: Ibid., 5,26,4. This is a particularly circumstantial account, which has 
at least a superficial air of credibility. The word used for "unit' is 
"arithmos7', the usual Greek equivalent for "numerus". 
70: Orosius, op. cit. (note 52), 7,39,4,13. 
71: Augustine, 0ý, &Gcoý 5,23. 
72: Zosimus, 5,45,1. 
73: 1,200 if Zosimus was using figures precisely. 
74: Ibid., 6,8,2. The manuscript actually reads 40,000. Sozomen (9,8, 
6) confirms 4,000. 
75: 666 would be an exact calculation. 
76: Cf. John Lydus, 017 Pbwv1z;, Part 2,6,5. 
77: Cf. for example, David J. Breeze and Brian Dobson, Hadlian '2- Wall, 
London, 1976, page 231. 
78: N. D. Oc. 34,41. 
79: Ibid., Oc. 35,24. Cohors IX Batavorum had been at Passau since 
a AD 166 - that is, about 310 years when the fort fell. 
80: Ibid.. Oc. 34,37. 
81: Eugippius, Vda Sewliki, 20,1. 
82: Ibid., 22,4. 
83: John Lydus, On Powets, Part 1, Chapter 46. 
84: He refers to 365 AUC (= 389 Bq but seems to cite the consuls for 
389 AUC (= 365 Bq. Veii had been captured by 396 BC (cf. Livy 
Book 5). It has been pointed out (John Matthews,, wfs. comm. ) that 
many modern scholars are less than well versed in the use of modem 
military organisational terminology! 
85: John Lydus De A-fensibas, 1,27. 
86: Cf. Chapter 2 pages 32-33. 
87: Agathias, The Histolies, Book 5,13,6-8. Agathias goes on to 
describe how the aged Belisarius was persuaded from retirement and 
defeated the Huns with just 300 veterans and a rabble of unarmed 
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Constantinopolitans and peasants. He claims that 400 Huns were 
killed but no Romans 
88: Procopius, De BelloPelsico, 1,8,4. 
89: Ibid.. 
90: Jones, op. cit. (note 23), Volume 2, page 685. 
91: Procopius, Rz111d117gs, 3,4,16. Cf. Chapter 2, note 9. 
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This chapter will consider the evidence provided by the two major 
documentary sources which actually date from the fourth century. Although 
neither of these sources provides dilect evidence for unit sizes, both have 
been widely used for this purpose and their implications have become 
central to discussion of the issue. 
These papyri, published in Dublin in 1964, comprise two fragments from the 
files of the Strategus (or sub-Governor) of the Panopolite nome at Panopolis 
in Upper Egypt, recording inferalia communications with 11 units of the 
provincial garrison: (1) copies of letters sent by him in September 298 and 
(2) letters received by him shortly afterwards from the Procurator (or 
Governor) of the Lower Thebaid. 1 (The Lower Thebaid was the area 
administered from Thebes, the southernmost of the three main districts of 
Roman Egypt, which seems to have been a province newly created by the 
time of these papyri. It was governed by an epi&qpos or Procurator, and 
was in turn sub-divided into nine of the traditional Egyptian districts called 
nomes, each controlled by a strategus. ) 
Panopolis I includes copies of two letters dated 24 September 298. The 
first (lines 392-394) orders the "overseers of barley" to supply the soldiers at 
the fort of Thmo6 under the Prefect Papas with 2.610 Italic modii for the two 
months 29 August to 27 October 298.2 The second letter (lines 395-398) 
has the same date and orders the Decemprimi of the Middle Toparchy to 
supply the same garrison for the same two months with 1287/8 artabas of 
wheat from the produce of the year 296/7. We know from later in the papyri 
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that the garrison unit at Thmod was the cavalry regiment ala I Hiberorum. 
The NoMa also records the same situation with the regiment being one of 
the 16 alae in the very large command of the dux Thebaidos. 3 
Panopolis Papyrus 2 comprises a large file of 16 letters received at 
Panopolis as detailed below: 
1) An order (lines 27-31) dated 4 February 300 from Aurelius Isidorus, 
Procurator of the Lower Thebaid, to Apolinarius, the stlategos of the 
Panopolite nome to recover 21.000 denarii from seven soldierS4 of the ala 11 
Herculia Dromedariorum commanded by the Prefect Eudaemon. Later in 
the papyrus this camel unit is placed at the joint forts of Todto and Psinabla: 
the No§&a also records the regiment at the latter place (called there 
Psinaula). 5 This money (3,000 denani per man) does not appear to be a 
simple over-issue of pay but it is far from clear what else it might be. 
2) An order (lines 36-42) dated 9 February 300 (sent on 30 January) from 
the Procurator to the same s&ategos and the Panopolite "receivers" to pay 
73,500 denarii in s#enoililm for I January 300 to the troops of ala I 
Hiberorurn (or lberorum) at Thmo6 under the decurion Besas. 6 Although 
nowhere stated to be so, this payment is usually assumed to represent a 4- 
month instalment with the other thirds paid on I May and 1 September; the 
annual s&pendizlm bill for the unit would therefore have totalled 220.500 
denarii. The unit is also ordered to be paid for the four month period 1 
September to 31 December 299 as annona (here presumably a cash 
substitute for provision in kind) 23,600 denarii. 
3) A letter (lines 57-60) sent on 30 January 300 and received on II 
February f rom the Procurator to the s&ategos and "receivers" ordering them 
to pay 343,300 denarii as s&, pnndium for I January 300 to the legionaries of 
the legion III Diocletiana serving in the headquarters of the Governor 
('Praeses') of the whole Thebaid, Julius Athenodorus. The payment is 
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ordered to be made to the leading centurion, Dioscorus, presumably this 
vexillation's plaepositzls. 
4) A letter (lines 161-167) sent on 8 February 300 and received 11 days later 
in which the Procurator orders the strategos and receivers to pay 302,5007 
denarii to the horse archers8 under the praqpositus Valerius at Potecoptus9 
to celebrate the anniversary of the accession of Diocletian (20 November 
284) and an identical amount to celebrate the emperor's birthday (22 
December). 
5) A letter (lines 168-175) sent with the previous one in which the Procurator 
orders two donatives for the same occasions of 53,750 denarii each to be 
paid to the soldiers of ala 11 Herculia Dromedariorum at Todto and Psinabla 
under the Prefect Eudaemon. 
6) A letter (lines 180-185) sent on 31 January 300 and received on 26 
February ordering payment of 1,386,250 denarii to the soldiers of the 
vexillation of legio // ThWana at Apollinopolis Superiorl 0 under the 
p, raeposlkls Leontius; this sum was to be paid as donatives for the 
emperor's birthday. 
7) One of four letters (lines 186-190) sent on 18 February 300 and received 
eight days later in which the Procurator orders an accession donative of 
2,496,250 denarii to be paid to the troops of a vexillation made up from 
"various Eastern legions" at Potecoptus under theplaeposlkls Mucianus. 1 1 
8) A similar letter to seven above (lines 192-196) ordering a birthday 
donative of an identical amount. 
9) One of two letters (lines 197-203) sent on 26 February 300 and received 
the next day (! ) in which the Procurator orders payment of two sums of 
2,500 denarii each to Leontius, praeposlkts of the equ1tesp1z71no& of the 
legion 11 Traiana at Tentyra12 as arrears of donatives and 18,000 denarii 
as stipenoilum for I January 300. 
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10) The second of two letters (lines 204-207) ordering 93.125 denarii to be 
paid to the II Traiana's equitesploimo& as donatives to celebrate the third 
consulate of the two Caesars, Constantius and Galerius. 
11) A letter (lines 245-249) sent on 28 January 300 and received on 26 
February in which the Procurator orders paid to the vexillation of legio /// 
Dlbaletlal7a under the plaeposlIzIs Prodianus at Syene 8,280 Italian sextarii 
of salt and 8,280 pounds of oil as _Sa1gamz11n1 
3 for the four months 1 
September to 31 December 299. 
12) A letter (lines 259-265) sent on 28 February 300 and received in early 
March in which the Procurator orders two payments of 1,097,500 denarii 
each to be made to the lal7cL-aiii of the legion 11 Traiana under the 
, plaepasitils 
Tinton at Ptolemais; these payments represented accession 
and birthday donatives. 
13) A letter (lines 266-270) received on 3 March 300 with a similar order for 
the payment of 526,875 denarii as donatives for the Caesarsthird consulate 
to the vexillation of legib // rralal7a under Tinton at Ptolemais. 1 4 
14) One of the same batch of letters (lines 285-290) as the previous two 
(dated 28 February 300), in which the Procurator orders salgalnuln of 3,596 
sextarii of salt and 3,596 litrae of oil for the two months I November to 31 
Dece m be r 29 9 to be i ss u ed to th e lalxL-alii of legio // rlakv7a at Pto Ie mai s. 
15) Another letter (lines 292-298) from the same batch containing an order 
for the cohors XI Chamavorurn under their tribune Ursus at Peamou 
opposite Abydusl 5 to be paid as s&, bel7dium for 1 January 300 65,500 
denarii, as well as 32,866 denarii as anl7ol7a for the four months 1 
September to 31 December 299. 
16) The last letter ', lines 299-304) before the papyrus is mutilated, in which 
the Procurator orders the lal7walii of the legion III Diocletiana stationed at 
Panopolis ("with you") to be paid fifty pounds of silver bullion and 50,000 
denarii in coin as a gift from the Tetrarchs. 16 
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It is important to stress that nowhere in these papyri, which contain orders 
for various payments in cash and kind, are any actual unit size details 
included and all such figures based on the Panopolis evidence are of an 
inferential nature only. Such statements therefore as "A papyrus from Egypt 
... reveals an ala with about 120 men and a cohort with about 160,17 need 
to be approached with great caution. In this field, theory is all too easily 
codified as fact. 
The first coherent examination of these letters and their possible implications 
came with Jones and his breakthrough discovery that all the donative figures 
in the papyri were divisible by 625.18 There are a couple of considerations to 
bear in mind before examining Jones's assumptions in detail. Firstly, the 
claim for a donative rate based on multiples of 625 denarii per man seems 
low, especially in view of earlier recorded donatives of more than 5,000 
denarii and the serious inflation of the late third century. A reasonable 
response to this objection would be that by the time of the Panopolis papyri 
donatives were no longer occasional gifts (usually granted once a reign - on 
the accession) but in effect had become a series of regular annual 
payments. Skeat denies that there is any evidence that dol7a&ka were 
graded according to arm of service or rankl 9 but there is in fact a record of 
an occasion at the beginning of Marcus Aurelius's reign (AD 161) when 
donatives, were paid at different rates for officers and other ranks, 20 and this 
does not seem unreasonable in view of the very considerable differentials 
recorded for stipenoililln rates. 21 Jones's calculations for donative rates are 
not to be dismissed out of hand but they have certainly not won universal 
acceptance. 
If we could achieve some certainty over individual shares of any of the items 
listed in the papyri - pay, clonatives, annol7a, or salgamum - then some fairly 
simple arithmetic would produce concrete figures for the sizes of two alae, a 
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cohort and several legionary vexillations of the Egyptian garrison in AD 
299/300. Such certainty unfortunately is not available and we must instead 
consider the plausibility of various possible alternatives. 
Considering the possibilities based on s&, a-, 17oNum first, Jones posits an 
annual pay rate for legionaries and auxiliary cavalry of 600 denarii, usually 
paid in 200 denarii instalments every four months, while auxiliary infantry 
received 375 denarii p. a.. Using these figures gives the following sizes for 
the units referred to in the papyri: - 
(a) 367% for ala I Hiberorum at Thmo6 on I January 30022 
(b) 1,7161/6 for the detachment of the legion III Diocletiana with the governor 
on 1 January 30023 
(c) 524 for cohors A Chamavorum at Peamou. 24 
There is nothing intrinsically unreasonable about these resulting figures but 
one or two observations need to be made. Jones's pay rate assumptions 
are compatible with what is known for the period up to the early third 
century but not enough is known about the situation at the time of the 
Panopolis papyri to be safe in assuming that these rates still applied. One 
alternative pay rate suggested for akmes rather lower than Jones's would put 
it at 450 denarii p. a. 25 and this would produce a unit total for I Hiberorum of 
490 men. This is not only reasonably close to the nominal strength of a 
quingenary ala but also matches well with Arrian's widely accepted figure of 
512.26 On the other hand. if the figure of 490 were applied to the av? 17ol7a 
allowance in the same letter, it would produce the difficult sum of 144% 
denarii per man p. a.. The whole issue of fractions remains a problem yet to 
be resolved for the two major sets of calculations derived from the Panopolis 
papyri: the only certainty is that the Roman army did not include fractions of 
men! Jones himself 27 warns that units certainly included men paid above 
the basic rate (as well as possibly recruits not paid at first, at least as far as 
donatives were concerned), and that without being able to quantify these 
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differentials, it is impossible to remove the fractions. It should be possible to 
construct model ala structures which allow for whole number solutions 
however: assume, for example, an ala of 354 men of whom 339 were paid 
at the basic rate but also including 12 duplicalii (3.4%) and three 
sesqzliplicalii (0.9%) and Jones's assumed pay rate of 200 denarii per four 
months would divide into 73,500 denarii exactly. 28 Although other models 
could be proposed, the above is of the same order as XX Palmyrenorurn 
appears to have been: P. Dura 100 records some 2-3% duplicarii in the unit, 
while P. Dura 82 records approximately 1.6% duplicarii and 0.5% 
sesquiplicarii. 29 354 is also the figure which matches exactly with 
the a1717ol7a allowance in the same letter on the basis of this amounting to 
200 denarii per annum. 30 
A similar exercise may be carried out with the second s&, 4L-17o11z11n payment, 
the 343,300 denarii paid to a vexillation of III Diocletiana. Leaving 
untouched Jones's 200 denarii basic pay scale but allowing for small 
proportions of troops being paid at 1 Y? times and double that rate, the 
fraction can be removed while still ending up with a detachment of about 
1.700 men: a total of 1,690 legionaries, for example, would receive exactly 
343,300 denarii if 1,658 were paid at the flat rate, 21 (1.2%) at double and 
11 (0.7%) at I Yst times. 31 
This fine tuning of Jones's calculations about s&, pL-n&R#n to remove the 
unconvincing fractions would, in other words, produce the following unit size 
conclusions: 
(a) cohors A Chamavorurn could still be considered as possibly 524 strong; 
(b) ala I Hiberorum seems more likely to have been 354 strong: and 
(c) the vexillatio of the legion III Diocletiana could be adjusted downwards 
slightly to perhaps 1,690. 
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Jones claims that "Donatives are the simplest, 32 payment to quantify and 
proposes the following rates: - 
(i) 2,500 denarii for an officer for the birthday or accession anniversary of 
an Augustus-, 
(ii) 1,250 denarii for a legionary on the same occasions: 
(iii) 625 denarii for legionaries for the consulate of a Caesar (or Caesars); 
and 
(iv) 250 denarii for auxiliaries. 
Although consulate donatives, were obviously occasional payments, birthday 
and accession payments were not and amounted to a regular bonus 
substantially larger than the s&penoklln rates, which were very possibly still 
the Severan levels -a century or so old by the time of the Panopolis papyri 
(and that a century of rapid inflation). Jones calculates the income from 
donatives to have been as much as 7,500 denarii p. a. for legionaries in 
years when the emperor was consul, and 1,250 for auxiliaries. 
The horse archers in letter 4 above (Jones's D& E) would have numbered 
242, if this donative were paid at the highest "legionary' rate of 1,250 
(although this is not actually a legionary detachment33). The dromedary 
unit, ala 11 Herculia, in letter 5 above (Jones's F& G) would have had only 
215 men if paid at Jones's lowest "auxiliary" donative rate of 250 denarii. 34 
The various legionary detachments in Papyrus 2 would have had strengths 
of 1.109 (letter 6/Jones's H: II Traiana); 1,997 (letters 7&8/Jones's I&J: 
"various Eastern legions7)3 5; 149 (letter I O/Jones's N: equites promorl of 11 
Traiana): 878 (letter 12/Jones's P&0: lancearii of 11 Traiana), and 843 
(letter 13/Jones's R: lancearii of 11 Traiana again36). The calculations for 
letters 10 and 13 use the lower "consulate" donative calculation of 625 
denarii: if the higher figure of 1,250 is applied, fractions result. 
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Jones states that he sees the key to examining the annona payments in the 
document he calls U (letter 15) where the cohors XI Charnavorurn received, 
in addition to its four months' sflAendluln payment for 1 January 300,32,866 
denarii as annona for the last four months of 299. Jones claims that the 
latter figures ". .. can hardly represent anything 
but 493 men at 662/3 .... 
i. e. 200 denarii a year. .. . "37 Applying this rate to letter 2, produces the 
figure for the ala of 354 already discussed above where an attempt has 
been made to produce a standard unit size based on both s&Ae17dW1n 
and anl7ona payments. The cohort at Peamou however is left apparently 
with 524 recipients of stiAenditlIn but with only 493 soldiers being 
paid annona. This apparent discrepancy of 31 men between the two 
payments in the salne letter is not easy to explain. It may be that some 
troops were entitled to one payment but, for some reason, not the other; 38 it 
could be that this year-end period saw the discharge of time expired 
veterans from the unit but this would only make sense if st*wnoiluln was 
or, of course, it might be the case paid in advance rather than in arrears-39 
that either the stipL-17dium assumption of 125 denarii or the a1717ol7a 
assumption of 662/3 is wrong - or both could be wrong. 
In conclusion, Jones's interpretations of the Panopolis papyri could be 
extrapolated to suggest early fourth century unit sizes as follows: - 
(a) alae of some 200-350; 
(b) cohorts of about 500; and 
(c) legionary vexillations in the region of 1,000. 
Fourteen years after Jones's work was published, R. P. Duncan-Jones re- 
assessed the Panopolis papyri in a short paper4O whose conclusions have 
become very influential and quite crucial to most contemporary 
interpretations of Late Roman Army unit sizes. Duncan-Jones's starting 
point is the area of the Panopolis papyri largely ignored by Jones, the 
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payments in kind. The centre of his thesis relates to the two letters in the 
first Panopolis papyrus ordering payment to ala I Hiberorum at Thmob of 
2,610 Italic modii of barley and 128718 artabas of wheat for the sixty days 29 
August-27 October 298. It seems reasonable to assume that these items 
represent respectively fodder for the unit's mounts and a bread ration for its 
troopers. 
In summary, Duncan-Jones's argument is that 1 artaba = 4.5 modii; I 
modius = 8.6185 litres; a daily fodder ration was 3.2 litres per horse; and 
that the strength of ala I Hiberorum therefore was 116 horses (and also 116 
men). 
A sixth century military document4l gives a fodder ration of apparently 3.2 
litres per horse per day, although Duncan-Jones allows that there are 
contradictory references too. 42 He takes this sixth century allowance to 
calculate a ration strength for the Thmo6 garrison of 116 men. 43 Of course, 
116 mounts need not imply 116 troopers and, it could be argued, is implicitly 
unlikely. Any remount capacity would of course reduce the size of the ala 
still further (10% remounts would mean only about 104 men) but all Duncan- 
Jones's calculations, it should be noted, require a 1: 1 ratio of horses to 
soldiers. 44 
These assumptions would put the wheat allowance for the Thmob troops at 
0.7182 litres of bread per man per day (about 2.2 pounds). Duncan-Jones 
himself admits that this quantity (totalling 2% modii of wheat per man per 
month) ". .. is relatively low"45 but his case involves rejecting other 
interpretations of the dry measures involved. He had earlier46 argued at 
length for new Roman and Egyptian dry measure sizes, putting the modius 
at 8.6185 litres (not 8.75 or 8.67 litres, as claimed earlier) and 4% modii as 
equivalent to I artaba. Skeat, on the other hand, worked on a figure of 1 
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artaba = 3.33 or 3.25 modii and this would put the wheat rations for a 116 
man ala at about 0.53 litres (or 1.6 pounds) per man per day. At least one 
other artaba: modius equivalent is known (1: 5)47 and this would again alter 
the calculations (and consequently the size of the Thmo6 ala). In addition 
there is some evidence for both fodder and food rations different from those 
resulting from Duncan-Jones's calculations: Polybius, for example, cites 
fodder rations three or four times larger48 than the 3.2 litres of barley a day 
suggested above, while one artaba of wheat per man per day is attested for 
the Principate. 49 Duncan-Jones however seems attracted by the neatness 
of two months' rations amounting almost exactly to five modii per trooper 
and five artabas per mount. 50 
These considerations will need to be borne in mind when examining the rest 
of Duncan-Jones's argument in detaB. Turning to the next letter (2), 
Duncan-Jones rejects Jones's argument for al7nona of 662/3 denarii per man 
per four months (200 denarii per annum) since this estimate, as we have 
seen, would put the ala at a strength of 354. Although conceding that an 
increase in 16 months of 238 men over his own calculation of 116 (a 
threefold rise in numbers) ". .. is conceivable", 
51 he argues that the "lesser 
hypothesis" would be for the unit to have remained more or less static in size 
but for a different annona rate to have applied. Duncan-Jones's assumption 
is for annona three times higher: 600 denarii per man per year, which would 
produce exactly 118 shares. 52 He then goes on to argue that the s§pendizlm 
was similarly three times higher than Jones reckoned: at 1,800 denarii p. a. 
the number of shares would have been 122Y2.53 Duncan-Jones explains the 
mismatch with his annona result by allowing for a few payments above basic 
for higher grade troops. His conclusion are that the ala at Thmo6 was 
116/118 strong in 298/300, and that alares were pa7id a total of 2,400 denarii 
a year in pay and donatives. 
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There are some problems with Duncan-Jones's conclusions about 
remuneration. He concludes that Diocletianic legionaries were paid 12,400 
denarii per annum, made up of 1,800 as stipendium together with annov? a of 
600 denarii and 10,000 denarii in donatives. This assumes that alales were 
paid the same as legionaries but it is not certain that this was the case in the 
first and second centuries. This total of remuneration would incidentally 
have made legionaries five times better paid than the highest wage recorded 
in Diocletian's price edict of AD 296 - the 2,400 denarii p. a. for Greek, Latin 
and geometry teachers. 
A couple of other points need to be made at this stage. Although there is no 
reason to suppose that the last known pay scales still applied in C. 30054, it 
seems that auxiliary cavalry were paid 450 denarii p. a. under Caracalla 
(quoted, for example, by PA Holder, The Rbn7an A17WiI7 Blitain, Table 1. 
page 143). This rate applied to the s&Aenailum sum in letter 2 produces the 
intriguingly exact ala size of 490.55 We might also wonder whether 
Duncan-Jones's figures do not leave the Thmo6 unit rather too stable with 
only two more soldiers (fewer than 2%) present after well over a year. The 
Twentieth Palmyrenes at Dura 60-80 years earlier seems to have a positively 
unstable strength in comparison. It seems, for example, to have lost the 
equivalent of nearly half that 2% in just three days, while the unit total for the 
latter date (27 March 223/235) is 131 men (or more than 14%) lower than 
the lowest suggested total recorded perhaps as little as three years earlier. 56 
It is also worth considering whether Duncan-Jones might have been Correct 
about the provision measures (which put I Hiberorum at 116 on 24 
September 298) but wrong to reject Jones's donative assumption of 200 
denarii p. a. in favour of a figure three times higher. Although an increase 
from 116 to 354 over a year and a third is indeed large, it would still leave 
the unit at only about 69% of a nominal quingenary ala strength of 512 - and 
the increase did follow a period of invasion and uprising in Egypt. Could it 
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be that I Hiberorum had suffered heavy casualties in the rebellion of 
Domitius Domitianus in AD 297/8 and that these casualties had been partly 
made up by the beginning of 300? 
One of only two other items of stip6ndiuln evidence in the Panopolis papyri 
(apart from the individual payment to an officer in letter 9) is an amount of 
343,300 denarii to a detachment of legionaries of III Diocletiana in the 
"office! 'of the praeses of the Thebaid for I January 300. Jones's 
calculation for pay had put this vexillation size at an unconvincing 1,7161/6 
but Duncan-Jones's estimate of 5721/6 is hardly more felicitous. 57 The 
third stipendiuln record from Panopolis refers to 65,500 denarii paid to the 
men of cohors A Chamavorum at Peamou for I January 300. Duncan- 
Jones rejected Jones's estimate for this unit of 524 men in favour of 163% 
on the basis of each soldier being paid 1,200 denarii p. a.. 58 
Duncan-Jones then looks at the donative evidence from Panopolis. He 
claims that the 2,500 denarii (or 10,000 sesterces) payment to the officer of 
leglo // ThWana in letter 9 represented what he called a7ype N' rate paid to 
all legionary and cavalry ranks on occasions relating to the Augusti. He also 
proposes a "Type B" rate (for commemorations in regard to the junior 
Tetrarchs) of 1,200 denarii also paid to all ranks. It is ironical however that 
one of the sources Duncan-Jones cites as supporting his proposed scale of 
donatives is the reference to the SHA Ufe of Marcus Aurelius which tells of 
20,000 sesterces "each for the other ranks" but "the rest (sc. receiving) 
proportionately more. " It may well be then that, even if there were different 
sorts of donatives for different occasions, differentials rather than flat rates 
operated anyway. 
Part of Duncan-Jones's case against Jones's suggested donative multiplier 
of 625 (denarii) is that it appears to give one unit a "shifting membershipP. 
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The lancL-a(ii of legio // Traiana at Ptolemais would have numbered, 
according to Jones, 878 on 22 December 299 but cnly 843 on 1 January 
300. Duncan-Jones prefers to argue instead for a static sized unit but with 
the two payments being at his Type A and Type B levels: the Ptolemais 
detachment would then have a fixed size of 439 men. It might be noted that 
the apparent loss to the unit resulting from Jones's 625 denarii calculation 
amounts to only 4% over ten days, and it might be suggested as more than 
" coincidence that this reduction occurred over a period including the end of 
" year (AD 299); it is again possible that the unit was discharging its time- 
expired veterans. 69 
Duncan-Jones's own donative reckoning however creates its own difficulties 
- notably some strikingly tiny units. The 11 Traiana detachment at Tentyra, 
for example, he puts (based on his "consular" donative figure of 1,200 
denarii) at just 77.604 men, while ala 11 Herculia Dromedariorum at Todto 
and Psinabla (based on the higher donative rate of 2,500 denarii) would 
have contained just 21 Y2 soldiers! Although it is the Thmoa ala, with an 
establishment of just under 120 by these calculations, which has become 
something like an assumed norm for Late Empire cavalry units. there is no 
logical reason why it should be seen as any more typical than 11 Herculia 
Dromedanorum - except perhaps that formations under two dozen strong (in 
this case split between two bases! ) are extremely difficult to envisage. This 
type of strength would, after all. represent only some 4% of Arnan's ala of 
512. 
Duncan-Jones then turns his attention to the oil and salt allowances in the 
papyri. Having already proposed a size for the legionary vexillation at 
Ptolemais of 439 men, he then needs to establish ration sizes from that 
basis. The oil allowance (3,596 sextarii for sixty days) would give 439 
soldiers 1/11 of a sextarius (57 grammes or just over two ounces) per man 
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per day. 60 He claims that this is close to "an attested rate" from a sixth 
century papyrus but admits that this 1/11 allowance related specifically to 
auggaXot ("allies" or possibly "messengers") while troops were allowed 1/8 
of a sextarius. (If this 1/8 rate were applied to the Panopolis evidence, it 
would put the Ptolemais detachment at a strength of 319 men. ). 
Duncan-Jones largely ignores the salt allowance in letter 14 of 3,596 pounds 
of salt but his assumption that the unit had 439 men would have given each 
man about 85 grammes [three ounces] of salt a day. This seems a very 
high allowance but it is not clear exactly what _-, Aqamz1m was: could it have 
been galz#77 (fish sauce) or a substitute for that, or was it intended to be 
used for preserving meat? 61 
The various legionary detachments referred to in the Panopolis papyri can 
also be assessed using Duncan-Jones's calculations for payments in cash 
and kind: his overall conclusion is that these were normally some 500-600 
strong (or about half the size assumed by Jones). The 2,500 denarii ("Type 
A") donative rate applied to the 11 Traiana element at Apollonopolis Superior, 
for example, produces a strength of 554Y2, while the salgamum allowance, 
calculated according to Duncan-Jones's 1/11 of a sextarius rate for oil, 
applied to a vexillation of III Diocletiana at Syene puts that formation at 506 
strong. 
Certainly the results of such estimates would imply legions of this period - at 
least in Egypt - very much smaller than the 5,000 or so men usually 
assumed for the Principate. 62 11 Traiana, for example , would number no 
more than just under 1,100 men according to Duncan-Jones: 554.5 at 
Apollinopolis Superior, 439.5 (the lal7cvaill) at Ptolemais and 77.6 
(the eqzlltes prolnoff) at Tentyra. 63 This legion had been in Egypt for well 
over 150 years at the time of these documents and it seems safe to assume 
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that most, and possibly all, of its strength is represented in these records 
(although the NoMa [Or. 28.19] also records it at a fourth station - 
Parembole in the Delta). It is worth recalling that cohors XX Palmyrenorum 
at Dura just two generations earlier could deploy up to as many as perhaps 
1,054 men - or 98% of the size of the legion 11 Traiana according to Duncan- 
Jones's estimate. 
A similarly small leglo AlDlb&Mana is produced by Duncan-Jones's 
calculations: about 10781/6 split between those with the governor of the 
Theba: id (5721/6) and those at Syene (506). There is also however a 
reference to the lancL-aeii of this legion at Panopolis itself64 but no certain 
calculation of the size of this detachment is possible. It seems at least 
possible however that the Panopolis papyri do not include references to the 
whole of III Diocletiana, which is recorded in the NoMa at four stations (as 
well as a permanent detachment in Thrace). 65 
Even accepting Duncan-Jones's suggestions in full with their implication of 
Diocletianic legions numbering no more than about 1,100 (less than a 
quarter the size of the usual estimate for the Principate). this does not oblige 
acceptance of his proposal for a legionary vexillation norm of 500-600. In 
support of this argument, he also cites: second and third century 
inscriptions apparently recording 1,000-strong vexillations only because they 
were above the norm: the Panopolis reference to a vexillation at Potecoptus 
which Duncan-Jones himself calculates at just under 1,000 men but 
interprets as a double-sized vexillation from two legions; John Lydus's claim 
of a 500-strong kvkilla&o; and Hyginus's reference to a unit with 600 
pM illa (ii. 66 
Support for Duncan-Jones's vexillation proposal as being a reality, if not an 
official norm, has come in a recent article by Constantine Zuckerman, which 
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is however generally critical. 67 An Egyptian papyrus, apparently dating from 
18/19 March AD 399 records payments of annonae to a detachment of legio 
VAfacadblMca at Memphis. 835 rations of wine (each of one sextatius 
or 0.54 litres 10.9 pints]) and meat (0.45 kilogrammes [one pound] each) 
were to be paid apparently for two days, giving a detachment size of about 
340-400 men. (This calculation is incidentally dependent on assuming that 
a fraction of soldiers received multiple annonae. ) 
It may well be however that this whole search for a legionary vexillation 
lonorm" is illusory. The word itself has no more precise meaning than 
"detachment'in British military usage, "detail" in US or perhaps ANWAIng in 
German. Duncan-Jones's argument is not, in any case, overwhelming: the 
Potecoptus vexillation is described as made up from "various Eastern 
legionsý'and it may be true that this means III Gc-dlica and I Illyrica but it is by 
no means evident that this is a double vexillation. Moreover John Lydus - 
hardly a military expert - referred specifically to " mvOla&bnes of 500 
horsemen' and was not therefore even referring to legionaries. In any 
case, Duncan-Jones really is being selective with his sources to use this 
reference while presumably rejecting the relevance of Lydus's references to 
cohorts of 300 (more than twice his claimed norm) or alae of 600 (five times 
the norm derived from Duncan-Jones's calculations). 
Table 4 below shows the two major interpretations of the evidence of the 
Panopolis papyri, those of Jones and Duncan-Jones, together with some of 
the other possibilities discussed above. 
Table 4e Some Possible Unit Sizes in Egypt in c. AD 300 
Unit T_ype Jones Duncan-Jones Others 
Legionary 17161/6 572116 1690 
vexillations 1035 506 
100 
1109 554Y2 
149 772/3 
843/878/899 439<Yp> 
1997 998y? 
Alae 354/367Y2 116/118 
215 21 Yp 
Cohortes 493/524 163YJ1641/3 
Equites 242 121 
1041122Yd 
490 
We are left then with interpretations showing two different orders of 
establishment for the units concerned: Jones's calculations put the units not 
unreasonably far from the usual estimates for the Principate (although with 
cavalry units rather weaker), while Duncan-Jones has produced figures 
showing drastically smaller sizes for all types of units. The latter quantities 
seem in general to have become the preferred interpretation with most 
authorities. 
Although others have not always been so judicious, it is interesting to note 
that Duncan-Jones himself warned: "Evidence from a single province at a 
particular date need not always reflect practice in the empire as a whole. "68 
There is in fact good reason to place the Panopolis evidence in the context 
of certain factors quite particular to Egypt in the 290s. 69 This decade had 
seen two military campaýigns there, both subsequent on rebellions: (1) a 
revolt in late 293 or early 294 involving the towns of Busiris and Coptos, 
when elements of the legions IV Flavia, VII Claudia and XI Claudia were sent 
to Egypt, and (2) the uprising of Domitianus in 297-8, which may have 
involved the whole country at least for a while and during which Diocletian 
visited Egypt. Mention has already been made of the possibility that some at 
least of the units referred to in the Beatty Panopolis papyri may have still 
been under-strength as a result of casualties during one or other of these 
campaýigns. The visit of Diocletian (AD 29819) seems to have been 
connected with a major re-drawing of the southern frontier, when 101 
pressure from the Blemmyes (the modern Beja, who are recorded raiding 
during the reign of Probus [267-82]) led to a withdrawal to the First Cataract 
and the apparent handing over of some territory to a new client area 
controlled by the Nobatai (Nubians). Philae (the modern Aareq, just above 
Aswan) became - at 241ON - the southernmost point of the Roman Empire 
with the new legion I Maximiana stationed in a fort on an island there. 70 
Bowman has put the number of legionary troops in the Thebaid at about 
10,000 based on Duncan-Jones's estimates (including all of the new legions 
I Maximiana and III Diocletiana, and vexillations from 11 Traiana and at least 
two other I. -gions. 71) but seems less inclined to accept Jones's estimate for 
18,000 auxiliaries in Upper Egypt. 72 
The point to stress here is that the Beatty Panopolis papyri reflect a situation 
in an area of the Empire that had witnessed invasion and rebellion recently, 
the official response to which seems to have included rationalising the 
frontier and creating new military posts (such as those at Diocletianopolis, 
Maximianopolis, Hieracon and Thebes). "The evidence is consistent with 
the notion that the main purpose of this activity was to spread the available 
troops around more thinly and evenly. "73 This development must have had 
as much to do with a security or policing r6le as with any strategic or frontier 
defence function, and this would not necessarily have been the situation in 
all other provinces. 74 
The Noffa Dignl? atum is one of the most extraordinary documents to have 
survived from Roman times. Although some still regard it as an official 
document, it seems more likely to have been the work of an amateur 
enthusiast with some access to official information. This information was 
not always used coherently and the work is riddled with errors and 
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inconsistencies. 75 Although there continues to be much discussion of the 
date of composition of the NoMa, it is now generally agreed that its two 
parts are not contemporaneous but that the Eastern section is earlier 
(written in c. AD 394/5), while the Western part was compiled in c. AD 420- 
430. 
What the information contained in the NoMa should allow us to do - at least 
in theory - is to construct something like an order of battle for the Late 
Roman army. The document is essentially a directory of civilian and military 
offices with details of the responsibilities of post-holders. It provides 
geographical locations and establishments of the frontier commands, as 
well as details of the composition of the various field armies. Constant care 
must be taken to remain aware of the problems of the NoMa - its mistakes, 
omissions, repetitions and use of material of different dates - but it should 
nevertheless allow us to speculate on at least the outline of the Late Army 
and to a certain extent to frame some basic assumptions about possible unit 
sizes. It would, for example, be relatively uncontentious to take the 188-odd 
units in the NoMa called "legions! 'and to observe the complete impossibility 
for all these units to have both existed simultaneously (which, of course they 
may never have done) and to have numbered 5,000 men each - to give a 
total of nearly a million legionaries! 76: even half that level would seem well 
beyond the limits of feasibility. 
One of the first comprehensive attempts to use the NoMa details to 
calculate the size of the Roman Army and its individual units in C. AD 400 
was that of VSrady in 1961.77 His unit size assumptions were notably 
complicated: he put most legions at 1,000 but "riparian" legions at 3,000; 
cuneii at 1,200; auxilia pala&na at 500; and all other formations at 300. 
This produced figures for the Eastern Army of 96,300 field army troops and 
165,700 frontier soldiers (total = 262.000), and for the Western Army of 
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123,800 field army troops and 107,200 frontier soldiers (total [with certain 
other additions] = 262,000). These unconvincingly balanced totals put the 
whole army at 524,000. 
A not dissimilar grand total with unit sizes in the same kind of area was 
adduced by Jones in 1964.78 His overall total was some 602,000 (plus 
6,000 soWae), divided roughly 6: 4 between the East and West (352,000: 
250,000). The basis for multiplying up the NoMa lists used by Jones was 
that field army legions numbered 1,000 each and other field army units 500, 
while frontier formations were of three sizes - "old" legions at 3,000 each, 
the few milliary units at nominal size and other formations all 500 strong. 
Jones's calculations in detail were as follows: - 
Field army units (51 "legions" at 1.000 + 106 others at 500) = 104,000 
Frontier units (29 old legions at 3,000,13 milliary units + 296 
other at 500) [incl. average assumption for omitted Libya] = 248,000 
Field army units (45 "legions" at 1.000 + 136 others at500) = 113,000 
Frontier units (15 old legions at 3,000 + 181 others at 500) = 135,500 
Jones's totals are of much the same order as the 645.000 of Agathias but, 
as we have already noted, this latter figure is not easy to accept: it is not 
clear what period it is referring to, nor whether it is meant as a real statistic 
from the past or to an ideal "paper"figure never actually reached in practice. 
In any event, it would be fair to say that few modern scholars are prepared 
to accept either Jones's unit size assumptions or the grand totals resulting. 
MacMullen. for example, - writing a decade and a half later - tentatively 
suggests a "Notitidarmy significantly smaller at some 400,000: he had 
suggested a Severan army of about 345,000.79 104 
Looking in detail at the mobile forces of the field armies, Tomlin8O produced 
a range of possibilities from a total slightly higher than those estimated by 
Vdrady and Jones (c. 250,000 cf. 220,100/217,000) down to a much lower 
figure (c. 130,000). Tomlin calculates the 240 mobile infantry units (127 in 
the West: 113 in the East) as between 500 and 1,000 strong: the lower 
figure produces a total of 120,000 men, the higher one of 240,000. Cavalry 
units, he states, ". .. were much less than 
500 strong": this might suggest 
between about 17,000 and about 34,000 cavalry in some 85 units (42 in the 
West, 43 in the East). 81 Even using the lower end of the range for infantry 
and the higher for cavalry, the proportion of cavalry is low and the actual 
numbers strikingly so. 
The general structural picture provided by the Noffa is, on the whole, very 
convincing and in harmony with other evidence we have. We can see very 
clearly, for example, the symmetry in the mobile armies of East and West 
resulting from a series of divisions in the later fourth century. Tomlin has 
suggested a very balanced 127 field army units originally in the East and 123 
in the West, increased over the course of time to about 157 and 173 
respectively. 82 
We can also trace through the No&&a a number of examples of earlier 
formations surviving into the Late Empire, especially in relatively quiet areas. 
Margaret Roxan has shown that between 13% and 23% of approximately 
410 auxiliary units (c. 310+ cohorts and a 100+ alae) known from the 
second century survived to be recorded in the Noffaý3 These survivals 
were however very unevenly spread: less then 9% were on the Rhine and 
Danube but 23% in Africa, 30% in Britain and 36% in the East. 84 The 
garrisons of north Britain, Egypt, Cappadocia and Raetia in particular 
contain high proportions of units surviving from the Principate. 
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The NoMa also reflects a whole series of particular responses to particular 
situations, some involving frontiers suffering heavy pressure from outside 
while others (like Britain) were relative "backwaters" for much of the time. 
Pragmatic rather than systematic answers would seem to indicate a certain 
level of intelligence and flexibility from Roman governments. Thus we find, 
for instance, an exact East-West division of milites (25: 25) but with a 
particular concentration on the lower Danube. 85 On the other hand numeli 
are very rare: all 15 recorded in the NoMa are stationed in Britain (four on 
the Saxon Shore and the remainder under the Dux), although it may be only 
the use of the title that is particularly "British" as several of these units 
appear to originate as fourth century field army units while one is very 
considerably older. 86 
Another example of the obsolete, "backwater' nature of the British garrison 
is that most of the Western frontier commands contain no old-style alae at 
all but of the small total of ten in the West, no fewer than five are in Britain 
(of which three may have been survivors of the original invasion force of AD 
43! ). 87 The Eastern frontier commands, on the other hand, contain no fewer 
than 73 alae of which a startling 32 (40% ) were based in Egypt. 88 Like 
Britain. Egypt according to the NoMa still included many archaic elements: 
so that, although two of the alae in the command of the comes Ami&s 
. yp# are actually 
described as "recently raised", 89 another two units are Aeq 
attested in Egypt in the diploma of 9 June AD 83.90 
The other "old-style" auxiliary units - the coholtes - are well spread in the 
NoRia lists, although the overall total of such units (107) is considerably 
smaller than estimates for the mid-second century. 91 Most frontier 
commands contain some cohorts, with Britain again exceptional in having 
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the largest number (38% of the West's total [16]), of which six may have 
been stationed there since the first century. 92 
Of the newer types of units, very large numbers of eqz11? &s are recorded in 
the NoMa frontier command lists (123 units in all). These are reasonably 
well distributed with most in an arc from Egypt to Armenia and on the upper 
Danube, there are none in Africa west of Egypt, the lower Danube or the 
upper Rhine. The type of overall army totals that can be considered feasible 
argues that this large number of cavalry units must comprise formations 
individually quite small - nowhere near quingenary size, for instance. 
Pragmatism also shows in the way the NoMa records special arrangements 
in place for particular areas. The lower Danube frontier, for example - 
comprising the provinces of Scythia, the two Moesiae and Dacia ripensis - 
includes no alae, no equites and almost no cohorts but instead is defended 
(in addition to the "standard" paired legions in each province) by almost 
entirely new units: cul7ei (31 of only 47 such formations in the No&&aU), 
atzrilia (14 of these rare units94) and milites (24 or nearly half of these 
similarly rare regiments). These new units were presumably recruited for 
this area to replace earlier losses, incurred particularly during the campaigns 
against the Goths. 
Another area with arrangements quite different from any other is the north 
African sector equivalent to modern Libya, Tunisia and Algeria (the 
provinces of Tripolitania, Alr'ica and Mauretania). Here there were 
apparently a number (38) of geographical commands with each sector 
commander (praepositils An7lYs) presumably responsible for a substantial 
area of desert frontier. 95 
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As well as those already cited, numerous other examples of stability (or 
inertia) in the deployment of forces can be quoted. For example, the 
Thebaid command in the NoMa may date no later than c. AD 300 but three 
of the ten cohorts listed there are found in Egypt a century and a half 
earlier. 96 In Armenia eight of t. he 21 old-style auxiliary units recorded in 
the NoMa had survived at least as long, since they are mentioned in 
Arrian's Hadrianic account. 97 In. Moesia Secunda, elements of the legion I 
Italica98 are recorded at Novae (modern Cezava? ), where it had been based 
since the late first century, while in the other Moesian province VII Claudia 
had been at Viminacium (Kostolac) since about the same time and IV Flavia 
at Belgrade from slightly later. 99 Further up the Danube, the legion 11 
Adiutrix was based at Budapest from AD 114 until an element was recorded 
still there in the NoMW 00 which likewise places 11 Italica at Lauriacum 
(modern Enns-Lorch, Austria)l 01 where it seems to have been stationed for 
over two centuries (from c. AD 191/205 to a 451). The details for the 
command of the duxRae&ae include a number of such survivals including 
cohors III Britannorum at Abusina (modern Eining, Germany) attested there 
in 107 and legio 1111taliba at Castra Regina (modern Regensburg, Germany) 
since 179. Such inertia could be considered typical of many institutions. not 
simply of military ones, and could certainly be matched by modern 
examples. The deployment of both NATO and Soviet forces in Germany, for 
instance, remained essentially static from 1945 until the recent ending of the 
Cold War: the British Army's 4th Armoured Brigade is still stationed in north 
Germany, as it was on V-E Day, while the 9th and II th Guards Tank 
Divisions of the former Soviet Army will have completed over 45 years of 
service in the sa-me region when their withdrawal is complete. Another 
example would be the US 2nd Infantry Division, which has served 
continuously in South Korea from 1965 until the present day and no doubt 
for many years to come. 
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At the other extreme, the NotKa lists provide us with the only really detailed 
evidence to have survived of the sort of disruption caused by long periods of 
warfare. The command of the daySýdeet&IpI7, ratensis102 is a prime 
example of an area where third century battle losses are reflected in a 
structure dominated by "new" units: apart from the two legions (IV Scythica 
and XVI Flavia firma), which had probably been at their bases since before 
the Severan period, all ten units of equites, both alae and three out of four 
cohorts were relatively recently formed. It may well be that this type of 
complexity - reflecting no more than the reality that some frontiers suffered 
severe disruption, while others remained relatively quiet backwaters - should 
lead to a search for more complex patterns than the simple assumption that 
all Late Army units were of a similarly small size resulting from similar 
circumstances. We must also never lose sight of the many internal 
inconsistencies in our surviving text of the Noffa. - for example, the legion V 
Parthica (which was a casualty of the Persian War of AD 359) has been 
correctly deleted by its compiler but two other legions lost that year -I and 11 
Parthicae - still appear in the Noffa (Or. 36,29 and 30) under the 
command of the Duke of Mesopotamia. 
The authenticity of many of the details in the NoMa is further confirmed by 
the continued survival of units into the fifth century or, in some cases, even 
beyond: Jones has referred to ". .. a strong presumption of continuity. "l 
03 
From the command of the AfagistarA&Rtm PlaeselMalis // (one of the two 
main Eastern field armies, normally stationed in Constantinople), 
the sqgAa&A17ne1W, Daaý, Regii and le&L-s T17eodbsianl are all attested 
in sixth century Italy, while the Daaý and Sqvthae are found in Egypt in the 
same era, and the Cbmzd(iunibles) had earlier been recorded on 
Constantinople's Golden Gate inscription) 04 The odd NoMa list for 
the AfqgisterAfilitulnper Olientem similarly includes units which can be 
traced later: the amigelisenibles OlielMales and T1a17s&g1#aN in sixth 
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century Egypt, the eqzlites teltio Dalmatae under Justinian in Phoenicia, the 
ýIbglq) pllma Isattla sqg1&aeia ap pa re n tly inI ate fi fth ce ntu ry Egypt an d 
probably the balistatii 777eodbsiaaý in sixth century Palestine) 05 
The 77ieoolbsiad stationed in 6th Century Romel 06 were probably either 
the eqLlites 777eodosia&iuniones recorded in the Notiffa under the command 
of the MagisterANituln per 777radas or the senibles under the Uagistar 
A. filit, yln p , r, aeqentalis //. 
107 The Noffa records (probably a detachment ofý) 
the legion V Macedonica at Memphis (modern Mit Riheina) under the Count 
of the Egyptian lilnes, and it remained in Egypt into the late fifth and sixth 
centuries. 1 08 Another Egyptian survivor was the cuneus equituln Maunoruln 
scuta, ribIzIln still apparently at its NojWa base of Hermupolis (modem el 
Ashmunein) in the early sixth century) 09 Reference has already been 
madel 10 to the astonishing story of the legion IV Parthica, listed by 
the No&&aunder the dLx Osll7oanae at Circesium (modem Buseire or 
Karkisia. SyHa)1 11 but found at Beroe in Syria in AD 586. Speidell 12 cites 
archaeological evidence as possibly indicating the survival of the Duke of 
Ara bi a's colmls / 77;, racum at 0 as raIH al Ia bcit and legio /// C>renaýca at 
Bostra (modern Busr&, Syria) until after 529 and 540 respectively and 
perhaps even until the Persian and Arab conquests of 613 and 636. As 
might be expected, these Byzantine survivals from the Eastern lists of 
the NoUla have no real counterparts in the West. Some survivals can be 
suggested on the basis of archaeological evidence for the Continued 
occupation of sitesl 13 but identification with a particular unit is rarely 
possible: the striking exception is the 9th Cohort of Batavians' continued 
existence at Passau until c. AD 476.114 
Ironically enough, the explicit evidence for unit sizes in the NbMa is 
extremely limited: a few examples based on unit titles or fort names have 
been cited by Duncan-Jones. 1 15 None of these examples however is 
completely convincing. Cohols lc%--ntenada at Tarba (-- Thamara: modern 
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Kurnub, Palestine), for example, does sound to have been a1 00-strong 
cohort but the manuscript actually reads agentenada. 1 16 In the same way, 
the unit at Bethallaha in Mesopotamial 17 also appears to have a title 
indicating its size of 50 men (col7ols quinquagenada Arabum) but Duncan- 
Jones himself suggests a corruption in the manuscript of the cohort's serial 
number: the adjacent units in the Duke of Mesopotamia's command are ala 
secLlnda. ala o&ava, ala quintaole6ma and colwls qualtade&ma. And, 
thirdly, the cohort atbulgus cL-ntenwAls in Valerial 18 may well have been 
I 00-strong but is not proved to have been so from the name of its base. 
On the other hand, the Noffa does list a small number of units still 
described as "milliary". They are only nine in number (including four alae 
and four cohorts) and concentrated in a relatively limited area of the East. 
Three are recorded in Arabia: ala Mnilliatia at Avatha; ala 111niliatiensis 
at Naarsafari (possibly modern Gasr Bshir or Khan Qasr el Buleida, 
Jordan); and colors lmilllatia 777, racum at Adtitha (modem Khirbet es- 
Samra, Jordan). 119 There are three in Armenia: co17ots111111piamMiaeia 
Re&a-eo1ztn7 at Metital 20 col7ors 1n1111aeia Bospolial7a at Arauracal 21 
and =17olsmilllaeia Gel7nal7olvm at Sisila (Zjziola? ). 122 Palestinehadtwo 
milliary units: ala Imilliatia Sebastena at Asuada (modern Khan es Samra) 
and ala ImIlliatia at Hasta (modern Midi el Khusaiya). l 23 And there were 
the n7ilites milliadenses at Syene (Aswan) in the Thebaid. 1 24 It may well be 
of course that these unit titles are of no more than historical significance 
(perhaps retained through sentiment and pride, or for defining the social or 
financial status of commanding officers) and had no relevance to the size of 
the actual formations as recorded in the Nb&&a. - if the correct idenUficabon 
of Naarsafari is indeed the castellum at Gasr Bshir. this has been described 
by its excavatorl 25 as a miniature fort of 0.31 hectares [0.77 acres] built in 
a AD 293-305 with stabling for just 69 horses. Milliary alae were never 
common units but the fort for the only known example in Britain, Stanwix 
ill 
(Uxelodunum), was some 12 times larger than this. 126 Itmaywellbethen 
that apparently "milliary" units (or at least a proportion of them) were no 
such thing in the Late Empire but it would then perhaps be wise to reject all 
the limited direct unit size evidence in the NoMa rather than to make a case 
from one element of it. 
Another consideration that may be of major importance but about which we 
have only limited information is that the newer units of the Late Army seem 
to have had a structure radically different from those established under the 
Principate, and a whole series of new ranks emerged. We can already see 
from the NoMa that the old titles for unit commanders (legionary legates, 
prefects for alae and quingenary cohorts, and tribunes for milliary cohorts) 
were no longer always used in the same way as before) 27 A famous remark 
of St Jeromel 28 lists the ranks for a cavalry regiment as: recruit, trooper 
(eqLles). 61zilbr, blarzYkls, cL-17tel7atiLls, dilcL-17aMus. senatol- and 
plilnicLnlius. Such ranks can be seen in use in the Concordia cemetery of 
perhaps AD 394/5: Flavius Odiscus and Flavius Mamuetus werebia1zhiof 
the Bla-aVa&ssenibres equites and Leones senibleis respectively; Flavius 
Severianus was a centenalizIs of the equMes catafracta4i with 22 years 
service; Flavius Fasta and Flavius Batemodus were ducL-nadiwith 
the RataWequites senibles and Helzllisenibles respectively: and Flavius 
Launio and Flavius Hariso were sanatoles of the same units) 29 The 
implications of a new rank structure (which seems in any case only to have 
applied to certain units) for internal unit organisation are not clear but there 
is also evidence for some retention of traditional make-up too: a dedication 
by cohorts VII and X of legio IlHenculia in perhaps AD 297 might imply that 
the whole legion with all ten cohorts was still in existence then. 1 30 We are 
left then with the problem of how far we can assume that similar or even 
identically named units did in fact resemble their ancestors. It does not 
seem to trouble the modern mind greatly that the United States Army of 
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today includes "cavalry' units (although without horses for at least forty 
years). that the Dragoon Guards of the British Army operate Oýiefiain main 
battle tanks, that the Indian Army still includes Skinner's Horse or the 
Belgian Army non-cycling "Carabiniers cyclistes. " 
One of the problems arising from the Nb&ffa lists is that, despite the 
enormous number of frontier and field army units they include. there are still 
some obvious gaps remaýining. A missing page in the Eastern section, for 
example, (Or. 30) presumably contained the command of the dux Ubyarum, 
while units based in Germania Prima appear to be missing from the Western 
lists. 1 31 Also frequently quoted as an area surprisingly empty of garrison 
units in the NoRia is western Britain: the whole area from Southampton 
Water right round the coast to Morecambe Bay was apparently without 
defences. As this area was under heavy pressure from raiding Scotti from 
Ireland in the fourth century and later. this seems hard to credit. Unless this 
threat has been exaggerated (no assault came from the West in the crisis 
year of 367). could there perhaps have been a western section of the 
command of the Dux Britanniarum missing from our version or even a 
separate Count of the "Scottish Shore" responsible for the defence of Wales 
and the adjacent part of north-west England? l 32 
It may be however that other explanations for apparent gaps in the No&&a or 
for perceived weaknesses in the Late Army are available. We know that 
local militias were well established in the Principate: Josephus refers to their 
use and Tacitus cites a whole series of occasions during the civil wars of AD 
69 w1hen loca: ly raised forces were employed - in Gaul, Raetia, Noricum and 
Mauretania, for example) 33 The Helvetian and Raetian levies appear to 
have been more than tribal irregulars enrolled for a temporary emergency: 
the Helvetii were paid and had their own fort, while the Raetians are 
described as having been well trained. There is every reason to suppose 
113 
that this pattern continued and some evidence to this effect: the Histolia 
Azlgzlst, g tells of Didius Julianus, as governor of Gallia Belgica in the 170s 
deploying locally raised militia against an invasion of Chauci and a similar 
use of local levies in Algeria a century or so later) 34 Eric Birley has 
suggestedl 35 that the only British auxiliary unit raised from a single tribe, 
the cul7on; lCbmoWbrum, may have originated as a tribal militia possibly 
ýmith defence against the Ordovices as its original purpose. 
Definitely known to have existed in the Late Empire but also not recorded in 
the No&&a were the mounted palace guard units known assaýo/a, 6136 R. I. 
Frank and othersl 37 have argued that these C-lite units were created by 
Constantine as replacements for the now unreliable Praetorians (who had 
opted for the wrong side) in c. 312/330: they were not part of the regular 
chain of command but under the Master of the Offices. By c. 400 there were 
a dozen units of soWae: seven under the Eastern A-fagistel- CWlaiblzk7 and 
five in the West. They were probably each 500 strong (a total of 6,000) but 
others have argued for 1.000 each and Frank claims a total of no fewer than 
32,500 by AD 527.138 By the late fourth century, most scbolares - in the 
tradition of Imperial guards units - were Germans and especially 
Rhinelanders. 
Another argument to explain the relative weakness and lack of combat 
success of the Late Roman Army is the increased use of "federates": 
individual barbarians recruited by Roman commanders for the duration of 
particular campaigns. This case has been put in recent years most strongly 
by J. H. W. G. Lif-beschuetz. 1 39 There had of course been a long history of 
assistance to Imperial armies by forces from allies or client kingdoms: 
Vespasian, for example, deployed in Judea in AD 67 15,000 allied troops in 
addition to his three legions and 29 auxiliary units. 1 40 Liebeschuetz sees 
the lbederati playing an even more significant r6le in the campaigns of the 
114 
late fourth and early fifth centuries. For example, although only two Gothic 
units are recorded in the Nolitia, 141 Jordanes records 20,000 of them 
fighting with Theodosius against Eugenius in 394 and Orosius claims that 
10,000 Goths were killed) 42 The bulk of these Gothic forces must therefore 
have been temporarily recruited and then disbanded. The need for such 
barbarian reinforcements is a reflection of the weakness of even Imperial 
field army units, and they played a significant part in Stilicho's campaigns 
against Alaric in 397 and Radagaisus in 405/6. There would also of course 
have been financial advantages to the deployment of temporary rather than 
regular forces. The recruitment of federate troops led in turn to the 
development of bucL-Aalii- military retainers of specific commanders. The 
use of allies only makes sense if Imperial forces were much smaller than the 
600,000 or more calculated, for example, by Jones from the NoMa lists: 
otherwise there ". .. could hardly have been such need to resort to 
barbarian federates ....,, 
l 43 It is perhaps possible to see this shift away 
from the use of auxiliary cavalry towards the employment of federates as in 
some ways a reversion to the situation that had existed in the Republic 
before the auxilia had developed into a significant element of the regular 
forces of Rome) 44 
1: T. C. Skeat (e d. ), P4 qwif, rom Pal 7opolis. - In 7 77e 0 5es ter A5 L-a to- 
LlbralyDub§17, Chester Beatty Monographs No. 10, Dublin, 1964. 
2: The item to be supplied is nowhere explicitly stated but can safely be 
assumed to have been barley for horse fodder. 
3: NoRia DiglMtatum, Or. 31,46. The station for the unit is also spelt 
Thmu and Thmuis: suggested modern equivalents include (Tel-e-) 
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Tmai and Essawieh el-Charq. The latter is on the right bank of the 
Nile four miles upriver of Panopolis. An Oxyrhynchus papyrus (POýy. 
2953) also confirms the ala as being at this base. 
4: Five of the soldiers' names survive in the papyrus: Ammonius (a 
cataphract), Petedsis (a decurion), Serapion (summus curatoo. ). 
Isidorus (an actuarius) and another Ammonius. 
5: P 6L-a#YPa17qo. 2. line 169: NoRla Dignitatum, Or. 31,54. 
6: Note that the unit has a new, presumably temporary, commander: 
more than 16 months had passed since Papas was recorded as its 
prefect. The reference to Besas as commander might however imply 
that only a detachment of the ala was stationed at Thmod (cf. M. A. 
Speidel 1992, page 99). 
7: Skeat (op. cit. [note 1], page 83) mis-translates this as 32,500. 
8: This does appear to be a reference to equiles -sagitaeW but it should be 
noted that the word for "mounted" C'hippeusi") has been restored by 
the editor (Skeat, op. cit. [note I], page 82). 
9: Potecoptos appears to be identical with the Coptos of the Noffa (cf. 
Skeat, op. cit. [note 1 ], page 145): it is there recorded as housing a 
unit of equites sagitatWinailgenae and the legion I Valentiniana (Or. 
31,26 and 36). It has been identified as equivalent to the modern 
Gebti or Gift. 
10: Modern Tebu. The No§&a records it as still housing 11 Traiana (Or. 
31,34). 
11: It has been suggested that this vexillation is the same as the one from 
the legions III Gallica and I Illyrica, which is recorded by an inscripfion 
of AD 315/6 (ILS 8882). 
12: Modern Dendera, where the NotKa records one of several units of 
local horse archers (Or. 31,25). 
13: Skeat (op. cit. [note I]. page 149) suggests this is "materials for 
pickling. " 
116 
14: Skeat (op. cit. [note 11, page 150) suggests the two vexillations of 11 
Traiana (in letters 12 and 13) are different formations; few others 
have agreed. 
15: "Peamu" is only otherwise known from the Noffa but it must have 
been situated on the right bank of the Nile, as it is described as 
opposite Abydus (modern El-'Araba el-Madfuna): the Noffa garrison 
(Or. 31,61) is the same cohort of Germans. 
16: Skeat (op. cit. [note 1], page 152) suggests this bullion was worth 
240,000 denarii. 
17: P. A. Holder, The Roman ArmX117,61ikWn, 1982, page 98. 
18: A. H. M. Jones, The LaterRoman hmaile 2494-602. - A &=&, Economic 
andAdminlstra&v Sulwy, Oxford, 1964, Chapter 17, note 31 
Volume 3, pages 187-189. 
19: Skeat, op. cit. [note 1], page xxviii. 
20: SHA, Marcus Antoninus, 7.9. 
21: Cf. G. R. Watson, Me Roman Soldier, London, 1969, pages 91 -10 1. 
22: Lefter 2: 73,500 -: - 200 = 367.5. 
23: Lefter 3: 343,300 - 200 1716.5. 
24: Lefter 15: 65,500 -: - 125 524. 
25: P. J. Casey, Roman Coinag-- in Britain, Aylesbury, 1980, page 49. 
26: See Chapter 1. page 4. - 
27: Jones, loc. cit. (note 18). 
28: 339 X 200 + 12 x 400 +3X 300 = 73,500. 
29: P-Dilra 100 lists some 29 or thirty duplicarii; P. Dilla82 lists 15 plus 
five sesquiplicarii. 
30: Letter 2: 23,600 - 354 = 66.666. 
31: 1,658 X 200 + 21 X 400 + 11 x 300 = 343,300. 
32: Jones, loc. cit. (note 18). 
33: A rate of 625 denarii would put the detachment at 484 men: one of 
250 denarii would put it at 1,210. 
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34: Jones miscalculates this as 211. 
35: Jones miscalculates this as 1,981. 
36: Skeat (op. cit. [note 1]. page 150) assumes these are two different 
units of lancearii, even though they have the same commander. 
37: Jones. loc. cit. (note 18). 
38: Could they have been new recruits yet to be paid stipendiuln? 
39: In theory a service period of 25 years might leave a unit expecting to 
retire 1/25 Of its strength each year but a relatively low life expectancy 
would increase this considerably in practice. perhaps to more like 1/12 
(R. Tomlin, pels. comm. ). 31 veterans is reasonable on this basis 
(about 1/17) but perhaps the cohort had also recruited heavily in AD 
275 to replace combat losses caused by the Palmyrene invasion of 
269/71 and/or the Alexandrian revolt of a 272. Yann le Bohec, 
however ( Me ImpelialRoman Almy, London, 1994 [originally 
pubIish ed as L Arm6w Rom, ýWne soas le Ha&-Empile, 19 89], pag e 
229) implies a military life expectancy - based on evidence from the 
legion III Augusta - in the mid-40s: this would allow an average 
soldier recruited in his early 20s to approach very near to the end of a 
quarter century of service. 
40: R. P. Duncan-Jones, 'Pay and Numbers in Diocletian's Army'. CY7iron, 
Band 8 (1978), MUnchen, pages 541-60. A revised version was 
published as chapter 7 of Richard Duncan-Jones's Shvc&llie anal 
Scale in the Roman Economy, Cam b ri dge. 19 9 0. pag es 10 5- 17. 
41: P. C? ky. 2046. 
42: Polybius. for example, refers to cavalry under the Republic being 
given 12.1 or 8.6 litres, of barley per day (Histolies , 6,39)-. the two 
different measures were for Roman and allied cavalry respectively. 
Polybius's measure is usually reckoned as equivalent to 1.6 kilos [3% 
pounds]: this level of fodder is supported by a sixth century papyrus 
(P. Ovy. 2046). 
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43: 2.610 modii for two months (60 days) at a rate of four choenices =3/8 
modius per horse (2,610 - 60 X8- 3) = 116. R. W. Davies (7he 
Supply of Animals to the Roman Army and the Remount System'. 
Latbn7zls Tome 28, Brussels, 1969, pages 429-59) calculates an ala 
strength at Thmod of about 107 on the basis of allowing 2.7 artabas 
per horse per month following P AM17.107 (published as No. 387 in 
A. S. Hunt and C. C. Edgar [edd. ], Sele&P4qp7i Volume 2. Loeb, 
London, 1963, pages 490-1). which records the receipt in AD 185 of 
20,000 artabas of barley as an annual allowance for the ala 
llela&iana at Coptos. Davies assumes the regiment had 600 
mounts. M. A. Speidel [1992, page 99] uses the s&pe,? &Iu1n payment 
to suggest a maximum strength for the ala of just 105 men. 
44: J. M. C. Toyn bee (Anhnals 117 RolnaI7 Life al&Atiý London, 1973, 
page 341) takes the Polybian ration scales as implying that each 
trooper was required "to maintain three horses and two attendants. " 
There is nothing intrinsically unreasonable in these figures. 
45: Duncan-Jones, 1978, page 543. Robert 0. Fink (Rolnan Afilltaly 
. ýms, 
Philological Monographs of the American Rewrds on Pap 
Philological Association No. 26, Cleveland, 1971) cites a series of 
second and third century records showing a monthly grain ration to 
troops in Egypt of one artaba per man (Nos. 78,79 and 81). It has 
also been pointed out - and the grain rations are at the heart of 
Duncan-Jones's thesis - that the 2.5 modii per month ration has been 
calculated ignoring what appears to be an additional allowance 
ordered in another letter of the same date (P. BeatA-Panqo. 1.399) 
of a further 100 artabas of wheat: cf. Constantine Zuckerman, 'Legib 
VA-facedon1ca in Egypt: CPL 199 Revisited'. Tjzbe, 3 (1988). pages 
279-87, footnote 23. 
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46: R. P. Duncan-Jones, 'The Choenix, the Artaba and the Modius, ' 
Zeits- c */ ift fi 7r Pammlogie una I Epigraph& Band21097 6). Bonn, 
pages 43-52. 
47: Me trologibol z im so r ip torum reliqz 11ae 1.2 2 4.13 &245.2 8. 
48: Cf. note 42. Donald W. Engels (Alexander&w Greatandthe 
Lqg1s&r olthe Afacedol7lan Almýv, Berkeley, 1978) quotes a range of 
fodder scales from 0.68 kilogrammes [1.5 pounds] per day (Xerxes' 
troops), through 1.36 kilogrammes [three pounds] (the US Civil War) 
to 3.06 kilogrammes [6.75 pounds] (the Spartans): a modem 
calculation would be for a horse doing moderate work to be given 9- 
11 kilogrammes [20-24 pounds] a day, half in grain and half in forage. 
This is much the same as the fodder rations allowed by the 
Wehrmacht up to 1943: an infantry division was supplied with 53 tons 
per day for its 5,375 horses (i. e. 9-10 kilograrnmes [20-22 pounds] per 
horse). Duncan-Jones's 3.2 litres is equivalent to about three 
kilogrammes [seven pounds] per horse per day. Colin M. Wells 
('Where Did They Put the Horses? Cavalry Stables in the Early 
Empire, ' L In 7es. -A kte des X1 h7 fel 7 7a &I 7alel 7L imeskol 7gne ss as, 
Budapest, 1977, pages 659-65) states that horses of 12-14 hands 
would have required 1.6 kilogrammes [3% pounds] of barley per day 
plus 4.5 kilogrammes [10 pounds] of hay and green forage. Ann 
Hyland (Eqzlus. - The Holse in 6e RoInan Wollal, London, 1990) 
agrees that the Polybian allowance of 3Y2 pounds of barley, if 
supplemented with ten pounds of hay, would have sufficed for small 
horses engaged in very moderate work and makes the interesting 
observation (page 41) that ancient graýin had a higher nutritional -value 
than modern (about 20% for barley compared with about II% in 
modern times). 
49: Cf. note 45 (Fink). 
50: Duncan-Jones, 1990, page 108. 
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51: Duncan-Jones, 1978, page 543. 
52: 23,600 X3- 600 = 118. 
53: 73,500 X3 -- 1,800 = 122.5. 
54: When there had been some eighty years of rapid inflation. Nicholas 
Higharn (Rolne, BIA2inal7dMeAnglo-Satkol7s, London, 1992, page 
43) estimates that prices rose by nearly 1,000% between the 190s and 
the260s. Duncan-Jones (1990, page 115) calculates that s&, wl7diuln 
had risen only six times however between the reigns of Domitian and 
Diocletian. 
55: 220,500 - 450 = 490. 
56: Of. Fink, RUR, Nos. 47 and 50. 
57: The known Caracallan legionary pay rate of 675 denarii p. a. would 
however put this detachment at 1,525.8: 343,300 X3- 675 
1525.777. 
58: One calculation for pay rates in the early third century (Casey, loc. 
cit. ) would put the differentials between legionaries and coholtales at 
3: 1. rather than the 2: 1 assumed by Duncan-Jones. Allowing the 
latter's assumption that legionaries were paid 2,400 denarii but 
assuming the auxiliary infantry of cohors XI Charnavorum were paid 
only one-third of this would increase the unit size to 245.6 men: 
65,500 X3- 800 = 245.625. M. A. Speidel [1992, page 99] has 
proposed an even smaller cohort of 131 men or fewer. 
59: Cf. note 39. The diploma evidence for auxiliaries seems to show that 
discharges could be granted at any time but it seems at least possible 
that the men might actually be retained beyond their discharge dates 
to the end of the calendar year or at least that the unit could carry 
their names and receive payments for these "ghost"troops. It is no 
doubt mere coincidence that the 35 men Jones's figures would imply 
the detachment lost in ten days represents almost exactly the 1/25 
which theory would require it to shed annually. 
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60: If the 1/8 of a sextarius allowance is applied here, the strength of the 
Ptolemais detachment would fall to 319 men. 
61: R Tomlin, pels. comm.. 
62: See Chapter 1. page 3. 
63: Total = 1,071.6. 
64: Letter 16: R beaVPanop. 2, line 301. 
65: Viz. Andros under the comes lim&s Aeg . yp& 
( Notitia Dignitatum Or. 
28,18), Ombos, Praesentia and Thebes in the Thebaid (ibid. Or. 31, 
31,33 and 38), and at Thebes in Thrace under the magistermifttm 
jce, r Thraoýas (Or. 8,36). [Ombos and Praesentia may in fact have 
been the same place. ) 
66: &S, 2726 and 531; P. BeaVPa,? qp. 2, lines 186-90; John Lydus, 
De InagistratibzIs 1.4 6: and Hyg inus, oel Ineta&ov? e castrolzlln, 5. 
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It is possible to compile quite a respectable collection of archaeological 
evidence for Late Army forts which appears to demonstrate both units of 
reduced size and sites newly constructed for units smaller than the norms 
conventionally assumed for the Principate. We will consider firstly the 
evidence for certain areas of the Empire. 
In a recent work, Kennedy and Rileyl have drawn attention to a series of 
strikingly small forts in the East which seem to equate to sites named in the 
NoMa as housing conventionally titled auxiliary units. Khan el-Hallabcit in 
Syria, for example, a site on the s&-ata Dib&Mana 31 kilometres [ 19 miles] 
from Palmyra in the command of the Duke of Phoenicia, was only about 47 
metres [153 feet] square and covered just 0.22 hectares [0.55 acres]. This 
is possibly the same place as the Veriaraca of the Notlya2 recorded there 
as the base of ala nova DiozYMal7a: although a very strong post with 
massive double walls 3.5 metres [11.5 feet] thick and towers 7.5 metres 
[24.5 feet] in diameter, it was small - about 10% the size of a typical western 
fort of the Early Empire. 
An even smaller fort was Khan el-Gattar, further down the s&ala Dib&Malw 
near Horns. It was only some 41 metres [135 feet] square with an area of a 
mere 0.17 hectares [0.42 acres]. This has been provisionally identified with 
the NbSlaý; Cunna or Carneia -base of ala lFrancorunO Similarinsize 
was Khan Aneybeh, which stood further south-west along the s&ata near 
Horns: it was 48.6 X 39 metres [ 160 X 128 feet] or 0.19 hectares [0.47 
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acresI. This site is usually taken to have been the Onevatha or Anabatha, 
where the NbMa places a unit of "pacified" Germans: cvhols V pacata 
Alamannolum. 4 Two other small forts in the command of the dux Foenicis 
are the 0.25 hectare [0.6 acre] Khan as-Sawat, which is probably the Vallis 
Diocletiana recorded in the NoRia as home of col7ols IlAegypAbIzIl" and 
Khan el-Manqoura near Damascus, a fort of 0.81 hectares [two acres] 
probably to be equated with the Vallia Alba cited in the NoMa as the base 
f or col7ol s/ lulia le &0/ um. 5 
Perhaps the key site for consideration on this frontier is further south in 
modern Jordan east of the Dead Sea near AI-Kerak: El-Lejjun, widely 
regarded as being the Befthorus cited in the NoMa as base for the legion IV 
Martia. 6 This fortress was erected late in Diocletian's reign, probably a little 
after AD 300 when IV Martia was only about seven years old: it had 2.4 
metre [7.9 feet] thick walls, massive comer towers and 20 U-shaped towers 
each projecting 11 metres [36 feet]. A remark by Procopius7 has been taken 
as referring to the disbanding of the legion in c. AD 530, but in any case the 
regular army probably finally abandoned EI-Lejjun after a large earthquake 
on 9 July 551. It seems to have been substantially reconstructed in the late 
fourth century following an earlier earthquake in AD 363. Excavation has 
found a Wcvs east and south of the fortress complete with mansio, but no 
p, raefolizlm, hospital or latrines have yet been discovered. The fortress 
measured 242 X 190 metres [790 X 620 feet] and only covered 4.6 hectares 
[or 11.4 acres]: in contrast an average legionary fortress of the Early Empire 
would have covered some 18 hectares [45 acres]. Caerleon, for example, 
was 20.5 hectares [or 50.5 acres]. 
El-Lejjun's 1980-85 excavators have found eight barrack blocks, each of 
which could have held 260 men8 for a total garrison strength of 2,080 men 
or just four cohorts. After the earthquake of 363, only half the barracks were 
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rebuilt implying the reduction of the garrison to only slightly more than 1,000 
troops. This may reflect the detachment from the legion of two cohorts to 
serve with Julian's Persian expeclition. 9 
A parallel to EI-Lejjun is the auxiliary fort of Dionysias (the modern Gasr 
Gar0n) in Egypt, newly built in c. AD 306 and the base of ala V 
Praelectorum according to the NoMa) 0 It measured just 83 X 70 metres 
[272 X 230 feet], some 0.76 hectares [1.9 acres]: British quingenary ala 
forts, in contrast, averaged some 2.63 hectares [5.8 acres] or 3% times 
larger. Another small fort in the Roman East that can be considered is 
Odeym in Syria, which has been calculated as only 0.77 hectares [1.9 acres] 
in size. This has been identified with the Acadama of the NoMa, which 
housed not a traditionally titled auxiliary unit but one of the numerous units 
of horse archers found in the Late Army: 1 1 there were another three such 
units in the same command of the dux Syriae. This command seems in fact 
to have suffered very heavy casualties during the third century and very little 
of its pre-Caracallan garrison survived to be recorded in the Noffa, where 
most of the Duke's forces (ten out of 16 non-legionary units) were new 
cavalry units of indeterminate size. 12 We know very little about the 
establishment of such units, or even if they had standard structures. 
A similar exercise can be carried out further west on the crucial "northern 
front"of the Empire, showiing both small and reduced forts. Abusina 
(modern Eining in Germany), for example, base of cohols 111BIMonuln in the 
command of the dux Raetiae, 13 was reduced in the fourth century to a 48 X 
37 metre [158 X 121 feet] rectangle of about 0.18 hectares [0.4 acres] - only 
about 10% of the old Trajanic fort's area. In the same command, the new 
fort for cohols V Valelia F*guln at Piniana (modern Bijrgle) was of much 
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the same size and could have held a century or perhaps 150 men at most. 
Further east in the command of the Duke of Valeria, can be found Intercisa 
(modern Isny in Hungary, it has been suggested ) hosting according to the 
NoMa three cavalry units (two cunei and a regiment of horse archers) but 
with space (0.36 hectares [0.9 acres]) apparently for two turmae at most. 1 4 
Further down the Danube new, small legionary fortresses were built in the 
Diocletianic period for the recently raised legion 11 Herculia and legion I lovia. 
The former's fortress at Troesmis (modern Iglitsa, Rumania) was a near 
trapezoid with 150 metre sides covering some 2.8 hectares [7 acres], while 
the latter's at Noviodunum (modern Isaccea, Rumania) was larger but still 
covered no more than 5.6 hectares [ 13.5 acres]. 1 5 
Before turning elsewhere, one or two words of caution are needed about the 
archaeological evidence considered so far. In the first place, it is important 
to remember that identification of ancient place names and modem sites is 
not always easy. Thus, Cunna is only tentatively equated with modem 
Khan-el-Gattar: Betthorus is very possibly El-Lejjun but no direct evidence 
has been found from excavation; and Intercisa has also been identified 
more probably with modern Duna6jvdros. Equally it needs to be 
remembered that the NoMa records represent the freezing of a particular 
historical situation, which need not necessarily match well with the situation 
discovered by excavation, or in some cases assumed from aerial or ground 
surveying. 
It is also a significant proviso that Roman Army units seem very frequei itly to 
have been subject to detachment of elements from the parent body. This 
was certainly widespread in all periods but by the Late Empire such 
detachments were increasingly of a permanent nature, and it is at least 
possible that the smaller sizes of some fourth and fifth century forts simply 
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reflect the recognition of a new or developed reality by military planners and 
engineers. The ala lFfancoruln cited above, for example, was stationed not 
only at Cunna in the Egyptian Frontier command but also "opposite 
Apollonopolis" in the Thebaid. 1 6 Leglo 1VMa)Wa was apparently responsible 
for manning, as well as its main base at El-Lejjun, the outposts at Khirbet el- 
Fityan (a 0.6-hectare [1.5 acre] castelluln some 1.5 kilometres [0.9 miles] 
away) and Rujm Beni Yasser: the recent excavatorsl 7 reckon that the 
former was capable of having housed over 300 troops. As well as this kind 
of sub-division among adjacent posts, a practice dating well back into the 
Principate, Late Army legions were also of course used as a resource from 
which field army detachments could be created, possibly on an adhoc basis 
at first but very frequently made permanent either by design or through 
inertia. The two mobile units called Marfel7sesl 8 presumably originated as 
such detachments of IV Martia. A similar situation applied to the two 
Scythian legions cited above: 11 Herculia was split among two or three sites, 
while I lovia was divided among three. It might well be asked whether a Late 
Army legion was ever, or was ever intended to be, concentrated in one 
place. 
We need also to beware of too readily drawing conclusions from partial 
excavations or just from fort sizes. At El-Lejjun, for instance, the north-east 
quadrant of the fort was not fully excavated and the unexplored area may 
well contain undiscovered evidence for additional occupation. 
There is too the problem that even where small forts from the Late Empire 
do exist, so too quite often do larger ones. A norm for Late Imperial legions 
(or at least for those raised from the Tetrarchy onwards) of about 1,000 men 
is now quite a widely accepted concept but it does beg the question of why 
such a wide range of fort sizes co-existed : even newly raised legions such 
as the two from the Scythian 11mes cited above show no real pattern or 
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consistency, as Noviodonum was double the size of Troesmis. 1 9 It should 
also be noted that, apart from IV Martia, the other legion in the Dux 
Arabiae's command (111 Cyrenaica) was based at a fort - Bostra (modern 
Bosr& eski-Sham, near Dera'a in Syria) - nearly four times larger than El- 
Lejjun. 20 it is significant in this context that Bosrd may have been nearly 
200 years older than El-Lejjun, and that III Cyrenaica was more than 300 
years older than IV Martia (and seems to have provided no field army 
detachments). 21 Are we again seeing inconsistent evidence merely 
reflecting an inconsistent reality? 
One final factor to consider when seeking to use fort sizes as a criterion for 
garrison strengths is that very little is known about the possibility of there 
regularly being upper storeys in the buildings of Roman forts but that they 
seem to have existed in some instances at least. Kennedy and Riley22 rite 
three examples of Jordanian sites with upper storeys: one of these, Deir el- 
Kahf23 near Irbid, may be the Speluncae24 in the command of the Duke of 
Arabia, which the Noffa records as the base of one of several groups 
of equitesprolno&indigenae. Although covering only 0.36 hectares [0.89 
acres], the two-storeyed buildings of the castellum could have housed 4-500 
men and horses. In the same command, Gasr Bshir (possibly the NoMa '2- 
Naarsafari) also had two storeys with ground floor stables and a first floor 
for the soldiers. 
It is evident that something of a new orthodoxy about Late Roman unit sizes 
in the British provinces has been developing based on the now well known 
concept of "chalets. " The argument for internally altered fort 
accommodation and thus substantially smaller garrison units originated with 
John Wilkes's 1960 excavation at Housesteads, and Charles Daniels' 
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interpretation of the findings there as representing married quarters for a 
greatly reduced cohort. 25 
Wilkes had discovered that the standard Hadrianic barrack block XIV at 
Housesteads with ten contubernia and a centurion's suite had been rebuilt in 
the fourth century as a series of separate, mostly detached huts with alleys 
between: he called these buildings "chalets". Further excavations at 
Housesteads by Charles Daniels and John Gillarn between 1974 and 1976 
revealed a series of six chalets (and a larger two-roomed building) overlying 
Barrack All. Later excavations and the re-examination of older site reports 
allowed for the extension of the chalet concept to a large number of British 
forts, mostly in the north. 
Rescue work at Wallsend in the mid-1 970s showed a re-shaping of eight 
barrack blocks in the fourth century into new buildings but with fewer chalets 
than at Housesteads. At High Rochester, two barrack blocks in the 
western leten&lla were apparently re-arranged into chalets. Similarly, it 
appears that the 1894 excavation at Greatchesters revealed five detached 
chalets together with a larger building. Work at Ebchester in 1972-3 showed 
a fourth century barrack block rebuilt as two or three back-to-back buildings. 
Daniels argued from the excavations at Chesters in the 1880s that there 
were indications that the most southerly of four barrack blocks identified in 
the eastern praeten&lra had been not stables but possible chalets. The 
1929-31 excavations at Birdoswald showed considerable fourth century 
rebuilding, including possible chalets, as did both excavation in 1843 and 
aerial photography in the late 1960s at Risingham. 
As well as this quite impressive catalogue of forts on the northern frontier 
with probable fourth century chalets, Daniels also suggested that there may 
have been chalets also at Caernarvon (where the 1922 excavation showed 
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several possible chalets, mostly undated), Portchester (where possible third 
or fourth century detached structures were uncovered by work in the early 
1970s) and Malton (for which there is a pre-war description of detached 
fourth century buildings). 
Having produced this list of about a dozen forts seemingly rebuilt with 
chalets in place of traditional barracks, Daniels then looked at the question 
of whether the new accommodation represented married quarters. Roman 
soldiers had of course been forbidden to marry until AD 19726 and, it has 
traditionally been assumed that even after Severus's "concession", wives 
and families would continue to live outside forts probably in W&and that 
barrack space represented accommodation for military personnel alone. 
Daniels however took the re-construction of barrack blocks as discrete living 
units, together with two other criteria (the presence in forts of typically 
female objects such as jewellery and the burial of infants) as clear evidence 
that many forts now contained married quarters. The excavation of 
Housesteads barrack X111, for example, produced many brooches and other 
trinkets, while infant burials have been found at Malton (where pre-war 
excavation produced 31 bodies of children in "chalet'floors and a guard- 
room of the north-east gate) and at Chesters (where two infant burials are 
recorded in the eastern interval tower of the south rampart). 
Daniels concludes that the appearance in the fourth century of chalets in the 
command of the Duke of Britain was part of a planned Diocletianic or post- 
Diocletianic re-organisation of the British garrison reflecting the running 
down and partial abandonment of many Wall forts not just to allow for units 
to be transferred to the new Saxon Shore defences but also as a result of 
the permanent reduction of the island's forces during the period of the Gallic 
Empire. He also attempted to quantify the changed situation on the 
northern frontier and argued that the Housesteads excavations in the 1960s 
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and '70s indicated only about eighty chalets, while Wallsend contained 
perhaps 50-52. Assuming that each chalet was assigned to one soldier and 
his family, the total of accommodation units would therefore also represent 
the garrison size: in these two instances, the fourth century garrisons would 
have been about 9.5-10% and about 8.5% of the nominal strength of the 
known second century units. 27 These are clearly very drastic reductions. 
Although Daniels did not attempt to expand the chalet concept beyond the 
sites detailed above (of which he seems to regard just eight as reasonable 
certainties) and although some north British sites have yet to produce even 
possible chalet evidence (Ravenglass and Maryport, for example), greater 
extrapolation has been attempted by others with implications expressed like 
this: Tre-existing barracks were demolished and replaced with terraces of 
close-set but free-standing 'chalets ..... The capacity of the new-style 
housing was no more than 15 per cent of that which it replaced, implying the 
presence of much smaller garrisons, now occupying 'married' quarters. 
Although widely distributed, the northern command of the DLxB1#anMb1v1n 
[sic] may have been no larger than c. 5000 men, all of whom consisted of 
the lower-paid frontier troops. "28 Using traditional unit size assumptions, the 
old-style cohorts and alae alone in the area of the Duke's command would 
have totalled more than double this suggestion and, since the Duke 
controlled two-thirds of all the forces the NoMa assigns to Britain (including 
the Count's mobile troops), a total for the fourth century British garrison of 
fewer than 8,000 men is implied here. 
Although the question of whether or not soldiers' families were routinely to 
be found living within fort walls, thus producing units with fewer fighting 
men, is not likely to be resolved easily, it does not appear ever to have been 
a practice which would have been officially encouraged. An anonymous 
Byzantine military treatise of the mid-sixth century, for example, states that 
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the ". .. men ... should not have their wives and children with them" except 
in conditions of peace and indeed recommends that families should 
deliberately be kept distant from troops. 29 It would be logical to expect, 
however, if chalets were indeed married quarters that their arrival in the 
fourth century should coincide with a compensating decline in Wbý, where 
traditionally soldiers' families are assumed to have lived. Although what 
evidence there is, based on pottery and coin finds, does indicate a decline 
in Wcxls life at many sites in the later third and fourth centuries (the 
Housesteads Wczls, for example, was operating at a very reduced level by 
a AD 300), the picture is far from conclusive and one obvious anomaly is 
Malton, which had a flourishing fourth century Wcas, although Daniels has 
interpreted the substantial number of infant burials and possible existence of 
chalets there as pointing towards the transfer of families to within the fort 
walls. 30 
A comprehensive attack on the whole "chalet"thesis has recently been 
launched by Paul Bidwell. 31 in which he concludes: '7he term 'chalet' now 
seems redundant, for it refers not to a separate building type, distinguished 
functionally by its series of detached blocks, but to a variant method of 
construction which has no necessary connection with the use of the 
building., '32 Bidwell cites other examples, not used by Daniels, of the 
construction of detached buildings in forts well before Daniels' proposed 
Diocletianic dating for the introduction of the chalet scheme: a free-standing 
double barrack block built at Vindolanda in c. AD 235; several detached 
buildings at High Rochester of possibly a similar date, and detached blocks 
from Newstead constructed in the Antonine period. Bidwell concludt, -s that 
detached blocks were not an innovation of the early fourth century but a 
much older reality in many instances and, in any case, were probably the 
result of being easier to produce in circumstances of poor carpentry skills or 
lack of suitable roof timbers33 and not built as new-style married quarters. 
140 
Intriguingly, he points out that Barrack XIV at Housesteads - arguably the 
starting point of the chalet concept - was later converted back from detached 
buildings to a continuous block. Daniels' argument for the chalet rebuilding 
as having been a planned development of the Diocletianic period is also 
rather uncomfortably dependent on assuming a long gap between the 
building (or re-building) of the earliest Saxon Shore forts and the 
construction of chalets for shrunken northern garrisons. In any case, 
although some units do appear to have been transferred directly from the 
northern frontier to the Saxon Shore. others were not. It is worth noting that, 
of Daniels' list of eight probable chalet sites, four forts (Housesteads, 
Wallsend, Greatchesters and Chesters) all had garrison units recorded in 
the NoMa - and therefore presumably fourth century - which were identical 
to those of the third century. 
Bidwell further draws attention to the calculation by Lindsay Allason-jones34 
that Hadrian's Wall forts have actually produced more finds associated with 
women (trinkets, bracelets, beads and so on) dating from the second or 
early third centuries than from the fourth. Bidwell also wonders whether Waý 
were ever primarily inhabited by soldiers' families or whether they served 
mostly as homes for merchants and craftsmen. He points out that no north 
British fort was more than two days' travel from a town and most were only 
one day (40 kilometres [25 miles]) away, and suggests that any decline in Wa 
might have more to do with the growth and prosperity of towns than the 
transfer of familes to married quarters in forts. A shrinking market if units 
were smaller and the replacement of private suppliers by state factories 
might be additional factors contributing to the decline of Waý. 
Bidwell also argues persuasively that infant burials are not a strong 
argument for the development of married quarters in forts. They are rare 
(known only from four of the fifty or so forts occupied in the third and fourth 
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centuries): not dated tidily from the post-Diocletianic period assumed to have 
seen the constructior of chalets (one from Malton was from AD 260/80, and 
one from Little Chester first century): in some instances at least, were 
perhaps of a ritual nature: and, in any case, they may represent not families 
living in a military environment but rather the presence of civilians in a site 
temporarily abandoned (or partly abandoned) by the army. 35 
In conclusion, Bidwell argues that there are no convincing indications that 
barracks were converted to chalets for family units but there are indications 
of contubernia being reduced from the earlier eight-ten men to a lower five- 
six. Bidwell connects this with a reduction in century size from eighty men to 
sixjy36 and dates it to the mid-third century rather than later. 37 Apart from 
issues concerning construction, maintenance would have been greatly 
simplified by having smaller, separate accommodation units, as would the 
"mothballing" or permanent closing down of parts of a fort. This apparent 
move away from a strict adherence to an official model towards a situation 
where practice more closely met real needs may also reflect a shift in the 
officer corps from the relative amateurs of the Principate to the professionals 
of the third century. 38 
One of the problems moreover with accepting Daniels' picture of a north 
British frontier with at least some forts with tiny garrisons is that it becomes 
difficult to see what function these troops would serve, other than as "trip- 
wire" forces to buy time while field army reserves were deployed. In the third 
century the outpost forts of the Wall alone may have housed over 5,000 
troops and their anticipatory and reconnaissance r6les would have been no 
less crucial once the outposts had been evacuated. The great superiority 
the Roman army possessed over its opponents, especially in the West, was 
its controlled mobility in the field but this function presumably devolved in the 
fourth century to the comitatensian forces behind the frontier as the strategy 
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of having forward static units [limitanei] supported by mobile reserves 
[comitatenses] developed. 
Nevertheless, the tiny units proposed by Daniels, and now receiving wide 
currency, would hardly allow for patrolling of any significance, let alone 
aggressive defence. Indeed these minuscule garrisons seem hardly capable 
of defending their forts. At Housesteads, eighty men were apparently 
expected to hold a rampart length of over 595 metres [651 yards]: while at 
Wallsend some fifty men were to defend 512 metres [560 yards] of rampart. 
Any commander could well have qualms at the prospect of withstanding a 
siege with each of his troops responsible for seven to nine metres [24 or 30 
feet] of wall. As has been said, ". .. 4th century defences [on the Wall] are 
essentially those built in the 2nd century. 2nd century forts were ... never 
designed to withstand siege, whereas most 4th century forts ... were.,, 
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Perhaps even chalet proponents need to consider whether such quarters 
need to be interpreted as housing only one fighting man (and his family). 
Daniels' Housesteads figures would allow a floor space of 4.6 X 8.2 metres 
[15 X 27 feet] per family group whereas a century of eighty men had shared 
a space of just 53 X 10 metres [1175 X 32 feet] In other words, the chalet 
married quarter thesis allows each soldier six times the room he had 
previously had; or it can be seen that each family unit required the same 
space that six adult soldiers (and their equipment) had been assigned 
before. If the "chalets" are seen instead as new style blocks for smaller 
contubernia, then garrison sizes would still be reduced but far less 
dramatically: Housesteads to perhaps 400-480 men (50-60% of its second 
century establishment) and Wallsend to around 260-312 (43-52%). 
Before leaving this issue of chalets, two other considerations should not be 
forgotten - both of which are little understood. In the first place, the whole 
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chalet thesis - as propounded by Daniels and others - ignores the vital 
question of bachelor soldiers. There has been minimal examination of this 
subject but a small sample studied by Margaret Roxan4O suggested that only 
about 50% of auxiliaries were married4l and even if the minimum 
assumptions of the chalet thesis are to be accepted, then it follows that the 
resulting garrison sizes will need to be doubled to allow for bachelors and 
the problem of where they lived is left unresolved. Other estimates, 
however, have put the proportion of married soldiers much lower than this. 42 
Secondly, we also know that soldiers commonly had servants43 - perhaps in 
very large numbers44 - but there is no clear evidence as to where they were 
quartered, although they may of course have been housed in the War. It may 
be that soldiers' servants were a more significant factor in cavalry units, 
where they acted as grooms and weapon-bearers. 
Several attempts have been made to see if a pattern of fort sizes and unit 
types can be distinguished: most of these have been inconclusive. Breeze 
and Dobson, for example, concluded45 that an attempt by Ian Richmond46 to 
classify British auxiliary forts according to their garrisons based on fort and 
barrack sizes "cannot be accepted in [its] entirety.,, 47 Mark Hassall has also 
looked at fort plans48 but his studies have produced more anomalies than 
patterns, both in overall sizes and in internal arrangements. Examples can 
also be found of small forts which nevertheless seem to have had 
unexpectedly large garrisons: Kennedy and Riley49 cite as examples Pen 
Llystyn which housed two cohorts in a site of just 1.8 hectares [4.5 acres] 
and Elginhaugh which squeezed a dozen barrack blocks and perhaps 
therefore just under a thousand troops into only 1.61 hectares [3.98 acres]. 
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An even more obvious complication is that forts frequently saw changes of 
garrison with not just units but unit types being altered. On Hadrian's Wall, 
for example, the NoMa records alae where earlier there had been 
quingenary cohorts at Rudchester and Carrawburgh, while a quingenary 
rather than milliary cohort seems to have made up the garrison at 
Birdoswald, and at South Shields a quingenary ala had given way to 
a nzI177elys. Whatever factors may have constrained the deployment of 
military units, the original garrison type of the posts concerned does not 
therefore appear to have been a consideration. 
Although in the expansionist times of the Principate forts were no doubt 
regarded more as fortified bases for future advance (and therefore quite 
closely resembling many modern military sites) than as sites likely to be 
subject to siege, a fact that seems all too commonly ignored is that Roman 
forts were on occasions attacked and were sometimes captured, as were 
some of the cities garrisoned by military units. That this was a reality in the 
Late Empire too is reflected in part by the strong nature of forts of that 
period, typically having thick walls, massive corner towers and projecting 
interval towers: this is true even of small sites and the investment involved 
must clearly have related to a perception of a real danger of aftack. 50 Some 
Norican examples of forts attacked in the fifth century are cited above. 51 
Examples of fortifications manned by surprisingly small garrisons may be 
drawn from many different periods and places. The massive 400-metre 
[1312 feet] main curtain wall of Harlech Castle, for instance, was originally 
assigned (in 1284) a permanent garrison of a constable and "30 fencible 
men"; when the castle fell to Parliamentary forces on 15 March 1647, they 
captured just 52 defenders. 52 On the other hand, it took over 20,000 troops 
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about two months to capture the Roman city of Constantinople during the 
4th Crusade: one source put the defending Byzantine army at over 400,000 
men. 53 
Is it possible then to seek evidence for a Roman doctrine on this issue of 10rt 
sizes and garrisons? There does in fact seem to be some indications that 
both officials and commentators understood the need for units to be able in 
ex&emis to defend their posts, and also the need to reduce fortified areas 
when appropriate. 
Caesar, for example, describing the siege of Gergovia in 52 BC, refers to his 
inability to reduce the size of his larger camp when pulling out the bulk of the 
garrison: a camp originally held by six legions was left with just two. 54 The 
implication is that the reduction of a camp was routine and only the pressure 
of time had caused him on this occasion to leave the defences unaltered. It 
is interesting to note that this particular camp was apparently 36 hectares 
[ninety acres] in area: not unreasonably large by the standards of a 
permanent legionary fortress held by two legions. 55 Just as interestingly 
Caesar goes on to describe the difficulties faced by the camp defenders 
when attacked by the Gauls ". .. propter magnitudinern castrorurn perpetuo 
esset isdem in vallo permanendum. "56 Surely the normal practice must 
have been that some reserve was held back to relieve the defenders in the 
event of prolonged fighting. 
Rather more than a century later Tacitus described the problems faced by 
under-manned forts at the beginning of the revolt of Civilis in AD 69. When 
Brinno, chief of the Cannenefates, attacked two forts usually identified as 
Valkenburg and Katwijk in a simultaneous land and maritime assault, he 
was successful because of the surprise nature of the attack and because 
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the garrisons ". .. would not have been strong enough to hold out [even] if 
they had [expected attack] ....,, 
57 
Tacitus describes how, immediately afterwards, the cohort prefects in 
command destroyed the frontier forts which were about to be attacked 
because they could not be defended .. ." due to the fact that ". .. Vitellius 
had withdrawn the bulk of [their] effectives .... "58 It is clear that Tacitus was 
taking it as self-evident that fort garrisons could not be indefinitely weakened 
and still be able to man their defences successfully. 
Then, when Civilis laid siege to Vetera (Xanten), Tacitus wrote: "The 
attacking force was encouraged by the length of the rampart, which, 
although designed for two legions [sc. V and XV], was in fact defended by 
barely 5,000 armed men. "59 Archaeology has revealed that Vetera 1, a 
Neronian stone rebuilt double fortress of the late 50s, was indeed about 
twice the size of a standard fortress: it covered some 56 hectares [138 
acresl with ramparts measuring 902 X 621 metres [2959 X 2037 feet]. 60 
Evidently the reduction of the intended garrison by a factor of 50% was 
expected to cause problems for the defenders. 
Although these examples date from the late Republic and early Empire, they 
represent at least unexceptionable plausibility and perhaps even a military 
doctrine reflecting obvious common sense. A similar attitude is also 
reflected in the comment from Vegetius quoted above6l in which he clearly 
argues that fort sizes ought to be appropriate to the garrison in question. 
A final complication which needs to be borne in mind when considering the 
whole issue of the relationship between fort size and unit size is that a 
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substantial proportion of Late Army units were. of course, not stationed in 
forts at all but were mobile formations, billetted in towns, often in specific 
districts, when not on campaign; they were entitled to one-third of the 
available accommodation, and this stipulation proved no more popular than 
the compulsory stationing of troops among civilians has usually been. 
Mobile formations generally had no fixed bases and are listed as such in 
the Nb&&x there is, for example, no way of ascertaining where the nine 
regiments assigned to the regional field army of the comes Blitalmiae were 
at any time stationed. There is of course therefore no archaeological basis 
for speculating on the size of such units. 
In addition, many Late Army frontier units, or at least garrisons classified as 
limlfanel, were also urban-based. MacMullen62 lists a number of such 
garrison towns, which were mostly frontier towns or legionary fortresses 
which had acquired civilian populations. They included Tiaret in Mauretania 
Caesariensis: Tours; Umm-Idj-Djimal in southern Syria-, Palmyra (modern 
Tadmor near Homs) in Syria [where the legion I Illyricorum was probably 
stationed in the 8-hectare Cas&a Dib&&#ana]-, Chersonesus; Castra 
Regina (modern Regensburg) in Germany [base of elements of the legion III 
Italica]; Vindonissa (modern Windisch) in Switzerland; Argentorate 
(modern Strasbourg); Damascus-, and Magnesia. 
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When we turn to consider what conclusions about unit sizes can be drawn 
from the evidence cited above, it is necessary to begin by stressing the 
uncertainty present even for the simpler and better documented situation of 
the Principate. Although the margin of doubt is not unduly large, it is not 
insignificant, and is more of a problem for some unit types than others. We 
can assert with reasonable confidence for example, that the legions of the 
Early Empire had an official establishment in the region of 5,100-5,200 men, 
without forgetting that such an establishment is nowhere stated in our 
sources. 
The division of the auxiliary units into six types with a large overall majority 
each conta: ining a nominal 500 troops (quingenary)l and a substantial 
minority of nominally double that strength (milliary) does suggest intended 
establishments but we only need to recall that legionary centuries C'units of 
1 OO'J illogically but unarguably contained eighty men each to appreciate that 
the process of theory being overtaken by reality all too often rendered the 
implications of such terminology less than meaningful. 2 If we consider the 
unit type descriptors for the various auxiliary formations ("quingenary 
peditate cohort', "milliary aW', etc. ) in conjunction with the limited literary 
evidence avaflable (from Arrian and especially Vegetius), various quantities 
of possible establishments with appropriate levels of certainty emerge. 
Quingenary peditate cohorts almost definitely contained 480 men each in 
theory; milliary peditate cohorts very probably had 800 men each; 
quingenary alae were almost certainly in the region of 512-528 strong; and 
milliary alae were more likely to have had about 760-800 men than anything 
higher. The part-mounted (equitate) units present greater difficulties but the 
outside range of possibilities is no wider than 480-608 for quingenary units 
and 820-1100 for milliary regiments; removing the more speculative 156 
suggestions and placing more faith in the statements of Vegetius would 
narrow the possibilities to 600-608 and 1000-1056 respectively. 3 
The small amount of documentary evidence that survives for the Principate 
provides some limited support for certain elements of the pattern suggested 
above. 4 The single document that appears to be a record of a milliary 
peditate cohort puts that unit at about 94% of the establishment of 800 
proposed above, while for the only unit type for which any substantial 
documentation survives - the quingenary equitate cohort - it seems difficult 
to dispute a structure of six centuries and four turmae with an overall 
establishment of about 600 men. It is significant that the three records for 
quingenary equitate cohorts available show such units at 9M 84% and 76- 
81 % of the theoretical 600 which has been proposed as the most likely 
establishment, even though the documents are from different parts of the 
Empire and cover a century or so. Without ignoring the limited and random 
nature of the surviving evidence or the problems created by the peculiar unit 
size and structure recorded in the files of XX Palmyrenorum, it is 
nevertheless encouraging that for the one area where any significant 
quantity of documentation exists, it reinforces rather than weakens the 
literary evidence. 
Although there is no evidence that the legions raised by Marcus Aurelius 
and Septimius Severus were smaller than the 5,000-strong units of the Early 
Principate, the piocess of the emergence of a field army can be traced back 
at least as far as those reigns. By the mid-third century a substantial 
reserve force had been formed, partly by the raising of new units but also 
through detaching elements from units already in existence. The most 
significant point thereafter was the reign of Diocletian, when the army was 
substantially increased in overall numbers and many new units were 
established. The quantity of legions deployed went up during that reign by 
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at least 50% and more probably by about 100%: this was between six and 
eleven times more than the largest previous number of legions raised at any 
one time. Although some of the other new, non-legionary Diocletianic units 
were formed by dividing existing ones or taking detachments from them, the 
recruiting of at least some troops for these units must have been needed 
and this fact, together with the creation of many new legions, is perhaps the 
single, strongest argument that such formations must have been smaller 
than their equivalents from the Principate. Although this has no necessary 
implication for the pre-existing units - and the possibility of the co-existence 
of two different establishments, for example for legions, should be 
considered - it makes an overwhelming case for the new, Diocletianic 
legions being 1,000-2,000-strong rather than any larger. As well as the 
insuperable problems of recruitment that would otherwise have had to be 
faced, the consequences for the Imperial Treasury of such a sudden and 
enormous increase in the military pay bill are unthinkable. 5 
The process of the growth of the central reserve forces continued apace 
under Constantine and by the end of the fourth century well over 300 mobile 
units existed. Although these forces were made up of new-style units - 
caval ry m; d11a§bnes, i nf antry legiones, awdlia and legiones pseudb- 
aomitatenses - rather than old-style coholfes and alae, it is very difficult to 
assign them even quingenary strengths as a generality: using such a crude 
measure, however, the mobile armies would have totalled well over 150,000 
men. 6 Although not a completely incredible figure, a rather lower one would 
fit more comfortably with the events of the Late Empire and particularly with 
the size of expeditionary forces that are reported. There seems little doubt 
in any case that, for instance, the field army "legions" must have borne little 
resemblance in terms of size (and presumably structure) to their namesakes 
of the Principate: mobile legions 5,000-strong would have produced a total 
for these units alone of a quite incredible half a million men. 7 
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The literary evidence that can be brought to bear on this subject is limited 
but there are some references - both direct and implicit - to small units. 
Ammianus's account of the garrison of Amida in AD 359, where he details 
the units and calculates the number of the besieged, argues strongly for 
relatively small legions (of perhaps one or two thousand men). The same 
implication for field army regiments can be drawn from the combination of 
Claudian's order of battle for the North African expedition of AD 398 and 
Orosius's statement about the size of that force. It is also possible to infer 
small field army units from references by Zosimus to events in AD 409 and 
410 but, in these instances, it is far from clear what type of units are being 
cited. And finally, a clear reference to a very small force of Late Roman 
soldiers in Libya is found in Synesius's description of a victory won by just 
forty men. What needs to be remembered in this case however is that it is 
not known whether these Hunnish troops were regulars or whether the force 
described was an actual unit perse. 
It is difficult to claim that this is an impressively large body of evidence and 
there are moreover contradictory references. Libanius, the HIstolia 
AtIgusta, Vegetius, Zosimus and John Lydus are all sources from the 
fourth-sixth centuries referring to army units - legions, alae and cohorts - at 
or near the sizes traditionally assumed for the Early Empire. Although it is 
usual to dismiss these writers as unreliable or backward-looking or both, 
caution might suggest some hesitation before rejecting them all out of hand. 
It is true that few of these writers had military experience and that the focus 
of interest for Vegetius and John Lydus was very much antiquarian but, on 
the other hand, the writers cited in defence of the case for small units 
include a poet and an academic cleric. The only real military expert at all 
among the writers of the Late Empire was Ammianus and the evidence he 
provides is far from unambiguous. It does, for example, include a reference 
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to what are perhaps alae, which he implies had totals of 350 men. Such a 
figure is cbviously smaller than the norm assumed for the Principate (68% of 
512) but, if it is not to be explained by combat attrition, may reflect a new, 
lower establishment. Contradictions in our literary sources may mean that 
some evidence has to be rejected as inaccurate but it could also suggest a 
more complex situation accurately described: we are not however able to 
quantify the proportions of small units and larger ones - although the former 
were presumably a significant majority. With the honorable exception of 
Ammianus, none of the authors referred to here were familiar with army life 
and organisation, and even Ammianus adhered to the literary conventions of 
the classical historians who had avoided employing technical terms. A 
modern student would not instinctively turn to a bishop, a poet laureate, a 
civil servant or a university professor of rhetoric if seeking details of military 
unit sizes but that is in effect what the student of the Late Roman Army is 
obliged to do. 
Perhaps the most influential source of all for the question of unit sizes in the 
Late Roman Army is the Panopolis papyri, despite the irony that nowhere do 
they explicitly provide such details. Jones's interpretation of the documents 
produced legionary vexillations of between about 850 and 2,000 men, a 
cohort at about the strengthB of the assumed Principate norm of 480 and 
alae at 69f72% and 42% of the assumed norm of 512. Duncan-Jones's re- 
interpretation halved the vexillation figures and reduced the auxiliary units to 
a cohort at 34% of norm, and alae at 22% and 4% of norm. That last figure 
(an ala with just 21 Y2 soldiers at two sites) is perhaps the most interesting 
and the most overlooked of all Duncan-Jones's calculations. Although his 
estimate of ala 1Hi&-, -o1z1m having 116/118 troopers has achieved wide 
acceptance as a typical Late Empire cavalry regiment size, there is no 
intrinsic reason why it should be any more typical than Duncan-Jones's 
other ala estimate - that IlHerculia Dromedadbrum contained fewer than 
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two dozen men. It is difficult to avoid concluding that an evidently absurd 
result has been rejected in favour of one less so9, whereas a greater 
scepticism about the whole structure of calculation involved could be 
advised. Even Jones's earlier and higher estimates had included significant 
reductions in the cavalry units compared with the unit sizes assumed for 
earlier. The cavalry would of course have been more difficult to tra: in and 
more expensive to maintain, so that the Late Roman Army may have 
experienced greater difficulties in keeping mounted units up to establishment 
compared with the infantry. 1 0 In any case, even if the whole of Duncan- 
Jones's thesis about the Panopolis documents is to be accepted as Correct, 
that relates only to one particular place and time without any necessary 
Empire-wide implications. Interestingly, with the exception of Synesius (who, 
it should be stressed again, may not have been referring to a vn., ý, none of 
the literary sources refer to units as small as the cohorts and alae suggested 
by Duncan-Jones. 
The survival of a list of Late Army units - even if the Noffa is probably not 
an official order of battle - is extremely fortunate and, whatever mistakes the 
list contains, it should allow at least the establishment of certain unit size 
maxima. Nearly 200 legions, for instance, cannot all have numbered 5,000 
men each: very possibly none of them were of anything like that size. 1 1 
Over 120 groups of eqz11? es similarly must have included many very small 
units. There is of course no reason to insist on supposing that all units with 
the same type name had identical sizes or structures, either in theory or in 
practice. Various attempts have been made to turn the Noffa lists into 
army sizes and to extrapolate unit sizes from that but the degree of 
uncertainty involved in such exercises is high. Overall Late Army sizes from 
as low as a quarter of a million men or so up to well over half a million have 
been calculated: the field army size suggestions cited abovel 2 range 
between about 130,000 and about 2-50,000. On the whole, the very small 
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quantity of evidence in the NoMa explicitly referring to units of particular 
sizes (such as "centenarid'and "milliaria! ) is probably best disregarded, as 
reflecting a historical rather than a current reality. 
Archaeology has produced some evidence for small forts from the Late 
Empire and, where these sites can be linked to known units with traditional 
titles, they suggest a strong assumption that such units must have been 
smaller than their counterparts from the first and second centuries. Small 
forts have been identified in the East and on the Rhine-Danube frontier; 
although the widespread practice of splitting units between different posts 
may be an additional factor involved, some of the forts were extremely tiny 
and can only have housed very weak garrisons. The re-development of 
North British barracks into "chalets" to serve as married quarters, on the 
other hand, probably still needs to be seen as an unproven thesis. Garrison 
units may indeed have been run down but not necessarily by the drastic 
amounts sometimes suggested. It should also be noted that several Roman 
writers, from the Republic to the Late Empire, demonstrate that the need for 
garrisons to be appropriate to the size of their forts was well understood and 
the dangers to posts held by understrength units were appreciated. 
The remarkable survival over many centuries of some units of the Roman 
Army should not lead to the assumption that these units necessarily 
remained unchanged in terms of size and structure. We do know that new 
titles for unit commanders and a new hierarchy of ranks for at least some 
regiments had developed by the late fourth century but it is not clear how 
widely the latter applied nor what this implied for unit sizes. The internal re- 
organisation of units may suggest a logical relationship with numbers of 
troops in units but this cannot yet be demonstrated for certain. The limited 
evidence there is on this subject is ambiguous: legio IlHelmlia, for 
example, was a Diocletianic creation with a typically Late Empire fortress 
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only about one seventh the size of an average legionary base of the 
Principate but it seems to have comprised a full complement of ten cohorts. 
One difficulty in assuming a small legion but with a traditional structure is to 
extrapolate from this what might have been the sub-unit sizes: if cohorts 
were near to century-size, did they in turn contain "centuries" and, if so, how 
many men did they include? l 3 
Although we would do well to beware the tendency of observers of most 
periods to bemoan the failings of the current time and to look back to a 
probably mythical golden age) 4 there is an inescapable consciousness of 
decline among certain writers of the Late Empire and this extends to their 
attitude towards the Imperial army. Before his detailed description of the 
"ancient legion". Vegetiusl 5 describes how the title survived into his own 
time but was applied to units depleted by the effects of neglect, corruption 
and lack of recruiting. Agathias, writing over a century and a half later, 
writes movingly of "The Roman armies ... [which] had dwindled to a fraction 
of what they had been and were no longer adequate to the requirements of 
a vast empire. "l 6 He claimed that the army had shrunk to less than a 
quarter of its authorised establishment and was unable to put up an effective 
defence against the invasion of the Cotrigurs in AD 559: "There was 
nothing to stop them, no sentries, no engines of defence, nobody to man 
them. There was not even the sound of a dog barking, as would at least 
have been the case with a pig-sty or a sheep-cot. "l 7 
One factor of real decline that may lie behind the image of decline is 
reflected by a number of references to the practice of units containing 
"ghost" soldiers. Libanius, for example, wrote that the dead were "kept alive" 
so that their rations could still be drawn. 18 His contemporary and fellow 
orator, Themistius, referred to a similar practice in an oration delivered early 
in AD 370: Valens, he claimed, had restored Danubian forts "whose 
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garrisons were ... fraudulent. "l 
9 Themistius made it clear that the obvious 
purpose of keeping "ghost' soldiers was to be able to continue to claim their 
pay; he made the same point about fraudulently enrolled soldiers in another 
oration. 20 The practice of retaining on the muster rolls dead soldiers was 
recorded again during Justinian's reign by Procopius, who claimed it was 
the official policy of the Treasury agents called Logothetes. 21 In this 
instance, it is far from clear what the point of having "ghost' soldiers was but 
Procopius stressed its effect of keeping the army under-strength. 
Something like official conniving at or a despairing acceptance of desertion 
is reflected in the edict of AD 413, which prescribed nothing more severe 
than demotion for a years absence without leave, and allowed deserters to 
remain on the "official register' until a period of four years absence had 
elapsed! 22 The custom of military units including non-existent personnel, 
either by retaining on the records the deceased or by other means, is known 
from many other periods of history. It was not always an unofficial or 
corrupt practice: a British army regiment of Foot was assigned a theoretical 
strength of 423 privates in 1763 but this figure included about twenty 
"contingent men": these were ... "non-existent soldiers whose pay the 
companies drew to cover hospital expenses, repairs to weapons and 
accoutrements, funerals, and similar expenses. . ..,, 
23 
If it can be considered as at least possible that the practice of including non- 
existent soldiers was widespread, then the confidence that can be placed in 
unit size estimates based even on surviving documentation will not be 
particularly high. The three instances cited above date from the fourth and 
sixth centuries but it can be by no means certain that the lack of evidence 
relating to earlier periods indicates that "ghost' soldiers did not exist then. It 
may of course partially help to explain the military setbacks of the Late 
Empire if allowance has to be made for units being in actuality weaker than 
the theoretical establishments that have been deduced from, for example, 
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the NoMAJ lists. The Iberian regional field army of the colnes Hisoaniae, for 
example, which was probably formed as an emergency force in the period 
407-409, counted 16 regiments24 -a force which might have been expected 
to number 8,000-16,000 men - but appears to have played little or no part in 
resisting the invasion of the Vandals, Suebi and Alans in the autumn of 409; 
they may however have been the troops who mutinied against Gerontius. 
When the Western government launched a campaign of reconquest in 
Spain in the period 416-418, they employed the Visigothic forces of Vallia 
and it seems an inescapable implication that the Count of Spain's army no 
longer existed. Similarly weak or virtually non-existent field armies can be 
inferred from the events during Ataric's invasion of Greece in 394/5 which in 
theory should have been defended by 26 field army regiments, 25 from the 
need to defend the Rhine frontier in 406 with Frankish federates and from 
the rapid Vandal conquest of North Africa in the 42-0s. Even Stilicho seems 
to have had available only one truly effective field army - that of Italy. 
Between a half and two-thirds of the entire field army strength had probably 
been lost in the late fourth and early fifth centuries: these losses were partly 
made good but only by stripping the frontier of lilnitanel, especially in Gaul. 
There is a substanial body of evidence that by the fourth century a clear 
division existed in terms of quality and prestige between the limitanean and 
comitatensian troops, even if those technical terms were not in use until 
later. This was expressed in clear legal terms: for example, field army 
troops were allowed a more favourable tax status and they were expected to 
meet more stringent physical standards. 26 The poor quality of the lilnitanei 
and their eventual decline to a type of peasant militia is still cited as 
axiomatic by some authorities but the evidence suggests a more complex 
reality. Jones27 cited examples of soldiers who appear also to have been 
farmers, traders, bakers, basket weavers and boatmen. There is however 
an increasing body of evidence - especially the Vindolanda tablets - which is 
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providing a picture of a well-developed unofficial economy among the 
officers and men on the northern frontier of first and early second century 
Britain-28 there is no suggestion however that the 9th Batavians or the I st 
Tungrians were in any sense part-time soldiers or made inefficient by their 
trading and lending. 
It is often forgotten that Imperial troops were specifically forbidden to hold 
land in the province in which they were serving29 and, although this 
prohibition was eventually lifted, the first record of Aml? anei officially working 
the land occurs as late as AD 443.30 This does not of course imply any 
imposition of an hereditary status on these troops nor that cultivating their 
own land ". .. seriously affected their professional duties.,, 
31 Limitanean 
units formed the garrison which successfully defended Amida against the 
Persians in AD 359, Julian included limital7ei in his Persian expedition four 
years later-, and liml? aneiwere of sufficient quality to be transferred to the 
colnitatenses on more than one occasion. Even as late as the mid-sixth 
century, Belisarius was able to deploy limitaneifrom Phoenicia-Libanensis 
against the Persians in Mesopotamia. 
One aspect of the Late Roman Army that is still a matter of controversy is 
the extent to which it was "barbananised". Some contemporary observers 
strongly criticised official policy of recruiting barbarians: Vegetius was keen 
to purge the army of non-Romans32 and Synesius urged their removal from 
the Eastern field army in AD 399: "We must. .. get used to winning our 
own victories, not puffing up with partners but dismissing the barbarian from 
every rank and post.,, 33 Synesius of course later changed his mind and 
praised the Huns who fought with him in north Africa but such purges did 
take place on occasions, sometimes with great violence: in 408, for 
instance, the families of 30,000 Gothic federates were massacred. 34 
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It has been fairly remarked that the use of allied troops must have reflected 
the weakness of the regular forces: otherwise there could hardly have 
been much need to resort to barbarian federates .. This dependency is 
not at all easy to quantify however. Liebeschuetz has argued on a number 
of occasionS36 that this barbarian element of the Late Roman Army was 
highly significant and ". .. by 450 the bulk of the field army ... in the West 
consisted of federates. ', 37 Recently it has been suggested that the r6le of 
barbarians in the fourth and fifth centuries has been overstated and the 
proportion of them was probably no higher than about 25%. 38 
Whatever may have been the truth about this issue, the forces of the 
Western Empire - lilnifal7eiand mobile forces - gradually but largely 
disappeared during the course of the fifth century. Some elements of the 
army in Britain may have survived beyond the break with the central 
government in 409-410 but there is little certainty about this. The north 
African army must have disappeared by the final Vandal conquest of the 
450s: the Spanish army could have lasted little longer. Eugippius has left a 
vivid picture of the decline of the garrison of Noricum. Julius Nepos may 
have continued to command the remnants of the army of Illyricurn until his 
death in 480. The end of the large army of Italy is an even more mysterious 
process. The last elements of the army of Gaul are usually thought to have 
been defeated by Clovis in 486 but it has been suggested that some final 
traces of late Roman military organisation survived under Merovingian 
control into the next century. 39 
1: 88% of second century units were quingenary - about 339 out of 387 
according to Dr Brian Dobson, 'The Empire'in Walfarein MeAndent 
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World, edited by General Sir John Hackett, London, 1989, pages 
192-2-21. 
2: In the modern Royal Air Force, Flight Lieutenants rarely command 
flights, Squadron Leaders are invariably too junior to command 
squadrons, Wing Commanders do not normally command wings 
and the organisational unit "Group" no longer exists for Group 
Captains to command. 
3: It is worth noting that the enormous range of possible sizes and 
structures for milliary equitate cohorts relates to regiments of which 
fewer than two dozen examples existed. 
4: No document from any period records the details of an entire legion. 
5: Even the lower level of new units would have meant a very large 
increase in expenditure (and incidentally of officers). 
6: 500 X 325 = 162,500. 
7: Roger Tomlin, 'The Mobile Army' in Peter Connolly (ed. ) Gfeew. 
al7dRbme at War, London, 1981, page 254 estimates some 93 
mobile legions. 93 x 5,000 = 465,000. 
8: Between 94 and 109%. 
9: A similar point could be made about legionary vexillations. Duncan- 
Jones's smallest calculation is for a detachment (from the legion 11 
Traiana) of just over 77 men but this has not usually been taken to 
represent a norm. 
10: Although of course theplidiana tend to suggest the reverse: that 
cavalry were the priority arm and that more effort was made to keep 
them up to strength compared with the infantry 
II: Most detailed calculations (such as those of Jones and Vdrady) in fact 
allow for two establishments for legions with a larger one for 
limitanean units. The NoMa lists include only 41 such "frontier' 
legions. 
12: See above page 105. 
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13: Assuming the retention of a classical establishment of I legion = 10 
cohorts and 1 cohort =6 centuries (and ignoring any complications of 
the I st Cohort), then a legion of 1,000 men would have contained 
cohorts of 100 and centuries of 17. A legion only one-seventh the size 
of an Early Empire legion (about 700 men) would, on the same basis, 
have contained cohorts of 70 and centuries of 12. These are not easy 
figures to credit but it has been suggested [Peter Salway, 
Aels. comm. ] that Diocletian himself may have consciously retained 
the existing legionary structure within the new small legions to allow 
for the rapid absorption of recruits in time of crisis; such an intention 
need not imply that any such expansion ever took place. 
14: Of. Horace, Ars Rw&a: "laudatur temporis acti se puero. " 
15: Vegetius, Eoltomareimilitatis, 2,3. 
16: Agathias, 1he Histolies, Book 5,13,7. Translation from the edition 
by Joseph D. Frendo, Cbypus Fonffum Histoliae 4zan&nae Volume 
11A, Berlin, 1975, page 148. 
17: Ibid., Book 5,13,6. 
18: Libanius, OkatlbI7 47,31. Examples can be found quite easily of the 
spurious nature of paper strengths from the better documented 20th 
Century. For example, at the end of April 1945 (within a week of the 
end of hostilities) the German Army still fielded a theoretical total in 
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273, note 2. It also needs to be remembered that the Roman Army 
performed a whole series of non-military functions. They acted in 
effect as a sort of "highway patrol". The army had had for a long time 
a "civil service" function: they were used, for example, to collect taxes. 
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They served as the empire's customs service. They had a significant 
function as very often the only police force available for dealing with 
criminal activity. In many provinces they had a crucial r6le as an 
internal security arm: a turbulent region like Judaea, although it had 
no external frontier, housed a very large garrison including two 
legions and several thousand auxiliaries in order to suppress banditry 
and rebellion. The army continued to play a similar r6le in the Late 
Empire: in AD 387, for instance, troops from the field army command 
of the comes Olien&s were deployed to put down the "riot of the 
statues" in Antioch. The increased need for the police function of the 
army may help to explain its increasing fragmentation: ". .. the need 
to use the troops for internal security made it sensible to disperse 
them into smaller unite' (Averil Cameron, op. cit. [note 35], page 114). 
It is difficult to avoid the inference that, as the quantity and probably 
the quality of troops available to the government declined - especially 
in the West - so the breakdown of those civil functions of the armed 
forces contributed to the weakening of the whole Imperial structure. 
On the question of the army's non-military r6le, see especially Averil 
Cameron, op. cit. (note 35) and David Kennedy and Derrick 
Riley, Rvmeý; j9esertF1o-17he, -- Frvm, 0eAir, London, 1990. 
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It can be seen then that the evidence for unit sizes in the Late Roman Army 
is limited in quantity and less than conclusive in nature. The surviving 
literary material is restricted in quantity and contradictory in detail; the 
documentary evidence is not extensive and, although some of it can be 
interpreted as showing small unit numbers, it is difficult to quantify this 
reduction with certainty or safely to generalize from it: and, although there is 
archaeological evidence for both reduced and newly built small forts, some 
of the extrapolations calculated for garrison numbers are not soundly based. 
An assumption that many fourth and early fifth century units contained 
numbers of troops much fewer than their equivalents during the Principate 
seems nevertheless inescapable, if only because of the very much larger 
number of, for instance, legions that formed part of the Imperial Order of 
Baffle from the last years of the third century. Beyond that, however, little in 
the way of certainties exists - whether in terms of the size of Late Army units 
or of the possibility that different establishments co-existed. Caution is 
therefore essential before further implications are explored. 
The discovery of further documentary evidence relating to the subject is of 
course quite possible and the survival of a range of organic materials at 
Vindolanda suggests that the search for such materials need not be 
confined to traditionally productive areas such as Egypt. Archaeological 
work is even more likely to add to the evidence available on this subject: the 
kind of detailed excavations undertaken at El-Lejjun, for example, could 
usefully be carried out at other small Eastern sites as a basis for estimating 
the sizes of garrisons recorded by documentary or epigraphic sources, while 
there is also the possibility of studying changes in use of internal fort space. 
Data might, for instance, be acquired through a programme of geophysical 
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survey within Later Roman forts with computer analysis of spatial patterns. 
An examination of fort cemeteries with the possible use of DNA analysis 
might shed light on matters relating to the proportion of married soldiers and 
family accommodation, while further study of numismatic evidence might 
help to indicate fluctuations in wage totals and therefore unit sizes. 
This thesis has been concerned primarily with an examination of the 
evidence available at the moment for the question of Late Roman Army unit 
sizes. It has also considered and analysed earlier interpretation of this 
evidence and of generalisations derived from such interpretations. It is 
hoped that certain common misconceptions will have been exposed and 
perhaps undermined. The way should also have been opened up for others 
- particularly those working with different techniques - further to examine the 
issue. 
174 
Agathias, The Histolies. 
Leslie Alcock, Althurý; Slitain, London, 1971. 
G6za Alffildy, Nolibum, [tr. Anthony Birley], London and Boston, 1974. 
Lindsay Allason-Jones, Women in Roman Blitain, London, 1989. 
Ammianus Marcellinus, HIsIblies. 
, 
417glO-52WI7 CY7r017kYe. 
L Annde EpIgraphlque, Paris, 18 88 
S. Archer, 'Late Roman Gold and Silver Coin Hoards in Britain: A 
Gazetteer' in The Endo(Roman BIMW17 BAR British Series 7 1, Oxford, 
1979, pages 29-64. 
Arrian, rac§ba. 
Augustine, C; ýYo( God. 
N. J. E. Austin, Ammianas on Walfaln- An 1,? m-s&gaho,? into Ammianas' 
AklitatyKnoWedge, Collection Latomus Volume 165. Brussels. 1979. 
B. S. Bachrach, AfeloWngian A611taly Olganizabo,? 481-751, Minneapolis, 
1972. 
Philip Bartholomew, 'Fourth-Century Saxons' in Blitannia 15, London, 1984, 
pages 169-185. 
Bede, His fol ia , Ecclesias Aba . 
H. I. Bell, V. Martin, E. G. Turner and D. van Berchern [edd. ], 7beAbinnaeas 
-410 ý/ iV* PaWl S Of a ROInan C WIZ 7 && ReIgn Of 0 OnS tan & IS 
Oxford, 1962. 
Belll;? erglieoýlsche Zll*unden (AqM&scyýe 411*unden aus den Adnlgllbýen 
AfuseenzuEel§? ), Berlin, 1895, 
Martin Biddle, Foul&7 CenfiAyFables, the Fourth Graham Webster Lecture 
[unpublished], given at the University of Birmingham, 1987. 
175 
Paul T. Bidwell, 'Later Roman barracks in Britain' in V. A. Maxfield & M. J. 
Dobson [edd. ] Romal7Fron&erSludies 1989, Exeter, 1992, pages 
9-15. 
Paul T. Bidwell, 775e Roman Fcvtof 14117dolanda. - at 05esterbolm, 
Nolthumbelland, Historic Buildings and Monuments Commission 
for England Archaeological Report No. 1, London, 1985. 
Paul Bidwell and David Speak, 'South Shields' in OmentArchaeolog , Y, 
116 (August 1989), pages 283-287. 
A. R. Birley, 'The Economic Effects of Roman Frontier Policy' in Anthony 
King and Martin Henig [edd. ], 777e Roman Westin the 777ird Cel7khy. ' 
CO17b7b1&017S kom Aroýaeolbgval7dHistoly, BAR International 
Series 109 (i), Oxford, 1981, pages 39-53. 
Anthony R. Birley. 775& Fasti cfRbman, 6nbi17, Oxford, 1981. 
Anthony Birley, 777e People cIRo1na17,61#,! W17, London, 1979. 
A. R. Birley, 'Vindolanda: new writing tablets 1986-89' in V. A. Maxfield & 
MA Dobson [edd. ], Roman Firow&rStudies 1.989, Exeter, 1992, 
pages 16 ff.. 
Eric Birley, 'Alae and Cohortes Milliariae' in Cblolla memoriae Elibý 
S»v&da Dedicata, Römische Forschungen in Niederösterreich V, 
1966, pages 54-67. 
E Birley, 'Hadrian's Wall and its neighbourhood' in H. Schdnberger 
(ed. ), Stildien zu den MiliAirgremen Roms. - Vorb-äge des 8 
IntemaiYonalen Limeskongresses, K61n, 1967,6-14. 
Eric Birley, 'Local Militias in the Roman Empire' in Bonnel-Histblia- 
ALIgUsla-00110quium 197211.974, Bonn, 1976, pages 65-73, reprinted 
in Afawls 4, Roman Alm, ývResearcýes Volume 4, Amsterdam, 1988, 
pages 387-394. 
Eric Birley, 'Septimius Severus and the Roman Army' inEpiprapbisoýe 
StudN5,17 8 (1969). pages 63-82, reprinted in M. P. Speidel (ed. ), The 
176 
Roman Am? y. - Papen; 1929- 1986 = Ma w1s, - Roman A177y 
VolumeA Amsterdam, 1988, pages 21-40. 
Robin Birley, 'Vindolanda'in C1117&ntArc17aeo1qg 
,y 
116, London, August 
1989, pages 275-9. 
Robin Birley, 'Vindolanda' in C1117e17tArc17aec1qgy 128, London, March 
1992, pages 344-9. 
George C. Boon, Isca. - 777& Roman Leglonar- bt&ess at Caelleca, Mon., . yF 
Cardiff, 1972. 
Alan K. Bowman, L& andLeAels on &7e Roman Frontier, London, 1994. 
Alan K. Bowman, 'The military occupation of Upper Egypt in the reign of 
Diocletian', Bulle&n of &7& Amelh7an Sb&&? ý, oIPqpyro1qgists 15, 
1978, pages 25-38. 
Alan K. Bowman and J. David Thomas, 'A Military Strength Report From 
Vindoland& in IRS 81, London, 199 1, pages 15-26. 
David Breeze, 'Demand and Supply on the Northern Frontier' in Roger 
Miket and Colin Burgess [edd. ], BeA*m-n ai7d&ýpvndOe Walls. - 
Essays onOe Prel7istol 
. 
ý, and 1-kstoly ol1Vb1h5,617bi17 in Honour of 
George, lbbeX, Edinburgh, 1984, pages 264-286. 
David J. Breeze and Brian Dobson, 'Fort Types as a Guide to Garrisons: A 
Reconsideration' in Eric BirleY, Brian Dobson and Michael 
Jarreft, Roman FroniVer Studies 1969, Cardiff, 1974, pages 13-19. 
David J. Breeze and Brian Dobson, Hadlianý; Wall, London, 1976. 
David J. Breeze and Brian Dobson, 'Roman Military Deployment in North 
England' in Blitalmia 16, London, 1985, pages 1-19. 
Andrew Burnett, 'Clipped Siliquae and the end of Roman Britain' in, 6ManlMa 
15, London, 1984, pages 163-8. 
Caesar, de b ello Gallico. 
Averil Cameron, Me LaterRon7an Enpire AZ7284490, London, 1993. 
Brian Campbell, 'The Marriage of Soldiers under the Empire' in dRS 68, 
London, 1978, pages 153-166. 
177 
John Casey, 775e Legions in Me Laterfioman Empire. - 775e Foudh Annual 
O. aellbcwLec-la, re, Caerleon. 1991. 
P. J. Casey, 'The coins from the excavations at High Rochester in 1852 and 
1855' in Arcbaeoloqia Aeliana 5th Seies, Volume 8 (1980), pages 
75-87. 
P. J. Casey, 'The end of garrisons on Hadrian's Wall: an historico- 
environmental model' in 6ulle&n of &7& London L1kAv1s*1ksftfe of 
Arcl; aeolqg, ýv, 1993, pages 69-80. 
P. J. Casey, 'A Fifth Century Gallo-Roman Gold Coin from Piercebridge, 
County Durham' in DU115am Arc. 4acclogicaldbamal Volume 3,1987, 
pages 5-7. 
P. J. Casey, 'Magnus Maximus in Britain'in The EnalofRolnan BIMW17 BAR 
British Series 71, Oxford, 1979, pages 66-79. 
P. J. Casey, Roman Cainqqe in RIM2in, Aylesbury, 1980, 
P. J. Casey and J. L. Davies with J. Evans, Eycava&cns atSegvn&um 
jneMalfUn 
. 
)Roman Folt, 19,75-1979, CBA Report 90, London, 
1993. 
G. L. Cheesman, 775&AavýliaoltheRon7anllnpelialArlny, Oxford, 1914. 
Niketas Choniates, 001iyollýý§uln. 
Claudian, De hL-11b Ge§bo. 
Claudian, /97 Gildonem. 
Claudian, On the awsulshlp &S§libýo. 
R. G. Collingwood and R. P. Wright, 777e Roman 117scyip§ms ol&ilaý17, 
1nscyip§bnso17 Stone, Oxford, 1965. 
Constantius, Ma Gelm-anl* 
Chpus117sc7ip&b17z1mLa&na1z1m, Berlin, 1862-. 
Cyril of Scythopolis, Ma Sahae. 
C. Daniels 'Excavation at Wallsend and the fourth-century barracks on 
Hadrian's Wall'in W. S. Hanson and LAF. Keppie [edd. ]. TavM 
178 
Congress of Roman Frol7ber Studies, BAR S71, Oxford, 1980, pages 
173-193. 
K. R. Dark, 'A Sub-Roman Re-Defence of Hadrian's WallT in, 61itanl7ia 23, 
London, 1992, pages II 1- 120. 
Jeffrey L. Davies, 'Roman military deployment in Wales and the Marches 
from Pius to Theodosius' in Valerie A. Maxfield and Michael J. 
Dobson [edd. ], Roman FrunfierStudles 1989, Exeter, 1992, pages 
52-57. 
Jeffrey L. Davies, 'Soldiers, peasants and markets in Wales and the 
Marches' in T. F. C. Blagg and A. C. King [edd. ], NilitalyanolaWlial7ln 
Roman Elitain, BAR British Series 136, Oxford, 1984, pages 93-127. 
R. W. Davies, 'Cohortes Equitatae'in Histolia, Band 20, Wiesbaden, 1971. 
R. W. Davies, 'The Supply of Animals to the Roman Army and the Remount 
System', Latomus Tome 28, Brussels, 1969, pages 429-59. 
David P. Davison, 775elFarrac*s of MwRblnanAm7, ý, from Me Ist to 3rd 
Cew&liesAD, BAR International Series 472, Oxford, 1989. 
George T. Dennis [tr. ], 'The Anonymous Byzantine Treatise On Strategy' in 
mree 23ýý§We AfIlltavy Trea&ses. - DIV177barIO17 OakS TeAlts No. IX, 
Washington, D. C., 1985. 
H. Dessau, hsmip&mes La&nae Sele&ae, Berlin, 1892-1916. 
Geoff roy de Villehardouin, Conquestof Constan§nqple. 
Karen R. Dixon and Pat Southern, 777& RomaI7 Oapatw Flo-m the Fl? st to 
the ThiraCen&zyAD, London, 1992. 
Dr Brian Dobson, 'The Empire' in WalfareiwffieAnciel7tWblld, edited by 
General Sir John Hackett, London, 1989, pages 192-221. 
Michael H. Dodgeon and Samuel N. C. Lieu [edd. ], The Romal7EasteI77 
Frol 7 tier and the Persial 7 Wars AD 226 ý 363 -A Documen taly His th y, 
London and New York, 1991. 
179 
J. N. Dore and J. P. Gil I am, The RomanFolt at Sou&7SIMelbs. - Excavations 
1875-1,97.1-7, The Society of Antiquaries of Newcastle upon Tyne 
Monograph Series No. 1, Newcastle, 1979, 
R. P. Duncan-Jones, 'The Choenix, the Artaba and the Modius, ' Zeitsclwi& 
, ýrolqgi& undEpigraphik 
Band 21 (1976), Bonn, pages 43-52. A 7r Pap 
R. P. Duncan-Jones, 'Pay and Numbers in Diocletian's Army', Chllcl7, Band 
8 (1978). MOnchen, pages 541-60. A revised version was published 
as chapter 7 of Richard Duncan-Jones's Shvc&lle al7dScale i17 the 
Rolnan Ecunomy, Cambridge, 1990, pages 105-17. 
John R. Elting, rhe Sa&le &BulAerý; Hill, Monmouth Beach, New Jersey, 
1975. 
onaIdW. EngeIs, Alexal 7der the Grea t ano I the L oqls &s of the A-fac v dol Man 
Ann, v. Berkeley, 1978. 
EpheI77elisEpIgraphIca, Rome-Berlin, 1872, 
Simon Esmonde Cleary, 'Constantine I to Constantine III' in Malcolm Todd 
(ed. ), Researaý on Roman Eaak- 1.960-89, Britannia Monograph 
Series No. 11. London, 1989, pages 235-244. 
A. S. Esmonde Cleary, 775& E17d117g &Rolnaw B1#2W17, London, 1989. 
Eugippius, V11a Sevelini. 
Jeremy Evans, 'Settlement and Society in North England in the Fourth 
Century'in P. R. Wilson, R. F. J. Jones and D. M. Evans fedd. ], 
Settlemental&Sbciqý47 the Roman Nolth, Bradford, 1984, pages 
43-48. 
Robert 0. Fink, 'Hunt's Pridiavwlm: British Museum Papyrus 2851'in IRS 
48, London, 1958 pages 102-116. 
Robert 0. Fink. RbmaI7 AGMaly Aecords on Paoylzls (Philological 
Monographs of the American Philological Association No. 26), 
CAeveland, Ohio, 1971 [=RAfq. 
D. J. V. Fisher, 77ieAnglb-Saxon Age c. 400-1042, Harlow, 1973. 
R. I. Frank, 'Scholae Palatinae: The Palace Guards of the Later Roman 
180 
Empi re' in Papels and Monographs of Me Amenban Acadetnv in 
Rome 23 (1969), Rome. 
D. H. French and C. S. Lighffoot [edd. ], 7? 5&fast&mFrvnA&1sof&7& Roman 
Emplre, BAR International Series 553, Oxford, 1989. 
Sheppard Frere, Britannia, London, 1967. 
Nicholas Fuentes, 'Fresh thoughts on the Saxon Shore' in Valerie A. 
Maxfield and Michael J. Dobson [edd. ], Romal7Frovtler Studies 1989, 
Exeter, 1992 pages 58-64. 
Michael Fulford, 'The Economy of Roman Britain' in Malcolm Todd (ed. ), 
Resea=17 ov Romam6ritallz* 1.950-8.9, Britannia Monograph 
Series No. 11. London, 1989, pages 175-20 1. 
GiId as, De Fxcibilo Blitonuln - 
J. F. Gilliam, 'The Moesian "Pridianum... in Homagesd Albelt Grel7icr, 
Brussels, 1962, pages 747-756. 
R. Goodburn and P. Bartholomew, Aspe&s offfie Notitia Dignitatum, BAR 
Supplementary Series 15, Oxford, 1976. 
Pope Gregory 1, Episfulae. 
, 
ýynchzls Pqgý, London, B. P. Grenfell, A. S. Hunt et alia [edd. ], 777& OxjTh 
1898, 
Robert Grigg, 'Inconsistency and Lassitude: The Shield Emblems of the 
Notitia Dignitatum', lbumalclRoInaw Studles 73,1983, pages 132- 
142. 
W. S. Hanson and D. B. Campbell, 'The Brigantes: from Clientage to 
Conquest' in Britannia 17, London, 1986, pages 73-89. 
Mark Hassall, 'The Internal Planning of Roman Auxiliary Forts' in Brian 
Hartley and John Wacher, Rome andHel-Ncltl7em Arovil7ces, 
Gloucester, 1983, pages 96-131. 
Peter Heather and John Matthews, 777e Goths in the Foulth Omfilly, 
Translated Texts for Historians Volume 11, Liverpool, 1991. 
Nicholas Higham, Rome, Britain and the Anglo-Saxons, London, 1992. 
181 
Nicholas Hodgson, 'The Notitia Dignitaturn and the later Roman garrison of 
Britain' in Valerie A. Maxfield and Michael J. Dobson, Roman Flnoflel- 
Studies 1989 - P1VCV6d117gS 0, (&2e XVW7 1171e177a§017,31 C017gleSS Of 
Roman Flow&er Studies, Exeter, 19 9 1, pages 84-92. 
yslwer and die Notitia Dietrich Hoffmann, Das 
, 01gl7l1atilln, Epigraphische Studien Band 7/1, DUsseldorf, 1969. 
Dietrich Hoffmann, 'Die spdtrbmischen Soldatengrabschriften von 
Concordia' in Afusealn HeA-e&wIn 20 (1963), Basle/Stuttgart. 
P. A. Holder, The RolnanAlmyinglitaim London, 1982. 
Paul A. Ho I der, Studies in &7e Auxi I ia o1&; eRb1na17A17nýv11vm Augustus to 
rla-lon, BAR International Series 70, Oxford, 1980. 
Horace, Als PILwAca. 
A. S. Hunt and C. C. Edgar [edd. ], Sele&Papyn, London, 1963. 
"Hyginus7, o1emeta#bnecas&o1z1m. 
Ann Hyland, Equils. - 777e Holne, in &7& Roman WbIld, London, 1990. 
The International Institute for Strategic Studies, The MilitalyBalancL-. 
1.993-1.9.94, London, 1993. 
Benjamin Isaac, 775& Limlts ol5npiln- The Roman ArmýYiI7 &7e EaSt, 
Oxford, revised edition, 1992. 
Benjamin Isaac, 'The Meaning of The Terms Limes and Limitanee' in JRS., 
78, London, 1988, pages 125-147. 
Simon James, Britain and the Late Roman Army'in T. F. C. Blagg and A. C. 
King [edd. ], Miliblyanal OWlian in Roman Blitain, BAR British Series 
136, Oxford, 1984, Chapter 7 (pages 161-186). 
St. Jerome, confla lohannem Hicrosql, ý, mitanum ep1scopuln. 
Stephen Johnson, Hadlianý; Wall, London, 1989. 
Stephen Johnson, Latel-Roman Blitain, London, 1980. 
Stephen Johnson, 777e Roman Folts ofthe S: ffxon S15ore, London, 1976. 
A. H. M. Jones, The De&ine oftheAnaient Warlol, London, 1966. 
182 
A. H. M. Jones, 77 ýe La ter Roman Empire 284- 602. -A Soo ý W, Ec vl 7cm4c and 
Administra&wSumey, Oxford, 1964. 
A. H. M. Jones. JR Martindale and J. Morris [edd. ], Plosopoglaphyof ffie 
LaterRolnan Enplle Volume 1, Cambridge, 1971. 
Barri Jones & David Mattingly, A17 Atlas ofRomaI7 SIMW17, London, 199 0. 
R. F. J. Jones, 'Change on the Frontier: Northern Britain in the Third 
Century' in Anthony King and Martin Henig [edd. ], 77wRoman West 
in the 77711d- Ce'VIZ11Y. ' Cý717#0ZI11017SOom Alchaeologv anal Hisfoly, 
BAR International Series 109 (i). Oxford, 1981, pages 393-414. 
Jo rd an es, 777c Gothic Histbly. 
Josephus, Bellum ludaicul n- 
JuIian, L etter to the A &7enlans. 
David Kennedy, 'The Composition of a Military Work Party in Roman Egypt 
(ILS2483: Coptos)'in TheloumalolEgyotianAlchaeology 71, 
1985, pages 156-160. 
David Kennedy, 'The East' in John Wacher (ed. ), The Roman WbIld, 
London, 1987, pages 266-300., 
David Kennedy, 'Milliary Cohorts: - The Evidence of Josephus, BJ 111,4,2 
, ýrolqgie undEblgrachik, 
(67) and of Epigraphy' in ZMsoW&A7rPaq 
Band 50, Bonn, 1983, pages 253-263. 
David Kennedy and Derrick Riley, 17om&2; Z? &s&1tFIo-17Aer- Flom theAhr 
London. 1990. 
J. P. C. Kent, 'Coin evidence for the abandonment of a frontier province' in 
Erich Swoboda [ed. ], OwnumV17a, Graz, 1956, pages 85-90. 
J. P. C. Kent, 'The end of Roman Britain: The Literary and Numismatic 
Evidence Reviewed' in P. J. Casey (ed. ), 775& EndofRoman ZN1,21n, 
BAR British Series 71, Oxford, 1979, pages 15-27. 
Lawrence Keppie, 777& Afaklng olthe RomaI7 A17nX. - Flum RepublIc to 
Empire, London, 1984. 
183 
Anthony King and Martin Henig [edd. ], 777& RomaI7 WestiI7 the Third 
Oewltlly. - Col7Hbzt§ol7slroinArchaeologpal7dHIstoly, BAR 
International Series 109 (i). Oxford, 1981. 
CA Kraemer, Jr., 'Non-literary Papyri' in Excava&bns atNessana, conducted 
b, vHD. Colt, lr Vol. 3. Princeton, 1958. 
[Lucius Caecilius Firmianus] Lactantius, ZýL- AfonYbas Pelsewfonlin, edited 
and translated by J. L. Creed, Oxford, 1984. 
Michael Lapidge, 'Gildas's Education and the Latin Culture of Sub- 
Roman Britain' in Michael Lapidge and David Dumville [edd. ], Gildas: 
Ne w Approaa ý&s to Studies // 7 CeNc HIs loly V, Woodbridge, 19 8 4, 
pages 27-50. 
Yann le Bohec, 777e ImpelialRomaw Armýy, London, 1994 [originally 
published as L ArmAw Romaine sous /, - Haut-Elnpim, 1989]. 
Naphtali Lewis and Meyer Reinhold [edd. ], Roman OWliza&17 SozIro. -bwAr 
//- 775& Empire, New York, 1955. 
Ubanius, Ora&bnes. 
J. H. G. W. Liebeschuetz, Balbadans andBishops. - Am? y, C)5u/ZA andstate 
in the Age OfArmdius and CYioýsýloln, Oxf o rd, 19 9 0. 
J. H. G. W. Liebeschuetz, 'Generals, Federates and Bucellarii in Roman 
Armies Around AD 400'in Philip Freeman and David Kennedy [edd. ], 
77; e ZýL'IMCV Of the ROMan andgjý'ZanfflW EaSt- RlMeedingS 01a 
C b1loquItlin held a t&e Z // 71 ie v/ Nli6 I ol Shelflelb I il 7 Apl 1Y 1986, BAR 
International Series 297, Oxford, 1986, pages 463-474, reprinted in 
Floln, OiOOMW to the Arab C017quest, CY7anqe i17 the Late RoInan 
Em, clre, Aldershot, 1990 (19). 
Wolfgang Liebeschuetz, 'The end of the Roman army in the western ei i ipire' 
in John Rich and Graham Shipley [edd. ], Wara17dSbcieA-in Me 
Romaw World, Leicester-Nottingharn Studies in Ancient 
Society Volume 5, London, 1993, pages 265-276. 
Livy, Ab urZw co17dita. 
184 
John Ly dus, De Magis fira fibus (0/ 7 Po wers ). 
John Lydus, Debfenslbus. 
Ramsay MacMullen. 'How Big was the Roman Imperial Army)', K11b, Band 
62 (1980), Berlin, pages 451-460. 
Ramsay Mac Mu II en, Soldier and aWllan in the Later Roman Emplre, 
Cambridge, Mass., 1963. 
John Malalas, Chrol7ograpl7ialWorldCI71ol7icl&)F 
J. C. Mann, 'Birdoswald to Ravenglass', Blifamia 20, London, 1989, pages 
75-9. 
J. C. Mann, 'The historical development of the Saxon Shore' in Valerie A. 
Maxfield (ed. ), 7he Saxon S15one. - A Handbook, Exeter Studies in 
History No. 25, Exeter, 1989. 
J. C. Mann, Legibnalyheovi&nentand Veteran Seftmeotdilring the 
Plilx*wte, Insitute of Archaeology Occasional Publications No. 7, 
London, 1983. 
J. C. Mann, 'Power, Force and the Frontiers of the Empire' inJR. S, 69, 
London, 1979, pages 175-183. 
Robert Marichal, 'Les Ostraca de Bu Njem' in Comptes Rcndus d, - 
Mcademie des 117scyipffons & Belles-Let&es , 1979. pages 436-452. 
.y of 
the Later RoInaw Elnplhe Vo Iume2, J. R. Martindale (ed. ), Prosopogm-ph 
Cambridge, 1980. 
J. Masp6ro, CaWbgu&gd17d1a1e des antiquitds dyýp&ennes duAfusde de 
Caire, -Pap, ýmsgrecsd2$wqueb,? kzan&17e. Cairo, 1911-16. 
Valerie A. Maxfield and Michael J. Dobson [edd. ], Roman F1-vn&erStvvk-s 
1989' PfOCMdingS Of ffie "&7 1nt&Ma&Ona1 Cbnqr6W Of ROMa17 
Fronlli? rSladles, Exeter, 1991. 
Mike McCarthy, Ian Caruana and Graham KeeVill, 'Carlisle' in 0117evt 
Archaeology 116 (August 1989), pages 298-302. 
E. Nischer, 'The Army Reforms of Diocletian and Constantine and their 
185 
modifications up to the time of the Notitia Dignitaturn' in IRS. 13, 
London, 1923. 
Orosius, Histolia co17&apqganos. 
H. M. D. Parker, 'The Legions of Diocletian and Constantine' inI. R. S. 23, 
London, 1933, pages 175-189. 
S. Thomas Parker, 'New Light on the Roman Frontier in Arabia' in H Vetters 
&M Kandler [edd], AlMen des 14 1nfe1na§bnaveo Litneskongnesses 
1986in 0amuntum, Teil 1, Wien, 1990, pages 215-230. 
S. Thomas Parker (ed. ), 'The Roman Frontier in Central Jordan: Interim 
Report on the Limes Arabibus Project, 1980-1985' in BAR 
International Series 340. Oxford, 1987. 
Pliny, Leffels, 
A Poidebard, La trace oel Rome oaas /e ddselfole S ., kne. 
1934. 
A. Poidebard and R Mouterde, Le Llmes de CY7akYs, 1945. 
Polybius, Histolies. 
Procopius, AedlAb a. 
Procopius, Aneadbia. 
Procopius, Bellum Gothicxom. 
Procopius, De &-Ilb Pelsibo. 
Procopius, VanoaflWar. 
John Rich and Graham Shipley [edd. ], Waranaf5nýe4lin the Roman 
World, Leicester-Nottingham Studies in Ancient Society Volume 5, 
London. 1993. 
I. A. Richmond, 'Roman Britain and Roman Military Antiquities' in 
Ploceedings ofthe Aglftfi Academy, 1955, pages 297-315. 
A. L. F. R ivet an d Co IinSm ith, The PlacvLNames o1Rvmw7 bl? iWn, Lo n dcj n, 
1979. 
Margaret Roxan, 'Pre-Severan Auxilia Named in the Notitia Dignitaturn' in R. 
Goodburn and P. Bartholomew [edd. ], Aspects ofthe Nofftia 
Dignitatum BAR Supplementary Series 15, Oxford, 1976. 
186 
Margaret Roxan, 'Women on the Frontiers' in Valerie A. Maxfield and 
Michael J. Dobson, Rom-aI7 FmlAer Studies 1989- jq1Oc&edi17gs Olg7e 
Xvtl7 Intemational Congress olRoman Frontier Studies, Exeter, 
1991, pages 462-7. 
Peter Salway, Roman Blitain, The Oxford History of England IA. Oxford, 
1981. 
Histol? ýJe Augustae. 
C Scorpan, Limes Scythiae. - TopWIapl7icalands&atiglapl7icallesearcy5 on 
&7e late Roman lotth7cations on the LowvrDanube, BAR International 
Series 88, Oxford, 1980. 
0ttoSeeck[ed. ], No Ma Dignita A Im (oInniuln, taln a Wiuln qualn Inilita t iul n, 
// 7 pal fibi Is OM&I 7 ks et // 7pw Ous C 1,; r idel 7 &s) acc v& // 7t No Ma Z // i ýis 
Constal7iVnopolital7a&ProWnaýaraln, Berlin, 1876 [= 
ýPrclbgie and J. C. Shelton, 'Two notes on the artab' in ZMsoW&fz7rPap, 
Epigraph* Band 42 (1981), Bonn, pages 99-106. 
T. C. Skeat (ed. ), P4qwihioln Panocolis-' In The ChesterBeaWLAMWY 
Dublim Chester Beatty Monographs No. 10. Dublin, 1964. 
C. Sebastian Sommer, 775e AGM, 29e V1b, *h7 Rolnan&ilain. - Aspcyys olthelr 
Origins, Oeir Loca&bns andLawut, Adminis&aMon, Func§bn and 
End, BAR British Series 129, Oxford, 1984. 
P. Southern, in'The Numeri of the Roman Imperial Army'. Blitalwia 20, 
London, 1989, pages 81-140. 
M. Speidel, 'The Pay of the AuxilW in IRS 63, London. 1973, pages 141 - 
147, reprinted in M. Speidel, RoInan AIMýv Stuoilm Amsterdam, 
1984, pages 83-89. 
M. Speidel, 'The Roman Army In Arabia' in Aulsteiguno'Medelgal7goefr 
rdmisoý&7 Welt Sellin, 11,8 (1977), pages 687-730 [reprinted as M. 
Speidel, Roman Army Studies Volume 1, Amsterdam, 1984, pages 
229-2721, pages 727-8 = 269-70. 
M. Alexander Speidel, 'Roman Army Pay Scales' in JRS 82, London, 1992, 
187 
pages 87-106. 
M. P. Speidel, 'The So! diers' Servants' in Valerie A. Maxfield and Michael J. 
Dobson, Roman Ffol&el- Studies 1989- Plvceedil7gs ofthe XVtb 
117tell7allonalCol7g, ressolRomal7FI-ol7&el-Studles, Exeter, 1991, 
page 477. 
K. Strobel, 1-117telsuchungel7zudel7Dakelkn&gel7 r1alans, Bonn, 1984. 
Ronald Syme, 'The Lower Danube under Trajan'in, /RS 49, London. pages 
26-33. 
Synesius, Constitu&b. 
Synesius, Le&els. 
Synesius, De Regno, 
Taditus, Histoliae. 
Arnold Taylor, Hallboý Castle, Cardiff, 1988. 
Themistius, Olatons. 
Codex of 77ýecdosizls. 
Theophylact Simocatta, (Uniw1sa# Histblýv, translated with introduction and 
notes as 777e History of 777eqoh. Wact Simocatta by Michael & Mary 
Whitby, Oxford, 1986. 
J. D. Thomas and R. W. Davies, 'A New Military Strength Report on Papyrus' 
in IRS 67, London, 1977, pages 50-6 1. 
J. 0. Tidder, Oie nibý&Meraiso5en lateihisaýen Papj, 7ilfaliens aus derZeit 
44,5-700, Lund, 1955. 
Malcolm Todd [ed. ], Rese-arzY7 on RoInan Blitaih- 1960-8.9, Britannia 
Monograph Series No. 11, London, 1989. 
Malcolm Todd, Roman 271itain 558C- AD400, Glasgow, 1981. 
Roger Tomlin, 'The Army of the Late Empire' in John Wacher [ed. ], 7ho 
Roman Korld, London, 1987, pages 107-120. 
Roger Tomlin, 'The Late-Roman Empire' in General Sir John Hackett 
(ed. ), Walfam in the Andent World, London, 1989. 
188 
Roger Tomlin, 'The Mobile Army' in Peter Connolly (ed. ) Greecv al7of 
Rome at War, London, 198 1, pages 249-259. 
Roger Tomlin, 'S&17ibles-lunibres in the Late-Roman Field Army', Am, -1jca17 
dommalolPhIlblogy Vol. 93,2,1972, pages 253-278. 
J. M. C. Toynbee, A17imals In Roman Lffe andAlt London, 1973. 
L. Vdrady, 'New Evidences on Some Problems of the Late Roman Military 
Organisation', A&aAI7&quaAcademla&S; ýien&alizlmHL117galica, - 
Tomus 9, Budapest, 1961, pages 333-96. 
Vegetius, Epitomareimilitatis. 
Velleius (Paterculus), Histolia Romana. 
A. von Domaszewski, Dliý- Ral7gordvul7g des rdlniscbes Heeres, Cologne, 
1967. 
G. R. Watson, 775v Roman Soldier, London, 1969. 
Colin M. Wells, 'Where Did They Put the Horses? Cavalry Stables in the 
ar1yEmpire, ' Z imes. -A kte des XI In te/ 7 7a #ol 7alen 1-, imeslcol 7g, ress es, 
Budapest, 1977, pages 659-65. 
C. B. Welles, R. O. Fink and J. F. Gilliam, 775&Excava&bnsaIDura-Evropos. - 
517alRepod V, Pad Z 777e Paroýmmts andPqepii, New Haven, 
1959. 
C. Wesse1y, Stz Idiel 7 zur Palaeogne e ohie ul 7d Papyruskul 7de, Leipzig, 19 01-. 
Dick Whittaker, 'Landlords and warlords in the later Roman Empire' in John 
Rich and Graham Shipley [edd. ], AarandSbcie#417 6e Roman 
Woll-d. Leicester-Nottingham Studies in Ancient Society Volume 5. 
London, 1993, pages 277-302. 
J. J. Wilkes, 'Early fourth century rebuilding in Hadrian's Wall forts' in M. G. 
Jarreft and B. Dobson [eclcl. ], Rlitain ano'Rome, Kendal, 1966, pages 
114-138. 
Stephen Williams, DioclMan andffie Roman Rewvely, London, 1985. 
Tony Wilmoft, 'Birdoswald' in CýIlTel#Archaeolqqy 112 (December 1988) 
page 158, and 116 (August 1989) pages 288-29 1. 
189 
G. Zereteli, 0. Krueger and P. Jernstedt, Papyrilussiscl7ol-i1ndor 
Sammlangen, Tiflis, 192-5-35. 
Zo simus. Nea Histolia. 
Constantine Zuckerman, 'Legib VAfacedbnlca in Egypt: CPL 199 
Revisited', ;, 5c)f7e, 3 (1 c, 88), pages 279-87. 
190 
